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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
In retrospect, my PhD-proposal paid only cursory attention to artisanal and small-scale 
mining (ASM), and focused more broadly on the nexus between (large-scale) mining, 
development, and armed conflict in Mindanao. This more general research focus was 
inspired in large part by the near-complete lack of prior (academic) research on mining in 
Mindanao. When starting my explorative research in early 2012, I was surprised to 
discover that in large parts of the island, the presence of large-scale mining was very 
limited. Instead, it was ASM-operators that dominated the scene, and had done so for 
several decades. Nowhere was this observation more apparent than in Compostela Valley 
province, the epicenter of ASM in the Philippines. It was here that in the early 1980s, the 
most (in)famous gold rush in Philippine history unfolded. At one time, the Diwalwal area 
(which is depicted on the front cover) in the uplands of Monkayo municipality was 
allegedly home to over 100000 miners from all walks of life. It was here that ‘artisanal and 
small-scale’ mining evolved into something qualitatively different, described by many 
respondents as ‘medium-scale mining’. It was also here that some of today’s mining 
bigwigs were made and unmade, with self-made millionaire and one-time barangay 
captain Babylona allegedly throwing money out of a helicopter as a campaign stunt. The 
Diwalwal situation was further complicated by the presence of a range of armed actors 
that had emerged in the vacuum left behind by the decaying regime of Ferdinand Marcos, 
the long-time dictator of the country. As different mining groups and their armed goons 
started clashing over Diwalwal’s rich underground ore bodies, Diwalwal soon earned itself 
a reputation as the “wild, wild west of the Philippines”. It is this Diwalwal gold rush, the 
romanticized stories of paupers-turned- millionaires and of anarchy and violence, that still 
dominates the popular imagery about small-scale gold mining in Mindanao.  
Partly in an effort to qualify these simplistic and romanticized images of ASM, I ventured 
where no academic had gone before –in many cases literally. While this frontier character 
of my research confronted me with a range of practical and methodological challenges, it 
was also a blessing in disguise. For example, in none of the areas included in my research 
did I encounter the kind of “research fatigue” one may encounter in ASM-areas in, say, 
Tanzania. Instead people were extremely curious to find out what I was doing, although 
this did not always translate into a willingness to actually take part in my research. The 
fact that I was (by my knowledge) the only academic doing sustained research on ASM in 
Mindanao also made it slightly easier to attract my peers’ attention. Finally, I soon 
realized that the ASM-phenomenon was indicative of wider processes of socio-economic- 
and political transformation. The contrast between the laid-back and quiet countryside life 
in Compostela Valley and its bustling and noisy gold rush areas could not be bigger.  
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This PhD-thesis is based on a series of peer-reviewed articles, four of which have been 
published (chapters 3, 5, 6 and 8), one that has been accepted for publication (chapter 4), 
and one that is currently undergoing review (chapter 7). Clearly, at least in Belgium, 
publishing in international, peer-reviewed and preferably Web of Science ranked journals 
is of paramount importance if one has any post-doctoral academic ambitions. However, 
my choice for an article-based PhD was also informed by several other considerations. For 
one, in addition to academic conferences, journal publications are one of the most 
effective ways to leave an imprint on academic debates. I am also strongly convinced that 
a publication-based PhD need not be detrimental for its internal consistency. On the 
contrary, it compelled me to situate my empirical findings in different academic debates, 
which in turn enabled a more holistic understanding of the ASM-phenomenon. In addition, 
as will hopefully become clear troughout, I made considerable efforts to ensure the 
narrative flow of my dissertation, and the mutual interconnectedness of my different 
arguments. 
Finally, I would like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to all the people that have 
made this research project possible. First and foremost, Totong, for being my host, 
interpreter, ‘fixer’, guide, and friend. His mother and the rest of his family, for giving me a 
taste of Philippine hospitality, and for the beer and darts nights, which were essential for 
boosting my morale during the long months away from family and friends. Malou, for 
being my personal mentor in understanding the ins and outs of Philippine politics, both its 
bright and dark sides, and for being an inspiration to what must now be tens of thousands 
of people. Amiat and Gin, for accompanying me on my numerous side-trips, and for 
helping me unwind. Bon, for helping me to reach out to the rest of the Philippine ASM-
community, assisting me with my field trips, and for being an indispensable source of 
expertise. I truly hope we can continue our collaboration in the future, undermining many 
of the myths that exist about the ASM-sector. 
Closer to home, I owe my gratitude to Koen, my supervisor, for putting his trust in me, 
and for providing me with the space necessary to independently develop my academic 
skills. To my colleagues at Conflict Research Group, for being a source of inspiration and 
academic expertise. Jeroen in particular, thanks for accompanying me to more and less 
inspiring places in the Philippines and beyond, and for listening to my frustrations as an 
early-career researcher. Finally, a word of thanks goes out to my friends and family. The 
magnificent seven, for being an inexhaustible source of non-conformist laughter, and for 
helping me to get away from it all. And last but not least I owe my gratitude to Katleen, 
for being an antidote to my cynicism, for putting up with my mood swings, and for giving 
me the most wonderful gift of all.   
 
Antwerp, March 9, 2015. 
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DUTCH SUMMARY / 
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
Deze doctoraatsscriptie tracht tot een beter begrip te komen van het fenomeen van de 
artisanale en kleinschalige goudmijnbouw in de provincie Compostela Valley, op het zuid-
Filipijnse eiland Mindanao. Doorheen de voorbije decennia heeft de sector een 
spectaculaire groei doorgemaakt, en vandaag wordt hij gekenmerkt door het bestaan van 
talrijke mijnbouwoperaties welke reeds lang het niveau van de kleinschalige mijnbouw 
hebben overstegen, met een graad van mechanisatie en een productiecapaciteit die 
artisanale en kleinschalige mijnbouwoperaties in andere landen (en andere regio’s binnen 
de Filipijnen) in het niets doen vervagen. Ondanks dit alles opereert het overgrote 
merendeel van deze operaties op informele wijze, zonder de noodzakelijke vergunningen 
van de nationale overheid. 
Mijn onderzoek werd opgehangen rond drie meer algemene onderzoeksvragen. Ten eerste: 
wat verklaart de immense groei van de kleinschalige goudmijnbouw in Compostela 
Valley, en het toegenomen belang van meer geavanceerde mijnbouwoperaties? Ten 
tweede: wat verklaart het voortbestaan van informaliteit, impliceert dit een totaalgebrek 
aan bestuurlijke orde en zo nee, wat is de bestuurlijke realiteit in de sector? Ten derde: wie 
wint en wie verliest bij de huidige (bestuurlijke) realiteiten in de kleinschalige mijnbouw?  
Door een quasi totaalgebrek aan bestaand onderzoek was ik in eerste instantie aangewezen 
op het vergaren van primaire veldwerkdata. Gegeven het bestaan van een reeks 
methodologische uitdagingen, waaronder een hoge graad van informaliteit en de 
aanwezigheid van gewapende actoren, heb ik bewust geopteerd voor een combinatie van 
meer flexibele kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden, waaronder semi-gestructureerde 
interviews en zogenaamde oral histories, welke trachten om (bepaalde aspecten van) 
individuele levensverhalen te relateren aan bredere processen van politiek-economische 
transformatie –in dit geval de expansie van de kleinschalige mijnbouw. 
Hoofdstuk 1 en 2 dienen gelezen te worden als inleidende hoofdstukken. In hoofdstuk 1 
presenteer ik een inleiding tot het de kleinschalige mijnbouw in de Filipijnen en in 
Compostela Valley, en introduceer ik mijn onderzoeksvragen en methodologische keuzes. 
In hoofdstuk 2 situeer ik mijn doctoraatsscriptie binnen bredere academische debatten, 
waaronder deze omtrent de kleinschalige mijnbouw, maar ook omtrent de informele sector 
en de zogenaamde ‘antropologie van de staat’. 
De resterende hoofdstukken zijn herwerkte versies van artikels welke eerder gepubliceerd 
werden (hoofdstuk 3, 5, 6 en 8), aanvaard zijn voor publicatie (hoofdstuk 4) of zich op dit 
moment in het reviewproces bevinden (hoofdstuk 7). In hoofdstuk 3 en 4 presenteer ik een 
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kritische analyse van de diverse factoren welke de immense groei van de kleinschalige 
goudmijnbouw in Compostela Valley als een grotendeels informele activiteit, mogelijk 
hebben gemaakt. Hoofdstuk 3 nuanceert bestaande theorieën over kleinschalige mijnbouw 
als een overlevingsactiviteit die beoefent wordt door arme individuen, door ook de 
aandacht te vestigen op de toegenomen financiële betrokkenheid van een groep van elite-
actoren die in de eerste plaats geïnteresseerd zijn in kapitaalsaccumulatie. Het is de 
betrokkenheid van deze spelers welke de opkomst van meer geavanceerde 
mijnbouwoperaties heeft mogelijk gemaakt.  
In hoofdstuk 4 tracht ik een verklaring te bieden voor hardnekkige informaliteit in de 
sector, door bestaande debatten omtrent de informele sector te consulteren. Er wordt 
geargumenteerd dat deze informaliteit niet louter een kwestie is van te hoge fiscale en 
bureaucratische kosten in de formele sector, of van het doelbewust uitsluiten van 
kleinschalige mijnbouwers door de overheid en de grootschalige mijnbouw, maar dat ze 
ook een reflectie is van een bepaalde logica van accumulatie. Meer bepaald zal worden 
aangetoond dat de massale groei van kleinschalige mijnbouw ook gezien kan worden als 
het resultaat van een crisis in de kapitaalintensieve grootschalige mijnbouw, welke een 
transitie teweegbracht naar meer flexibele kleinschalige mijnbouwactiviteiten, waarbij 
accumulatie berust op de uitbuiting van een goedkoop en informeel arbeidsreserve.   
De resterende hoofdstukken hebben vooral betrekking op de tweede onderzoeksvraag naar 
de bestuurlijke realiteiten in de sector. In hoofdstuk 5 tracht ik de vraag te beantwoorden 
naar de relatie tussen de immense informele mijnbouwsector in Compostela Valley en de 
Filipijnse staat. In tegenstelling tot wat vaak intuïtief verondersteld wordt, is de informele 
mijnbouw niet nefast voor de draagkracht van de Filipijnse staat. Integendeel, de expansie 
van kleinschalige goudmijnbouw in Compostela Valley is paradoxaal genoeg hand in hand 
gegaan met een consolidatie van de lokale staat, met lokale politici die zich zijn gaan 
inzetten voor een bestuurlijke stabilisering van de zogenaamd ‘informele’ goudmijnbouw. 
Waar lokale politici profiteren van de aanwezigheid van informele mijnbouw als een bron 
van fiscale inkomsten en van politieke legitimiteit, is deze bestuurlijke configuratie ook 
voordelig voor een heel scala aan andere actoren die inkomen vergaren uit kleinschalige 
mijnbouwactiviteiten. Tevens wordt beargumenteerd dat de centrale rol van lokale politici 
in de informele mijnbouw dient gezien te worden als de uitkomst van een historisch 
gegroeid elitepact tussen nationale elites en lokale politici, waarbij de laatsten een hoge 
mate van autonomie genieten binnen de lokale politieke economie, in ruil voor hun rol als 
vertegenwoordigers- en indien nodig verdedigers van de statelijke orde. 
Hoofdstuk 6 focust op de positie van (informele) landeigenaars, en hun relatie met de 
kleinschalige mijnbouw, door middel van een comparatieve analyse van Compostela 
Valley, Oost-Congo en Liberia. In tegenstelling tot een intuïtief verondersteld 
antagonisme, blijkt uit onze analyse dat er een hoge mate van wederkerigheid bestaat 
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tussen beide partijen, welke vaak aanleiding geeft tot min of meer geïnstitutionaliseerde 
systemen voor inkomensverdeling. Ondanks het informele karakter van deze 
arrangementen, wordt te pas en te onpas gerefereerd naar legaliteit en naar ‘de staat’ om 
deze arrangementen te legitimeren.  
In hoofdstuk 7 verschuift de focus naar de positie van gewapende actoren, en meer 
bepaald naar de relatie tussen rebellen en de lokale staat. Door middel van een 
comparatieve analyse van Compostela Valley en North Cotabato (2 provincies met een 
sterke aanwezigheid van respectievelijk communistische- en Moslimrebellen) zal worden 
aangetoond dat ook de grens tussen lokale rebellen- en statelijke structuren eerder fluïde 
is. In het specifieke geval van Compostela Valley zijn communistische rebellen van het 
New People’s Army een integraal onderdeel geworden van de politiek-militair-
commerciële netwerken die de kleinschalige mijnbouw controleren, en waarbinnen lokale 
politici een steeds belangrijkere rol zijn gaan vervullen. Om deze situatie te verklaren 
wordt verwezen naar (1) het toegenomen belang (vooral sinds decentralisatie) van de 
lokale staat als een accumulatie- en legitimatiestructuur; en (2) het belang van sociale 
relaties, en dan vooral familiebanden, in het overbruggen van het onderscheid tussen 
statelijke- en rebellenstructuren. 
In hoofdstuk 8 worden deze lokale bestuurlijke arrangementen, welke gebouwd zijn rond 
de kleinschalige mijnbouw, gesitueerd binnen de bredere bestuurlijke realiteit binnen de 
Filipijnse mijnbouwsector. Er zal worden aangetoond dat verschillende pogingen om de 
bestuurlijke controle over minerale rijkdommen te decentraliseren hebben geleid tot een 
hoge mate van institutionele ambiguïteit, en onduidelijkheid omtrent wie de autoriteit 
heeft om de toegang tot minerale rijkdommen te sanctioneren. Binnen deze 
gefragmenteerde institutionele realiteit proberen verschillende actoren en actorgroepen 
zich nu te positioneren om hun controle over minerale rijkdommen te maximaliseren. De 
eerder beschreven coalities tussen lokale politici, kleinschalige mijnbouwoperatoren, 
landeigenaars en gewapende actoren zijn hiervan een uitdrukking. Deze complexe 
institutionele realiteit geeft aanleiding tot een reeks van (soms gewapende) conflicten over 
toegang tot minerale rijkdommen, waarbij althans in Compostela Valley de tegenstelling 
tussen kleinschalige en grootschalige mijnbouw het strijdtoneel bij uitstek is. En hoewel 
deze institutionele contestatie mogelijkheden biedt voor emancipatie, door het hervormen 
van bestaande verdelingsmechanismen, is er ook een hoog risico voor elite capture door 
lokale politici. 
Tenslotte breng ik in hoofdstuk 9 mijn verschillende argumenten samen in een ‘master 
narrative’ over de kleinschalige mijnbouw in Compostela Valley. Het centrale argument 
dat doorheen deze doctoraatsscriptie loopt is dat de immense groei en transformatie van de 
kleinschalige goudmijnbouw, als een product van de informalisering van de 
mijnbouwsector in haar geheel, hand in hand is gegaan met de opkomst van een 
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bestuurlijke orde die gericht is op het voortbestaan en zelfs de verdere expansie van de 
kleinschalige goudmijnbouw. De gevestigde belangen binnen deze bestuurlijke orde, 
welke in essentie focust op een minimalistische erkenning van informele land- en 
mijnbouwrechten, bevinden zich in een heterogene coalitie van lokale politici, 
mijnbouwfinanciers, lokale landeigenaars, en gewapende actoren, voor wie de 
kleinschalige goudmijnbouw een cruciale bron van inkomsten is.  Tegelijk wordt gewezen 
op het bestaan van een immens informeel arbeidsreserve dat weliswaar afhankelijk is van 
de sector voor haar inkomen, maar zich tegelijk in een zeer kwetsbare positie bevindt, en 
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
This introductory chapter has three central objectives. First I will present some preliminary 
observations about artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in the Philippines, with special 
attention for Compostela Valley province, the geographical focus of this PhD-thesis. 
Based on these preliminary observations, I will then outline the three overarching (sets of) 
research questions that have guided my research. Finally, I elaborate on some of the 
methodological challenges associated with doing research on ASM, and how I have opted 
to deal with these challenges. 
ASM IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE 
COMPOSTELA VALLEY GOLD RUSH 
In recent decades ASM has witnessed a spectacular expansion worldwide, with current 
estimates putting the number of people engaged in what is commonly defined as “labour-
intensive, low-tech mineral exploration and processing” (Hilson, 2011, 1032) at 20-30 
million people, producing around 15-20 per cent of global mineral output (Buxton, 2013). 
In parallel with this expansion, there has been a notable increase in scholarly attention for 
the sector. While most academic attention has gone to ASM in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(particularly in Tanzania and Ghana) and to a lesser extent in Latin America (particularly 
Brazil and Guyana), Southeast Asia remains underrepresented in the ASM-literature, 
although this is gradually starting to change1.  
One Southeast Asian country with a sizeable ASM-sector that has hitherto remained below 
the radar of academic research is the Philippines2. While the peninsula has a century-long 
tradition of artisanal gold mining (Caballero, 1996), since the 1980s ASM has seen a 
massive expansion, particularly in the Cordillera mountain ranges of northern Luzon and 
in the eastern mountain ranges of Mindanao, the southernmost island of the Philippines. 
While ASM-operators now target a wide range of minerals, gold continues to be the 
sector’s backbone. While there are no official statistics regarding the number of ASM-
operators nationwide –not least due to persistent informality– most estimates range 
between 200000 and 500000. And while reliable output figures are also lacking, yearly 
                                                          
1 See for example Spiegel, 2012 on Indonesia; Spiegel, 2014 on Cambodia; and Lahiri-Dutt et al., 2014 on Laos. 
2 One notable exception is a study on mercury pollution in the Agusan River basin in Eastern Mindanao (Appleton et 
al., 2006). 
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statistics released by the Bangko Sentral (the Philippine Central Bank), which still retains 
a legal monopoly on gold buying, can nonetheless provide us with some indications 
regarding overall growth trends in the sector (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Gross production value in the mining sector, in billion PHP3 
Since the mid-1990s there has been a clear upward trend in ASM-output, and in different 
years it even surpassed that of large-scale metallic mining. However, after reaching a 
record high of PHP 42.9 billion (around US$ 1 billion) in 2010, and despite historically 
high gold prices, output dropped to a trifling PHP 0.3 billion (below US$ 7 million) in 
2013. Rather than being indicative of an existential crisis in the ASM-sector, countless key 
informants suggested that this dramatic drop was first and foremost the result of new taxes 
on gold sales, imposed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in 2011. While the export 
of ASM-gold is still prohibited by law, unofficial estimates by traders and government 
officials suggest that over 90 percent of ASM-gold, while typically processed locally, is 
now smuggled to Hong Kong and then onwards to mainland China (Francisco, 2012). In 
2011, Hong Kong authorities recorded 81,192 kilograms of gold imported from the 
Philippines, while official Philippine export data (i.e. gold exported by large-scale mining 
companies) amounted to only 3 percent of that volume (Ibid.). Using the average 2011 
gold price as our point of reference, illegal gold exports to Hong Kong in that year alone 
were worth over US$ 4 billion4. Finally, figure 1 reveals a massive increase in large-scale 
mining output since the late 2000s, due in part to massive mineral price increases. 
                                                          
3 Raw data retrieved from www.mgb.gov.ph. One billion PhP equals approximately 20 million Euro or US$ 23 
million. 
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Despite the existence of a fairly elaborate formal regulatory framework, in the form of 
Republic Act 7076 (the “people’s small-scale mining act” of 1991), in addition to the 
buoying illegal trade in gold, most of the actual small-scale gold mining operations –the 
small-scale extraction of other minerals is prohibited by law– are taking place without the 
necessary government permits and licenses, and are located outside government-
sanctioned Minahang Bayan (can be translated loosely as “people’s mines”, and is the 
Philippine equivalent of ASM permit areas). Instead, ASM is often taking place “illegally” 
in what the national government sees as public lands, large-scale mining concessions, 
timber areas and/or nature reserves.  
Probably nowhere are ASM-activities more ubiquitous than in Compostela Valley 
province, the self-proclaimed “gold mining capital of the Philippines”. Traveling through 
the province at the height of the latest gold rush in 2012, it was impossible not to notice 
the signs of the ongoing bonanza, with a steady stream of saddam (6 by 6) trucks traveling 
back and forth between the mining areas and the numerous carbon-in-pulp processing 
facilities scattered throughout the province. Tellingly, the province’s ‘symbol of unity’ is 
the solidarity ring, a piece of jewelry forged out of 1,5 kilograms of pure gold, donated by 
the governor’s political supporters, and displayed during a yearly Bulawan (gold) festival. 
 
Figure 2: Map of the Philippines indicating Compostela Valley province5 
                                                          
5 Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compostela_Valley. 
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According to most accounts, ASM first emerged in Compostela Valley soon after the 
Second World War, when poverty-stricken upland communities became engaged in 
rudimentary river panning activities as a sideline to upland farming. However, the real 
gold rush began in the 1980s, when at one point the (in)famous Diwalwal gold rush area 
(depicted on the front cover) alone was allegedly home to over 100000 miners (Crimmins, 
2007). While ASM continued to expand at a gradual but persistent pace over the next 
decades, it would take until the late 2000s before a second major gold rush enveloped the 
province.  
 
Figure 3: A typical gold rush area somewhere in Compostela Valley 
Today, Compostela Valley’s ASM-sector is characterized by high degrees of 
heterogeneity. Based on working practices and output levels, a rough distinction can be 
made between three types of small-scale gold mining activities –although in reality this 
distinction is not always clear-cut6. A first and fairly rudimentary type of ASM is river 
panning, which relies on the use of a simple pan or sluice box and gravity to capture gold 
particles (see figure 4). Gold panning often occurs in the vicinity of larger mining projects, 
                                                          
6 A fourth type, hydraulic mining (banlas), has become progressively unimportant over the years, although it 
continues to be rampant in other Mindanao provinces. 
  17 
 
which tend to enrich the surrounding rivers. An upsurge in river panning can often be 
observed following heavy rains, when gold-bearing sediments are released.  
A second type of small-scale gold mining activities are smaller and self-financed tunneling 
operations (see figure 5). While credit for these operations is sometimes provided by the 
landowner or by local store-owners, the corpo (team of miners) will often pool its own 
resources. In these smaller tunneling operations, revenue-sharing tends to be more or less 
equal, with each corpo member retaining one share of the net proceedings (i.e. the money 
that remains after processing). 
     
  Figure 4: River panning                                             Figure 5: A number of smaller tunnels  
The third and final type of ASM-operations, which are the defining feature of ASM in 
Compostela Valley, are bigger tunneling operations with outside financiers. In some cases 
these financiers merely provide the capital for basic tools and equipment like pick-axes, 
mining sacks, and food for the labour force. In other cases, outside capitalization results in 
a significant degree of  mechanization, pushing the boundaries of what qualifies as ASM 
according to international definitions that emphasize the sector’s labour-intensive, low-
tech character (Hilson, 2011). To be sure, these operations still rely on a massive 
workforce for the actual extraction of the gold ores (see figure 6). At the same time they 
also use heavy machinery like pneumatic drills, excavators, explosives, diesel generators, 
water pumps, and mine carts; while ore transport takes place in massive trucks. 
Furthermore, many of these operations boast a high degree of labour specialization, 
employing portal guards, carpenters, electricians, explosives experts, and in some cases 
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even geologists. These tunnel complexes invariably start from a main portal operated by 
the ‘management’. This main tunnel portal usually branches out into numerous side-
tunnels (destinos), which are financed either directly by the management, or by an 
independent financier. While sharing modalities are subject to a significant degree of local 
variation, the ‘management’ will often retains 20-70 per cent of the net proceedings, while 
the remaining share accrues either to the corpo or to the destino. In the latter case there is 
an additional round of revenue sharing involving the destino financier and his corpo.  
 
Figure 6: The Australia tunnel portal, one of the biggest ones in the Diwalwal gold rush area. 
Meanwhile there are two major gold processing methods. The first and more rudimentary 
form involves the granulation of ores in a ball mill (see figure 6), after which mercury is 
added to capture part of the gold particles. If this first processing phase indicates a high 
gold content, stockpiled ball mill tailings are brought to a Carbon-In-Pulp (CIP) 
processing plant (see figure 7). Here, gold ores are dissolved in a limestone-cyanide slurry, 
after which carbon is introduced to ‘capture’ the gold particles. This ‘impregnated’ carbon 
is then ‘cooked’ (using a blowtorch) to recover most of the gold, as well as the silver. 
Since the gold rush in the late 2000s, Compostela Valley has also seen the emergence of 
several laboratories, whose assay (mineral content) readings have significantly decreased 
the geological risk inherent to gold mining. Together, these assay readings and the higher 
recovery rate of CIP-processing have significantly decreased the geological risk inherent 
to small-scale gold gold mining. 
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Figure 6: A ball milling facility 
 
Figure 7: A Carbon-In-Pulp processing plant.  
      
Figure 8: An assay laboratory 
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As elsewhere in the Philippines, ASM in Compostela Valley is a predominantly informal 
affair. Adding to these regulatory complexities is the presence of a range of armed actors, 
with Compostela Valley bearing the imprint of decades of insurgency- and 
counterinsurgency warfare. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7, in the 1980s, 
in a context of a pervasive rural subsistence crisis caused by decades of government 
neglect, and with the regime of dictator Ferdinand Marcos reverting to increasingly 
authoritarian strategies to suppress societal demands for change, the uplands of eastern 
Mindanao became a stronghold of the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) 
and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA) (Abinales, 2000). After roughly a 
decade of decline in the late 1980s and 1990s, in recent years the NPA has regained much 
of its former strength, and continues to wage what is now effectively the longest-running 
Maoist insurgency in the world (Espejo, 2011). From the start of the first gold rush in the 
1980s, the NPA has allegedly maintained close ties with ASM, which considered to be a 
major source of ‘revolutionary taxes’ (ICG, 2011). The presence of the NPA as well as  
various other armed rent-seekers, including army, police, and various paramilitary militias, 
further add to a popular image of anarchic ASM-areas.  
OUTLINING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
When I started my research, I ventured into virtually uncharted academic terrain. There 
was a near-complete lack of prior research on ASM in the Philippines, on historical trends 
in the Philippine mining sector7, and on the sociopolitical history of eastern Mindanao8. 
Instead, an image persists of the eastern Mindanao uplands as a wild frontier, a rebellious 
and “unruly” (Scott, 2008) place that escapes government supervision. This image is 
nicely captured by references to the (in)famous Diwalwal gold rush area as the “wild, wild 
West of the Philippines”. This ‘frontier’ character of my research sites presented me with 
various methodological challenges, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
Meanwhile to guarantee the internal consistency of my PhD-research while maintaining an 
open mind towards the issues at hand, I identified three overarching (sets of) research 
questions, which became further specified as my research progressed. 
A first and fairly straightforward question relates to the factors underlying the dramatic 
expansion of ASM in Compostela Valley. This question becomes all the more relevant 
when considering the relatively advanced (i.e. capitalized and mechanized) state of some 
of province’s ASM-operations when compared to those in other countries and other 
regions in the Philippines.  
                                                          
7 A slightly outdated exception is Lopez, 1992. 
8 Notable exceptions include Abinales (2000) and Tiu (2005), both of whom study historical processes of state 
formation on the eastern Mindanao (agricultural) frontier. However, both authors fail to provide a history of the 
uplands, where most of the ASM-operations are taking place. 
  21 
 
A second set of research questions pertains to the regulatory situation in the ASM-sector. 
At first I set out to understand why national government efforts to formalize and regulate 
the sector have largely failed to materialize. Inspired by an unfolding research agenda of 
my research unit, I aimed to move beyond such a narrow focus on formal policy 
interventions, by considering the real regulatory complexities of Compostela Valley’s 
purportedly anarchic ASM-sector. I was particularly interested in understanding how 
access to mineral-bearing land is organized, and I wanted to gain a better understanding of 
the role played by state- and armed actors in ASM. 
A third and final set of research questions, and probably the most challenging of all three, 
are those related to the distribution of risks and benefits within the sector i.e. who benefits 
and loses from the expansion of ASM and from current (regulatory) realities in the sector? 
While there should be no doubt that the ASM-sector now provides much-needed 
livelihood opportunities to a massive workforce, and gives a massive boost to local and 
even regional economies, I wanted to avoid the pitfalls of an uncritical acceptance of ASM 
as a panacea for rural development. Even when leaving aside ASM’s dramatic impact on  
regional ecosystems (Appleton et al., 2006), it quickly became clear that the distribution of 
risks and benefits in the sector is far from equal. 
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AND 
CHOICES 
Given the frontier character of my research, I was forced to rely mainly on primary data 
collection. For this purpose I spent nearly 8 months doing field research in the Philippines. 
While the bulk of this field research took place in Compostela Valley, I also paid shorter 
research visits to mining areas in Agusan del Norte and South Cotabato province (also in 
Mindanao), and in Benguet province (on the Northern island of Luzon).   
Different methodological challenges conspire to prevent easy primary data collection in 
ASM-communities. A first set of challenges relates to sector-specific variables such as 
fluctuating income- and production levels, which make it difficult to collect accurate 
micro-economic data from ASM-operators (Heemskerk, 2005). In addition, the mobile and 
transient character of gold rush mining in particular (Jønsson & Bryceson, 2009; Nyame & 
Grant, 2014), which was described by several respondents as a “hit and miss activity”, 
makes it difficult to identify and follow up on respondents. Throughout my research, I was 
repeatedly confronted with respondents who had moved on to a different mining area; and 
in one instance I was even faced with the disappearance of a mining area altogether. 
Another sector-specific challenge is the fact that most ASM operates on “the fringes of or 
completely outside the law” (Sinding, 2005: 244), resulting in a lack of official data about 
ASM –although this observation can to some extent be qualified based on the empirical 
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evidence presented in this PhD-thesis. This informality –or “illegality” according to many 
national government officials– makes ASM-operators wary of outside inquiry, particularly 
in cases where they operate inside a large-scale mining concession or protected area. 
Together, high degrees of mobility and informality mean that the ASM-population is in 
many ways a “hidden population”, which poses particular problems for the (random) 
selection and sampling of research sites and respondents (Watters & Biernacki, 1989).  
A second set of challenges is related to the presence of a range of armed actors in the 
Compostela Valley uplands, many of whom now have a stake in the mining sector. These 
include not only communist rebels of the New People’s Army (NPA), but also army 
battalions, Philippine National Police (PNP), paramilitary units like the Citizen Armed 
Force Geographical Units (CAFGU), (supposedly unarmed) barangay militias like the 
Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVO), and various indistinct extortionist groups and 
‘private armies’ working at the behest of private political and commercial (mining) 
interests. In addition to posing a security threat, which is particularly pressing in areas 
with competing mining interests –often but not always between ASM and large-scale 
mining– the presence of armed actors brought up a range of methodological challenges. 
Arguably the most important is difficulties in obtaining access to information, to research 
sites, and to respondents (Barakat et al., 2002). Many respondents were (understandably) 
reluctant to share sensitive information about the role of armed actors. Despite its decade-
long presence in the region, the NPA in particular remains somewhat of an enigma: while 
frequently referred to by respondents –albeit implicitly rather than explicitly– few 
respondents were willing or able to elaborate on the exact role played by the NPA in the 
ASM-sector. Furthermore, different areas included in the research had ongoing 
counterinsurgency operations, which not only limited my mobility as a researcher, but also 
resulted in a high degree of suspicion on both sides of the insurgency / counterinsurgency 
divide, so that I had to be careful not to become associated with either one of the warring 
parties. Finally, a combination of alcohol and drugs, the proliferation of loose fire-arms, 
and various “illicit” activities like gambling and prostitution, all add up to a fairly 
unpredictable situation in mining areas, especially at night.  
A third and final set of challenges is related to geographic and climatic circumstances. Bad 
and sometimes even lacking road infrastructure and mountainous terrain made many of the 
mining areas very difficult to reach, forcing me to travel for hours in public transport, on 
the back of a motorcycle or a horse, or by foot. These accessibility problems were further 
compounded by unpredictable weather conditions, which have undoubtedly become more 
unpredictable in recent years. At several instances I was confronted with torrential rains, 
tropical depressions, storms and at one time in late 2012 even with a typhoon. Leaving 
aside for a moment the devastating consequences for the local population, these extreme 
weather conditions repeatedly cut off my research sites from the outside world, so that 
monitoring weather forecasts became part of my everyday routine. 
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To summarize, the major methodological and logistical challenges that I faced during my 
research were (1) A near-complete lack of existing research, (2) A hidden research 
population characterized by high levels of mobility and informality, (3) A volatile security 
environment marked by the presence of different armed actors that have a stake in ASM, 
and (4) Geographic and climatic conditions which hampered my mobility and the 
accessibility of my research sites. Finally, I should add to this list the language issue. 
However, because English is the language of tuition in the Philippines, most respondents 
were at least able to understand my questions, and in many instances to actually respond to 
them. However, my partner was present at all times to translate where needed, and by the 
end of the research (partly due to my residing with my assistant and his family), I had 
gained a basic and passive understanding of the Visayan dialect, particularly where it 
concerned discussions about mining. 
Together with my local partner, I worked out a research routine that allowed me to deal 
with some of the more practical and logistical challenges identified above. For example, to 
gain easier access to the different mining sites, we coordinated closely with local 
government officials, working from the provincial level downwards to the barangay (the 
lowest level of government in the Philippines). While this meant spending countless and 
often frustrating hours doing courtesy calls and waiting for a letter of recommendation, 
once we had such a letter it became much easier to move around and to find willing 
respondents. To deal with the sometimes volatile security situation, we equally relied on a 
range of local contacts (particularly barangay officials), and took some precautions, like 
bringing a ‘getaway driver’ in the more volatile mining areas.  
The selection of research sites as well has been influenced by accessibility- and security 
concerns. I opted for an in-depth case study of one mining area (Bukal in Nabunturan) that 
was relatively accessible –although it still required me to travel at least 90 minutes (one 
way) from where I was staying, depending on the weather– and was the scene of an 
ongoing gold rush at the time of my initial field research in 2012. However, to offset or at 
least diminish a potential bias of my research findings, I paid numerous visits to other 
mining areas, both inside (in the municipalities of Monkayo, Maco, and New Bataan) and 
outside (in the provinces of South Cotabato, Agusan del Norte and Benguet) Compostela 
Valley province. While these shorter visits, which usually lasted 1-2 weeks, did not enable 
a more systematic comparison between these different research sites, they did allow me to 
understand resonance i.e. recurrent and divergent “elements, dynamics, and relations” 
(Lund, 2014: 226). Furthermore, in two of the chapters in this PhD-thesis I do present a 
more systematic intra- (chapter 7 on the relationship between armed actors and the state) 
and cross-national (chapter 6 on the relationship between ASM-operators and landowners) 
comparative analysis, which allows me to illustrate the wider relevance and applicability 
of some of my research findings.  
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Turning to my actual methodological repertoire, I needed a set of data collection methods 
that are“informed by the shifting social complexities unique to unstable field sites”, and 
allows for “a level of investigative flexibility on the part of the ethnographer” (Kovats-
Bernat, 2002: 210). Hence, I opted for a range of flexible qualitative research methods, 
prime amongst which semi-structured key informant interviews and thematically oriented 
oral histories. Oral histories are an indispensable source of historical evidence ‘from 
below’ (Thompson, 2000), and can provide a grounded understanding of how ordinary 
lives intersect with broader processes of socio-economic and institutional transformation 
(Locke & Lloyd-Sherlock, 2011). They are well-suited to trace changes in informal and 
transient economies, as illustrated by Storm-Clarck’s (1972) work on the largely 
unrecorded history of the mining sector in Victorian-era England. I was particularly 
interested in understanding how individual lives were affected by the gradual expansion of 
ASM –and vice versa. While problems may arise with regards to historical recall, these 
can be partly offset through the comparative chronological structuring of oral histories in 
order to verify their internal consistency (Lummis, 1981). Finally, to facilitate the orderly 
recollection of memories, I also relied on visual techniques like timelines (Chambers, 
1994) and historical mineral price charts, which proved to be an indispensable tool to 
stimulate discussions with- and between respondents on the localized effects of trends in 
global mineral markets.  
Both in the case of the semi-structured interviews and oral histories, I interviewed a wide 
range of respondents, although for the oral history interviews my main targets were local 
landowners, ASM-financiers, and mining labour. Respondent selection took place on the 
basis of snowball sampling, relying on earlier respondents and local figures of authority 
(particularly barangay officials) to identify other respondents. In addition to facilitating 
access to respondents (due to having a reference from earlier respondents), snowball 
sampling has the additional advantage of offering insights into local social networks (Noy, 
2008). Given the sensitivity of many of the issues at hand, I made a deliberate choice not 
to record my interviews, and to instead rely exclusively on field notes. Respondent 
anonymity was (and still is) respected at all time, except in cases where respondents 
explicitly agree (or even request) to be named. To facilitate a discussion on more sensitive 
issues, I also organized interviews in neutral settings outside the mining area, including in 
the house of my assistant in the poblacion (town center) of Nabunturan.  
Finally, for qualitative data analysis, at first I attempted to undertake a more systematic 
qualitative coding exercise in Nvivo (software for qualitative data analysis). However, I 
quickly found out that overly rigid coding procedures risked fragmenting my data, leading 
to a loss of narrative flow. Henceforth I came to rely on a more flexible approach towards 
data analysis, using my interview transcripts and oral histories as “a quarry” (Yin, 2008) 
from which I reconstructed the interaction between individual life stories and trends in the 
wider political economy.  





In this theoretically oriented chapter I will situate this PhD-thesis at the interface between 
different academic debates. Indeed, to answer the research questions identified in the 
introductory chapter, I opted to pragmatically combine selected findings from the ASM-
literature with insights from other academic debates, particularly those on informal sector 
activity and on the ‘anthropology of governance’. In part, this choice to combine insights 
from different academic debates and disciplinary backgrounds was informed by the fact 
that this PhD-thesis is based on a series of articles. At the same time I am strongly 
convinced that this pragmatic and combined theoretical approach is well-suited to obtain a 
more holistic understanding of the multi-faceted ASM-phenomenon.  
Clearly, it is not my intention in this chapter to provide an exhaustive overview of these 
different theoretical debates; all the more so because each of them is discussed in more 
detail in the different chapters included in this PhD-thesis. Rather, I will start by 
identifying some of the shortcomings of the existing ASM-literature in explaining the 
somewhat peculiar situation in Compostela Valley, where ASM has moved well beyond 
subsistence level. I then adopt a step-by-step approach to explain my rationale for 
engaging with different other bodies of literature. Finally, I provide an overview of the 
different chapters included in this PhD-thesis, all but one (the concluding chapter) of 
which are edited versions of articles that were either published earlier, or are currently in 
the review- or publishing process.  
WHITHER THE ASM-LITERATURE? 
While by no means exhaustive, the 170 search results produced by the Web of Science 
database upon entering the search term “artisanal and small-scale mining” reveals a lot 
about the current state of research on ASM9. For one, ASM-expansion in recent years and 
decades has gone hand in hand with an increase in the number of yearly publications 
dealing with the subject, from a mere 2 in 1997 to 38 in 2014. Furthermore, based on a 
ranking according to Web of Science categories, a rough distinction can be made between 
a majority of publications in the field of environmental sciences (most of which deal with 
                                                          
9 A book search in the WorldCat database, while producing far less ‘hits’, more or less confirms these observations.  
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mercury pollution) and a smaller share of publications in the interdisciplinary field of 
development studies. For the purposes of my PhD-research, I was mainly interested in the 
latter body of work, although a case can be made for research that aims to exploit the 
synergies between both strands of literature. 
WHAT EXPLAINS THE MASSIVE EXPANSION OF ASM? 
ASM was long seen as an activity practiced by opportunists who were looking to “get rich 
quick”, and even today this narrative persists in policymaking circles and among the 
audience at large. At least in academic circles, however, a consensus has emerged that for 
the overwhelming majority of ASM-operators, their involvement in the sector is mainly 
poverty-driven (Heemskerk, 2001; Hilson, 2009). More precisely, ASM-expansion has 
been attributed to, amongst others, the detrimental impact of structural adjustment and an 
associated crisis in large-scale mining (Banchirigah, 2007), the declining viability of 
(peasant) agriculture (Hilson & Garforth, 2012), and in some countries also to the 
devastating effects of armed conflict (Maconachie, 2011).  
By answering questions with regards to the expansion of ASM, the ASM-literature 
dovetails with that on livelihood diversification (Banchirigah & Hilson, 2010). However, 
as can already be gleaned from this brief overview, the ASM-literature has focused 
primarily on identifying and understanding the factors that push people into ASM, with 
poverty as the common denominator. This poverty-driven view of ASM-expansion 
contributes to an image of a sector composed primarily or even exclusively by desperate, 
poverty-stricken operators that lack the necessary capital to move beyond subsistence 
level. While this image may well capture the situation in some sub-Saharan African 
countries, it is squarely at odds with that in Compostela Valley, where ASM has moved 
(far) beyond subsistence level, and now boasts significant levels of capitalization and 
professionalization.  
As I will demonstrate in chapter 3, to fully account for the situation in Compostela Valley, 
attention needs to be paid to ASM-expansion as a product of a complex interplay between 
different push- and pull factors. Here, it is interesting to refer to those authors who have 
argued that, in addition to offering opportunities for social mobility within the workforce 
(Jønsson & Bryceson, 2009), ASM also provides scope for outside investment and elite 
accumulation (Mawowa, 2013). A particularly pressing issue in this regard is the increased 
involvement in the ASM-sector of Asian investors, notably from China and South-Korea 
(Hilson et al., 2014; Weng et al., 2015).  
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PERSISTENT INFORMALITY EQUALS REGULATORY DISORDER? 
The first part of my second research question i.e. why does informality persist despite 
government efforts to formalize the ASM-sector, has been dealt with extensively in the 
ASM-literature (e.g. Siegel and Veiga, 2009; Clausen & Baretto, 2011; Hilson, 2013). 
Existing explanations for persistent informality in ASM are often legalistic in kind, 
emphasizing the existence of a range of entry barriers that prevent or discourage 
formalization for the overwhelming majority of poor ASM-operators. Prominent examples 
include a range of fiscal and administrative requirements (Hentschel, Hruschka & Priester, 
2002), elite capture of the formalization process (Fisher, 2007), and government support 
for large-scale mining, which limits mineral-bearing land available for ASM (Hilson & 
Potter, 2005; Banchirigah, 2007). These legalistic explanations typically feed into policy 
recommendations that focus on ‘democratizing’ registration procedures and on segregating 
mineral-bearing land for ASM (Hilson, 2013).  
As I demonstrate in chapter 4, these legalistic explanations also apply to the 
predominantly informal ASM-sector in the Philippines. At the same time I will 
demonstrate the shortcomings of more ‘mainstream’ legalistic explanations in the case of 
Compostela Valley where, even in cases where a permit has been issued to a registered 
ASM-cooperative, the membership of this cooperative is typically restricted to financiers, 
landowners and/or tunnel owners. Meanwhile the ASM-workforce at large remains bereft 
of formal-legal recognition. This failure of existing legalistic accounts to account for 
persistent informality in the workforce can partly be related to the aforementioned 
poverty-driven view of ASM, which cultivates an image of poor individual ‘smallholder’ 
operators. Such a view is at odds with the growing degrees of differentiation in the ASM-
sector of Compostela Valley, both within the workforce, and between the workforce and a 
class of ASM-entrepreneurs.  
The second part of the question, that related to the real governance situation inside 
otherwise mostly informal ASM-areas, has received far less attention in the literature. 
Some clues may be derived from the economic history literature on the 19th century US 
gold rush, which counters popular perceptions of a gold rush as “a chaotic scramble for 
high-profit opportunities in an open access setting, where the premium is on speed” (Clay 
& Wright, 2005: 156), by describing the bottom-up emergence of sophisticated systems 
for regulating access to mineral-bearing land (Umbeck, 1977). Likewise, some of the more 
anthropologically oriented literature that deals with present-day ASM has analyzed 
complex informal organizational practices for handling uncertainty and risk (Grätz, 2003, 
2004; Geenen, 2011), and the complex ways in which these informal arrangements 
intersect with formal governance institutions (Fisher, 2007; Jønsson & Fold, 2009). 
Nyame and Blocher (2010) have drawn attention to the existence of mutually beneficial 
arrangements between informal ASM-operators and customary land claimants in Ghana. 
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Similarly, in chapter 6 I (together with two of my colleagues) demonstrate the existence of 
mutually beneficial revenue sharing arrangements involving ASM-operators and informal 
landowners. Finally, Fisher (2008) places ASM “at the margins of the state”, where access 
to (mineral) resources is subject to continuous negotiation between ASM, state actors, and 
mining companies. In doing so, she ventures into the body of literature on the 
anthropology of the state that is discussed in more detail below. 
Finally, where the role of armed actors is explicitly or implicitly –what is described here 
as ASM is sometimes referred to as artisanal mining, small-scale mining, illegal mining, 
or simply (gold or diamond) mining– discussed in relation to ASM, it is usually outside 
the scope of the more ‘mainstream’ ASM-literature. Instead, the relationship between 
“lootable” (Le Billon, 2001) mineral wealth (which is often extracted through artisanal- 
and small-scale mining methods) and armed actors has been extensively debated in 
relation to broader debates about an alleged “resource curse (for an overview of these 
debates see Cuvelier et al., 2014). Here, ASM is mainly seen as a source of rents that 
provides armed actors with the motivation or opportunity to become engaged in armed 
conflict. In engaging with these debates, Lahiri-Dutt explicitly criticizes the tendency to 
equate ASM with armed conflict and chaos, claiming that theories about an alleged 
“resource curse” fail to acknowledge how “mineral resource management is 
characterized by multiple actors with their multiple voices”, including those embedded in 
what she refers to as “community mineral economies” (Lahiri-Dutt, 2006: 19). Garret, 
Sergiou and Vlassenroot (2009), meanwhile, provide a more nuanced account of the role 
of armed actors in the ASM-sector, by describing how an army brigade in the eastern DRC 
sustained itself through mining- and mineral marketing activities, the taxation of mineral 
transport routes, and ultimately by setting up a system of “coercive security governance”: 
“an institutionalized political and economic system of rules that allows reliability of 
agreements between the military leadership and the civilian population” (Garret et al., 
2009: 11). Similarly, in chapter 7, I demonstrate how in Compostela Valley, armed actors, 
ASM-financiers and local elected politicians have become drawn into “peculiar coercive 
arrangements” (Hedman & Sidel, 2000) that revolve around the rents produced by 
informal ASM. 
WHO BENEFITS AND WHO LOSES? 
The third and final question i.e. who benefits and who loses from the current state of ASM 
in Compostela Valley, was clearly the more challenging of the three. Most of the existing 
ASM-literature emphasizes how existing formal regulatory frameworks favor large-scale 
mining over ASM-operators, who remains excluded from formal mineral rights (Hilson, 
2013). Instead, ‘illegal’ ASM-operators find themselves misrecognized, criminalized, and 
all too easily associated with armed conflict (Lahiri-Dutt, 2006) and various other social 
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and environmental woes (Tschakert, 2007). At the same time, insofar as ASM persists 
amidst these formidable threats, it is sometimes seen as a popular form of resistance 
against state policies that promote large-scale mining (Lahiri-Dutt, 2006; Bush, 2009). 
Far less attention has been devoted to the distribution of risks and benefits within the 
ASM-sector. While most authors now pay lip service to the immense heterogeneity that 
characterizes ASM in many countries, a tendency still persists to talk about the sector in 
‘community’ terms (e.g. Lahiri-Dutt, 2004; Bush, 2009). This failure of at least some 
analysts to meaningfully differentiate within the ASM-sector is (yet again) particularly 
problematic in cases like that of Compostela Valley, where ASM is characterized not only 
by high degrees of differentiation, but also by a skewed distribution of risks and benefits, 
both across the workforce and between the workforce and a class of ASM-entrepreneurs. 
Initial clues concerning the distribution of spoils within the sector may nonetheless be 
derived from the aforementioned authors that pay attention to (mostly informal) 
organizational arrangements and practices of risk- and benefit sharing inside ASM-areas 
(e.g. Grätz, 2003; Jønsson & Fold, 2009). Both Fisher (2007) and Ojukutu-Macauley & 
Keili (2008) provide a fairly detailed description –respectively in Tanzania and Sierra 
Leone– a multi-layered organizational structure involving mining labour, different types of 
middlemen, and financiers. Cutting across this multi-tiered organizational structure are 
“socio-economic differences and power relations that reveal the level of differentiation in 
the sector” (Fisher, 2007: 751). However, linking back to my second set of research 
questions, virtually no attention has hitherto been paid to how these power relations and 
the associated distribution of risks and benefits in the sector intersects with trends in the 
wider political economy.  
SUMMARY: WHITHER THE ASM-LITERATURE? 
Summarizing this brief albeit critical assessment of the ASM-literature in light of my 
research questions, it should be clear that it has severe shortcomings in accounting for the 
current state of small-scale gold mining in Compostela Valley. Most of these shortcomings 
can be related to the persistence of fairly simplistic poverty-driven views of the ASM-
sector as a rudimentary subsistence sector composed of poverty-stricken individual 
operators. This poverty-driven ASM-sector is often contrasted with a modern, corporate 
mining sector, in what is described as a “dual mining economy” (Banchirigah, 2007).  
However, this dominant understanding of ASM as a subsistence economy is at odds with 
the situation in Compostela Valley, where ASM is characterized by significant degrees of 
capitalization and differentiation. In this (and similar) environment(s), a one-sided 
poverty-driven view risks obscuring the complexity of existing organizational 
arrangements, the complex intersection between formal and informal institutions 
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(Teschner, 2012), and the (skewed) distribution of risks and benefits that accompanies 
these arrangements.  
Finally, while increased attention is now being paid to the complex and multi-layered 
struggles over access to mineral-bearing land between a wide variety of actors, chief 
among which ASM-operators and large-scale mining (e.g. Fisher, 2008; Luning, 2008; 
Geenen, 2012), an image still emerges from the literature of mining areas that are 
somehow disconnected from trends in the wider political economy. This prevents a fuller 
understanding not only of existing regulatory arrangements inside these mining areas, but 
ultimately of who stands to benefit and lose from these arrangements. In short, to answer 
the research questions outlined in the introductory chapter, I needed to consult different 
other bodies of academic literature. 
“INFORMALIZATION” AND THE ASM-
WORKFORCE 
To remedy some of these shortcomings of the ASM-literature in accounting for the current 
state of ASM in Compostela Valley as a largely informal phenomenon, I decided to revisit 
longstanding debates on informal sector activity (for an excellent overview see Chen, 
2008). As I demonstrate at length in chapter 4, such an exercise revealed that the ASM-
literature, by emphasizing legalistic explanations for persistent informality, has neglected 
so-called structuralist perspectives on informal sector activity (Castells, Portes & Benton, 
1989). These structuralist approaches analyze “informalization” (Meagher, 1995) as a 
long-term systemic process, embedded in the ebbs and flows of global capitalism (Tabak 
& Crichlow, 2000). Instead of treating the expansion of informal sector activity as simply 
a bottom-up response to economic crisis and over-regulation (cf. the legalistic 
perspective), informalization is seen as a capitalist response to a crisis of accumulation in 
the formal economy. More precisely, in an attempt to counter declining profit rates, 
employers have increasingly reverted to the exploitation of a cheap, unprotected and 
flexible informal labour reserve.  
Relying on such a structuralist approach, in chapter 4 I will demonstrate how at least in 
Compostela Valley, the massive expansion of ASM as a predominantly informal activity 
can also be understood as the product of a profound crisis in large-scale mining, which 
was caused by a combination of domestic instability and a global commodities crisis. As a 
result of this crisis, a gradual transition took place away from a regime of accumulation 
that revolved around capital-intensive large-scale mining, to one built around flexible 
ASM and the exploitation of informal labour. Significantly, different actors previously 
employed in the higher echelons of the large-scale mining sector played an active role in 
facilitating this transition from capital-intensive to labour-intensive mining methods. 
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In part, this more critical understanding of ASM-expansion as indicative of a broader 
process of informalization in the mining sector –and arguably in the economy at large– 
provided me with initial clues as to who is currently on the winning (a group of successful 
ASM-entrepreneurs) and on the losing (the lion’s share of the informal workforce) side of 
distributional arrangements within the sector. However, to gain a more nuanced 
understanding how the distribution of risks and benefits in the sector is embedded in 
broader sets of power relations, I needed to move beyond a critical analysis of persistent 
(in some instances partial i.e. in the workforce) informality, by turning my analytical 
attention to the real governance situation inside ASM-areas. 
THE ANATOMY OF MINERAL RESOURCE 
GOVERNANCE 
HYBRID MINERAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE? 
In my attempt to come to terms with the regulatory complexities in Compostela Valley’s 
ASM-sector, and inspired by the research agenda of our research unit, I was initially 
drawn to a body of literature on what came to be known as “hybrid governance” 
(Meagher, 2012), or “governance without government” (Raeymaeckers, Menkhaus & 
Vlassenroot, 2008). In an attempt to move beyond state-centrist notions of governance and 
public authority, this literature aims to understand “real governance” (Hagman & Péclard, 
2010) as it exists in areas where state control is weak, contested, or even non-existent. In 
these areas, governance –and public authority, for that matter (Hoffmann & Kirk, 2013)– 
is seen as the outcome of a complex process of negotiation between a wide range of actors, 
which may include state actors from different branches and levels of government, 
traditional leaders, but also armed actors like rebels (Weinstein, 2009) or warlords (Reno, 
2009). Building on these “hybrid approaches to governance and state building” 
(Meagher, 2012: 1073), Sikor and Lund (2009) propose to analyze the “recursive 
constitution of property and authority” i.e. the ways in which people’s efforts to have 
(competing) claims over natural resources recognized by (competing) public authorities, 
simultaneously affect broader struggles over public authority, by strengthening the 
authority of “the authorizers”. As I will demonstrate throughout this PhD-thesis 
(particularly in chapter 5), in the Philippines local elected politicians have appropriated a 
central role as authorizers in the purportedly informal ASM-sector, relying on the 
normative and coercive strength of the state to sanction access to mineral-bearing land.  
Clearly, this body of literature on hybrid governance has thoroughly influenced my PhD-
research, as it convinced me to empirically analyze the machinations of public authority 
and regulatory order inside ASM-areas that are all too often presented as conflict-ridden 
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and anarchic spaces (Le Billon, 2008). However, the limitations of this literature in 
accounting for the regulatory situation inside Compostela Valley’s mining areas quickly 
became apparent. For one, this body of literature has repeatedly been criticized for 
uncritically emphasizing the negotiability of governance, while glossing over the 
potentially predatory traits of local regulatory orders (Meagher, 2012). While this critique 
is perhaps a bit overdrawn, it nonetheless remains quintessential to analyze “who benefits 
and who loses from instances of negotiability?” (Peters, 2004: 269). Secondly, the 
premium put on hybrid- and non-state forms of governance fails to account for why at 
least in the Philippines, state actors (local elected politicians) play a crucial role in 
regulating the informal ASM-sector. For this reason I turned my attention towards two 
other bodies of literature, one of which –that on the anthropology of the state– dovetails 
with that on hybrid governance.  
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE STATE 
The literature on ‘the anthropology of the state’ (Trouillot, 2001; Sharma & Gupta, 2006) 
provided me with important clues as to why state practices persist in the regulation of 
informal ASM. To be sure, there is no denying that many states, pressured by the forces 
unleashed by neoliberal globalization and economic restructuring, have undergone a 
radical process of decentralization and privatization. Many states have effectively ceded a 
range of regulatory powers to local (semi-)private actors, some of whom are now staking 
(competing) claims to public authority (Hibou, 2004). At the same time, it has been 
observed in different contexts –even in places with a purportedly weak state presence– that 
state-sanctioned legality exhibits surprising resilience as a frame of reference to stake 
claims to public authority and -natural resource access (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2007; 
Nielsen, 2013). Similarly, in chapter 6 me and my colleagues demonstrate how in very 
different geographical contexts (i.e. the Philippines, the DRC and Liberia), informal 
arrangements between landowners and ASM-operators are replete with references to state-
sanctioned legality.  
The trick to solving this apparent paradox is to no longer see ‘the state’ a fixed set of 
institutions that exercises control over a particular territory, but instead as “an open field 
with multiple boundaries and no institutional fixity” (Trouillot, 2001: 127), punctuated 
with references to the “idea of the state” (Lund, 2006) as an abstract and impersonal 
source of authority that stands above society, and serves as a particularly potent 
legitimizing repertoire (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001). At the same time, while state-
sanctioned legality may well persist as a legitimizing repertoire on which different actors 
can bank to stake claims to wealth and power; particularly in countries with a weak state 
bureaucracy the rather chaotic process of state decentralization and -privatization has led 
to a (further) fragmentation of the state (Hansen & Steputat, 2001). While government 
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actors continue to fulfill vital roles as “licensing and franchising authority” (Comaroff & 
Comaroff, 2007: 139), governments themselves are now subject to high degrees of 
“system-internal pluralism”, whereby different branches and levels of government co-exist 
uneasily or even compete for supremacy (von Benda-Beckman, 2002). Building on these 
observations, in chapter 8 I draw on theories of incremental institutional change (Mahoney 
& Thelen, 2009) to demonstrate how different efforts to decentralize mineral resource 
governance in the Philippines have led to high degrees of institutional ambiguity, and 
uncertainty over who holds the authority to sanction access to mineral resources. While 
creating the conditions for an entire range of mineral resource conflicts, this institutional 
ambiguity also creates opportunities for various actors to contest existing arrangements for 
the redistribution of mineral resource wealth across society.  
TRAJECTORIES OF STATE FORMATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Finally, to fully understand the particularities of governance arrangements in Compostela 
Valley’s ASM-areas, including the central role played by local elected politicians, I 
engaged with a critical historical-institutional body of literature on trajectories of state 
formation in the Philippines. As will be discussed repeatedly throughout this PhD-thesis, 
despite a longstanding tradition of administrative centralism, since the advent of American 
colonialism in the early twentieth century local strongmen-politicians have played key 
roles as frontier stabilizers, maintaining sociopolitical stability while espousing the 
symbols of the democratic state throughout the peninsula (Abinales, 2000; Wong, 2006). 
In return, these local politicians can bank on the coercive and legitimizing strengths of 
state rule to entrench themselves at the “commanding heights” of the local political 
economy (Sidel, 1999).  
In short, as I will demonstrate in chapter 5, the involvement of local politicians in ASM 
and the preponderance of state practices in the regulation of ASM can be seen as intricate 
outcome of an elite pact between political elites at the national and sub-national level. At 
the same time I will also suggest that the looming expansion of large-scale mining under 
the tutelage of (sections of) the national political elite now risks undermining this elite 
pact, with possibly far-reaching consequences for sociopolitical stability. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE PHD-THESIS 
While the theoretical overview presented in this chapter already contained repeated 
references to the different chapters included in this PhD-thesis, it is still important to 
present a more detailed overview; all the more so because these different chapters are 
(slightly) edited versions of articles that have either been published earlier (chapters 3, 5, 6 
and 8), have been accepted for publication (chapter 4), or are currently undergoing review 
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(chapter 7). While chapters 3 and 4 are primarily aimed at gaining a better understanding 
of ASM-expansion as a predominantly informal phenomenon, chapters 4 to 8 provide an 
empirical analysis of local governance arrangements in the ASM-sector, and how these are 
embedded in the wider political economy. Throughout, critical attention is constantly paid 
to understanding who benefits and who loses from existing arrangements in the sector.  
In chapter 3 I engage with ongoing debates in the ASM-literature on the different factors 
fuelling the sector’s persistent expansion in recent decades. I will demonstrate that in 
Compostela Valley, in addition to providing a safety net for poor people who remain 
bereft of other meaningful livelihood opportunities, the ASM-sector has also attracted the 
attention of a heterogeneous class of outside financiers who are primarily interested in 
accumulation opportunities. It is the gradual involvement of these ‘capital interests’ that 
has allowed ASM to evolve far beyond subsistence level. 
The entry point for chapter 4 are academic debates over the causal explanations for 
persistent informality. I argue that the legalistic explanations that currently dominate the 
ASM-literature fail to account for the persistence of informality in the massive ASM-
workforce. To remedy this shortcoming, I propose an integrative approach that also pays 
critical attention to the exploitation of informal labour as an underlying rationale for 
persistent informality. More precisely, I demonstrate that the massive expansion of ASM 
as a predominantly informal activity is the product of a transition away from formal, 
capital-intensive large-scale mining to flexible, labour-intensive ASM, whereby the logic 
of accumulation revolves around the exploitation of informal labour. Significantly, this 
logic of accumulation transpires in regulatory arrangements that put a premium on the 
recognition of mineral property rights, to the detriment of labour rights. 
Turning to my empirical analysis of governance dynamics in the ASM-sector, in chapter 5 
I demonstrate that the expansion of informal –and according to many people ‘illegal’– 
ASM in Compostela Valley, instead of undermining state power, has paradoxically gone 
hand in hand with a consolidation of the state in (parts of) the uplands. More precisely, by 
capitalizing on the legitimizing and coercive strengths of the state, local politicians have 
come to play a vital role in the regulatory stabilization of otherwise informal ASM, 
thereby indirectly contributing to its further expansion. This regulatory stabilization 
benefits not only these politicians themselves, with ASM being a prime source of fiscal 
revenues and rents; but also caters to the interests of a heterogeneous coalition of ASM-
financiers, local landowners, and a range of armed rent-seekers, all of whom benefit from 
the persistence of ASM as a key source of rents. This existence of “joint institutions of 
extraction” (Snyder, 2006) involving public and private actors is then explained with 
reference to the longstanding tradition of decentralized statebuilding described above. 
While the first (ASM-financiers) and second (local politicians) group of these vested 
interests are given due attention in chapters 3 and 5, in chapter 6 I zoom in on the position 
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of (mostly informal) landowners, by means of a cross-national comparative analysis of the 
relationship between ASM-operators and surface landowners in Compostela Valley, 
Liberia, and the eastern DRC. In all three cases, but arguably more so in Compostela 
Valley than in the other two cases, informal arrangements for mutual benefit-sharing now 
connect the interests of local landowners with those of ASM-operators. In addition, in all 
three cases these purportedly informal arrangements are legitimized through implicit and 
explicit references to state-sanctioned legality.  
Chapter 7 zooms in more explicitly on the role of armed actors, by presenting a 
comparative analysis of relations between local state- and rebel structures in the conflict-
affected provinces of North Cotabato and Compostela Valley. In both provinces, 
barangay-level politics in particular are now characterized by a seemingly counterintuitive 
rapprochement between state- and rebel actors. In North Cotabato this entanglement is 
more direct, with rebel commanders becoming directly involved in electoral politics; 
whereas in Compostela Valley the intricate relationships between local politicians and the 
NPA (as well as various other armed actors) are embedded in indistinct networks that now 
reign over the province’s ASM-sector.  
Chapter 8 transcends the locality, in an attempt to situate these localized regulatory 
arrangements in broader mineral resource governance regimes in the Philippines. It is 
argued that various efforts to decentralize mineral resource governance have given rise to 
a highly ambiguous institutional environment, wherein various actors are now contesting 
the distribution of mineral resource wealth across society, sometimes becoming embroiled 
in real (armed) conflicts on the ground. Arguably the most important axis around which 
conflicts over mineral resource wealth are now taking place is that between large-scale 
mining companies supported by (sections of) the national government, and ASM-operators 
that are a part and parcel of indistinct political-military-commercial networks at the 
subnational level. 
In the ninth and concluding chapter, I piece together these different arguments, in an 
attempt to provide (in some cases initial) answers to the research questions outlined in the 
introductory chapter. In doing so, I combine my critical account of ASM-expansion with 
my historical-institutional analysis of governance dynamics in the sector. It will be argued 
that the informalization of mining in the Philippines, epitomized by a shift from formal, 
capital-intensive mining to informal, labour-intensive ASM, has gone hand in hand with 
the emergence of a local regulatory order centered around local elected politicians that are 
spearheading a process of “informal formalization” (Benjaminsen & Lund, 2003) of land- 
and mineral tenure relations. While this local regulatory order caters to the interests of a 
heterogeneous coalition of local politicians, ASM-financiers, royalty-receiving landowners 
and armed rent-seekers; it simultaneously glosses over the needs of a massive workforce 
that remains extremely vulnerable to exploitation. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
‘CAPITAL INTERESTS’ AND 
ASM-EXPANSION 
ORIGINAL ARTICLE: 
Verbrugge, B. (2014). Capital interests: A historical analysis of the transformation of 
small-scale gold mining in Compostela Valley province, Southern Philippines. The 
Extractive Industries and Society, 1(1): 86-95. 
BACKGROUND: 
This article was my first publication on ASM in the Philippines, and is best read as a 
historical introduction to the ASM-sector in a country that received no prior attention in 
the literature on ASM. 
ARTICLE ABSTRACT: 
In line with trends observed in several other countries, small-scale gold mining in 
Compostela Valley province has expanded immensely, and now boasts a high number of 
more advanced (i.e. more capitalized and mechanized) operations that push the boundary 
of what is usually considered artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). A historical, 
fieldwork-based analysis is presented of the diverse factors underlying the current 
situation. It is argued that existing accounts of ASM-expansion, by focusing 
disproportionately on the role of poverty in pushing people into ASM, fail to satisfactorily 
account for the state of gold mining in Compostela Valley. Whereas this poverty-driven 
narrative may well explain the constant supply of mining recruits, it risks obscuring how 
for certain groups, ASM harbors important opportunities for capital accumulation. More 
specifically, the increased engagement in gold mining on the part of a heterogeneous class 
of mining financiers enabled ASM to evolve from rudimentary- into relatively mechanized 
operations with highly complex working- and revenue sharing arrangements. The nascent 
gold mining elite has entrenched itself in a regulatory environment amenable to the further 
expansion of gold mining. These observations suggest that more critical attention should 
be paid to the ‘capital interests’ driving similar transformations of ASM elsewhere. 
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INTRODUCTION: DEBATING THE EXPANSION 
OF ASM 
In recent years scholars have attempted to understand the factors underlying the massive 
expansion of ASM in developing countries. The literature on rural livelihood 
diversification has proven highly instrumental in this endeavor (Hilson, 2011). In this 
literature on livelihood diversification, a variety of push- (e.g. risk management, 
subsistence crisis) and pull factors (opportunities for income accumulation) have been 
identified that determine diversification behavior (Barrett et al., 2001). Significantly, 
attention has also been devoted to the socially segmented nature of livelihood 
diversification. For most people, diversification is primarily a matter of necessity, with a 
growing labour reserve pushed into a “scramble for income” (Bryceson, 2002), combining 
easily accessible and usually low-return livelihood activities. For some, however, 
particularly those with the resources necessary to surmount entry barriers to high-yielding 
activities, diversification harbors opportunities for accumulation (Start & Johnson, 2004). 
Reviewing existing explanations for increased diversification into ASM, debates have 
hitherto been dominated by two opposing narratives. On the one hand, in policymaking 
circles and amongst the audience at large, an idea persists that individuals are lured into 
ASM by the prospect to ‘get rich quick’ (for an academic illustration see Godoy, 1988). 
While this particular understanding of ASM-operators as opportunist fortune-seekers may 
duly apply in particular cases, an academic consensus has emerged that the majority of 
those engaged in ASM are primarily driven by economic (subsistence) needs and a lack of 
viable livelihood alternatives (Heemskerk, 2001; Hilson, 2010). More specifically, ASM-
expansion has been attributed to a range of push factors, which play out to varying extents 
in different contexts. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the detrimental impact of 
structural adjustment on (peasant) agriculture and formal sector employment has been a 
major factor in fuelling ASM-growth (Banchirigah, 2007; Hilson, 2010; Hilson & 
Garforth, 2012). In countries like Ghana (Hilson, 2010) and Tanzania (Chachage, 1995), 
the liberalization and privatization of the mining sector have also contributed significantly 
to ASM-expansion, with many of those retrenched from large-scale mining subsequently 
finding their way to ASM. At the same time, by limiting land available for agriculture and 
legal ASM, government support for large-scale mining (LSM) further boosts informal 
ASM, often within company concessions (Hilson & Potter, 2005; Banchirigah, 2007). 
Finally, in countries like Liberia (Hilson & van Bockstael, 2011) and Sierra Leone 
(Maconachie, 2011), armed conflict and associated economic and institutional breakdown 
have also been major factors fuelling ASM-expansion. In short, most scholars have 
focused predominantly on identifying the push factors that explain increased 
diversification into ASM, positing an intimate association between poverty and ASM-
expansion. 
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Part of the reason for this rather one-sided focus on poverty as an explanatory variable for 
ASM-expansion may lie in the literature’s geographical bias towards Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where ASM often does qualify as an artisanal, low-tech undertaking, driven by subsistence 
needs. However, in some regions and countries ASM has now moved firmly beyond 
subsistence level, boasting a level of capitalization and mechanization that pushes the 
boundaries of established definitions of ASM as a labour-intensive and low-tech 
undertaking (Hilson, 2011). Notable examples include Ghana (Hilson, 2010), Guyana 
(Clifford, 2011), and Brazil (Graulau, 2011). Significantly, both Clifford (2011) and 
Graulau (2011) draw (cursory) attention to the role of outside capital in enabling the 
expansion of ASM. Building on these initial observations, in this chapter I will 
demonstrate that, in order to explain the massive expansion of ASM in Compostela Valley 
and its subsequent transformation into a highly heterogeneous sector with fairly 
mechanized and professional operations, analytical attention needs to be paid to the ASM-
sector as a site for accumulation. More precisely, while the seemingly unremitting supply 
of new labour recruits in the ASM-sector is rooted in a pervasive crisis in (upland) 
agriculture, large-scale mining, and ultimately in labour markets writ large; my empirical 
evidence suggests that the fairly ‘advanced’ state of ASM in Compostela Valley can only 
be fully accounted for when considering the role of (outside) capital (read: ASM-
financiers) in pushing the sector forward in terms of working practices and output levels. 
THE EXPANSION AND TRANSFORMATION OF 
ASM IN COMPOSTELA VALLEY 
A CONCISE HISTORY OF UPLAND SETTLEMENT 
While good historiographical research on eastern Mindanao is lacking, it is clear that 
present-day Compostela Valley province long remained bereft of substantial human 
settlement. From the early 20th century onwards the entry of American and Japanese 
plantation agriculture in the coastal regions surrounding Davao gulf forced existing 
inhabitants (today’s ‘indigenous people’) further inland (Tiu, 2005). Following Philippine 
independence at the end of World War 2, migration to the more remote ‘frontier areas’ of 
Mindanao really took off, predominantly on the part of Christian settlers fleeing 
overpopulation and social unrest in other parts of the peninsula (Wernstedt & Simkins, 
1965; Umehara & Bautista, 2004). This trend was facilitated by infrastructural 
development, particularly road construction. In the case of Compostela Valley, the 
construction (in 1938) of a national highway connecting Davao to Agusan, and the 
expansion of corporate agriculture, were of paramount importance in inducing Christian 
in-migration. This Christian influx went hand in hand with a further retreat of the 
‘indigenous’ population into the uplands, where they came to rely on a combination of 
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hunting and swidden farming (kaingin) (Rodil, 2003). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s 
these same uplands saw an (often aggressive) expansion of corporate logging and mining, 
bringing in its wake more migrant labour from the Visayas and Luzon; although these 
companies also recruited unskilled ‘indigenous labour’. As will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 4, the subsequent downturn in the mining sector in the 1980s gave further 
impetus to the process of ASM-expansion, by creating a pool of (semi-)skilled mining 
labour. Meanwhile extractive industry expansion, in combination with persistent poverty 
and military aggression, provided fertile grounds for the expansion of the communist New 
People’s Army (NPA) in the 1970s and 1980s (Abinales, 2000). The construction of 
logging roads by these same companies gave further impetus to upland settlement 
(Wernstedt & Simkins, 1965). Migrant logging labour increasingly settled in the vicinity 
of the logging operations, initiating a pattern of ‘chain migration’ whereby “relatives, 
friends and village mates follow in the footsteps of the pioneer settlers” (Umehara & 
Bautista, 2004: 65). During the 1970s and 1980s the number of upland settlers increased 
rapidly, mingling with- and in some cases displacing existing (indigenous) inhabitants, 
many of whom retreated further into the uplands. While the narratives of these newcomers 
differ, most if not all of them were motivated by a combination of social crisis in their 
home regions, and the prospect of securing a piece of land or a job on the Mindanao 
frontier.  
THE LIMITATIONS OF UPLAND FARMING AND THE FARMING-GOLD 
PANNING CYCLE 
In line with trends observed elsewhere in Southeast Asia, rapidly decreasing land 
availability due to persistent demographic growth, in combination with increased demand 
for cash crops like banana, coffee and abaca, led to a gradual intensification and 
sedentarization of upland agriculture (Cramb et al., 2009). Pretty soon, however, the 
limitations of upland farming became apparent, with respondents citing diverse problems, 
including:  
1) Seasonality and an inability to bridge cash-stripped periods in-between harvests; 
2) Expensive inputs and problems in accessing (affordable) credit; 
3) Challenging environmental conditions, including erosion, steep slopes, and bad soil 
quality; 
4) Low and fluctuating prices and dependency on traders because of the distance to 
markets and -processing facilities; 
5) Decreasing land availability and increased landlessness due to demographic growth; 
6) Lacking legal tenure, deterring investment in the farm; and 
7) The intensification of armed conflict between the government and the communist NPA 
in the 1980s, with secure access to the farm no longer guaranteed. 
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As a result of these trends, upland settlers were increasingly unable to sustain themselves 
through upland farming alone, and were on the lookout for alternative income sources. 
However, a mounting debt crisis had plunged the Philippines into “a period of financial 
and economic crises, stagnation, and political turbulence” (Umehara & Bautista, 2004: 
18), and in tandem with the escalation of conflict and a structural crisis in (upland) 
agriculture, commercial logging and mining also suffered amidst a deteriorating 
investment climate. In this depressed socio-economic environment, upland inhabitants 
increasingly found recourse in small-scale gold mining.  
Already in the 1960s and 1970s, some of the migrant labour with prior experience in gold 
mining in their home region had started panning for gold in the rivers and creeks of 
Compostela Valley. These initial panning activities targeted free gold (i.e. gold that does 
not require processing), which was brought to Sino-Filipino gold buyers operating from 
Tagum City. Pretty soon other upland settlers joined in on these panning activities, which 
were increasingly supplemented by hydraulic mining (locally known as banlas or flusher 
panning). These embryonic ASM-activities were seen as a sideline to upland farming, and 
were practiced when there was little work in the farm or when income was too low to 
cover subsistence needs. At the same time, as was repeatedly alluded to in fieldwork 
interviews, the income from gold panning was also used to support the development of the 
farm: 
“Gold panning started as a communal activity. (…) The money was used to pay 
farm workers and to invest in farm tools and animals, and sometimes also in 
coffee.”10 
“The farm was our main concern, panning was the sideline (…) If we had no more 
work in the farm, we went panning (…) It helped us to develop the farm and hiring 
workers.”11  
“The first time I went flusher panning was with my neighbor.  I bought tools for 
1000 pesos, but after a week I already recovered. The panning was for additional 
income, it allowed us to maintain consumption and we could buy fish. (…) 
Sometimes when there was high income I invested in the farm, mainly in tools. But 
farming remained the priority.”12 
Initial ASM-expansion provided room for the development of gold buying and ball mill 
processing. Whereas these activities were increasingly performed locally, gold buying 
networks were dominated by Sino-Filipino merchant networks that operated from Tagum 
City. The example of Alberto is illustrative of these processes. A landowner and barangay 
official in an upland barangay of Nabunturan municipality, the increase in gold panning in 
                                                          
10 Interview with landowner, Maco, October 2012. 
11 Interview with landowner, Nabunturan, September 2012. 
12 Interview with landowner and purok chairman, Nabunturan, October 2012. 
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the 1970s convinced Alberto to purchase a ball mill. He was supported by a Chinese 
merchant from a nearby village, who provided him with start-up capital, and bought his 
gold. 
THE TRANSITION FROM CORPORATE MINING TO ASM13 
Booming global mineral markets in the post-war decades induced a corporate mining 
boom in the Philippines, and Compostela Valley (back then was still part of Davao del 
Norte province) saw the start of several large-scale mining projects. While initially 
focused on copper mining, by the end of the 1970s decreasing demand for copper and 
skyrocketing gold prices compelled these companies to shift their attention to gold mining 
(Lopez, 1992). The gold boom was short-lived, however, and by the mid-1980s corporate 
mining was mired in a deep crisis. The investment climate suffered amidst profound 
political and economic instability, with debt-driven growth under the Marcos regime 
coming to an end and political opposition mounting, including by a virulent communist 
insurgency that was particularly active in eastern Mindanao (ICG, 2011). Arguably even 
more important were sector-specific factors, including a volatile legal environment; 
corrupted management structures and debt accumulation in the sector; and above all 
negative trends in global mineral markets, which made large-scale, capital-intensive 
mining increasingly unprofitable (Clad, 1988; Lopez, 1992). In response to increasingly 
unfavorable employment conditions in large-scale mining in the early 1980s, an exodus –
both forced and voluntary– of (semi-) skilled mining labour commenced. It was these 
labourers who swarmed out over Compostela Valley14, initiating the first tunneling 
activities.  
These embryonic tunneling targeted gold veins close to the surface, which were still 
readily available at the time, and required limited capital input. Hence, operations were 
often self-financed, and after the gold was processed and sold and all expenses deducted, 
the net income was divided equally amongst corpo members, who were usually friends or 
relatives. Furthermore, from the start tunneling operations were undertaken in close 
coordination with local, mostly informal landowners, who not only received a share of the 
proceedings, but also came to fulfill a role as middlemen recruiting local labour. As 
indicated in the preceding section, this labour was in ample supply due to a pervasive 
upland subsistence crisis. This reciprocity between migrant miners and local landowning 
families is nicely captured by the following quote from a landowner:  
                                                          
13 The transition from large-scale mining to ASM is described in much more detail in chapter 4. 
14 But also to other places throughout Mindanao, including T’Boli in South Cotabato province and Buga in Bukidnon.  
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“APEX-workers were the ones who started tunneling here (…) We received 1 share 
as landowner, but most of the workers are also my family, so eventually we got 4 
out of 7 shares.”15  
THE CAPITALIZATION OF ASM AND THE NASCENT GOLD MINING 
ELITE 
Whereas these more rudimentary, self-financed ASM-operations continued to proliferate 
throughout the following decades, their limitations soon became apparent. As miners 
followed gold veins deeper and deeper into the mountain, the risk for flooding and tunnel 
collapse increased considerably. Furthermore, because they are self-financed, these 
operations tend to be discontinuous, hinging on the availability of cash for basic supplies 
and equipment. These obstacles were overcome by a gradual process of capitalization, 
with outside financiers providing the financial resources necessary for timber 
reinforcements and equipment like generators and water pumps, but also for food and 
shelter for the workforce. For the miners in question this meant that they no longer had to 
worry about subsistence needs, so they could focus on mining full-time. Meanwhile rising 
levels of capitalization went hand in hand with (potentially) bigger profit margins for the 
financier. Under a scheme that became popularly known as back-financing, after 
deducting operational expenses and the landowner’s share, the financier retains two or 
three shares of the ores, while the rest is divided equally amongst corpo members. Aside 
from shifting part of the risk to the workforce, this revenue sharing arrangement 
guaranteed highly motivated labourers (Godoy, 1988). Control over labour (recruitment) 
and over the day-to-day management of the operations was increasingly outsourced to 
‘trusted’ team leaders –often experienced miners– and local landowners, who are assumed 
to be able to guarantee peace and order due to their position in local authority structures. 
Meanwhile within the corpo, an embryonic system of labour division emerged between 
diggers (abanteros or “those who move forward”) and unskilled haulers (atraseros or 
“those who retreat”). While in some cases these atraseros are included in the revenue 
sharing, in most cases they are paid on a ‘per sack’ basis. 
By the mid-1980s Compostela Valley hosted several mining areas, including those in 
places like Ngan (municipality of Compostela), Boringot (Pantukan), Mainit (Nabunturan) 
and Masara (inside the APEX-concession in Maco). However, the transformation of ASM 
into the capitalized and mechanized operations, that now possibly set ASM in Compostela 
Valley apart from that found in many other countries, was most apparent in the Diwalwal 
area in Monkayo (for a journalistic account of the Diwalwal gold rush see Gonzales & 
Conde, 2002a, 2002b; Bagayaua, 2008). Following the gradual involvement of Sino-
Filipino merchant capital from nearby Tagum City, what started out as smaller tunneling 
                                                          
15 Interview with landowner, Maco, October 2012. 
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operations similar to those found elsewhere in Compostela Valley gradually evolved into 
big tunnel portals owned and maintained by corporate-like ‘management’ structures. 
While some of these mining groups eventually registered with the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue, the operations in question were never fully formalized. Competing for 
underground ore bodies, these mining groups gradually ‘oligopolized’ access to an 
intricate underground web of tunnels and destinos (side-tunnels) financed either directly 
by the management or by ‘independent’ financiers.  
In tandem with this professionalization of ASM, more complex systems of labour division 
ensued. Labour in the main (i.e. management-owned) tunnel portal such as electricians, 
haulers, explosives experts, and drillers, were increasingly paid a fixed wage. Corpo 
members inside the destinos, meanwhile, continued to work under the revenue sharing 
scheme that made small-scale gold mining so appealing in the first place. However, 
revenue sharing became increasingly skewed in favor of the financier. After the landowner 
is given a 10 per cent share and the financier has been recompensed for all operational 
expenses, net proceedings are divided between the management of the main tunnel portal 
and (in case there is one) the destino. Within these destinos there is a second sharing 
between the destino owner (financier) and the corpo. The precise allocation of revenues 
between capital and labour depends on a range of factors, including not just the degree of 
capitalization, but also the reputation of the tunnel owner, the proven gold content of the 
tunnel, and the size of the management. The management share typically varies between 
20 and 70 percent, while that of the destino will (obviously) vary from 30 to 80 per cent. 
Leaving aside these revenue sharing arrangements as such, financiers developed various 
other strategies to appropriate a bigger share of the surplus, which will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 4. Still, even these more capitalized operations continued to rely 
heavily on manual labour for digging, hauling and processing ores. Hence, higher degrees 
of capitalization expanded rather than reduced the ASM-sector’s ability to absorb surplus 
labour.  
At the same time the gradual capitalization of ASM created opportunities for accumulation 
for a nascent and highly heterogeneous mining elite. As regional political and economic 
elites felt the pinch of economic crisis, they were looking for ways to invest and 
accumulate money, preferably foreign exchange. ASM provided them with an exciting and 
potentially highly lucrative investment opportunity. Xavier, a member of a small-scale 
mining association and the owner of several tunnels and a processing plant, is a good 
illustration. His family owned a 6 hectare vegetable farm and a lumberyard. However, 
during the 1980s the logging industry was facing severe problems and the lumberyard 
went broke. While the farm could sustain the family’s consumption needs, it failed to 
provide opportunities for social mobility for the children. For this reason, Xavier’s father 
heeded the call of his friends to venture into gold mining. As he grew older, Xavier 
gradually became engaged in mining himself.  
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This increased involvement of outside financiers did not prevent a degree of social 
mobility within the workforce. Several of the landowners and miners who ‘got lucky’ by 
hitting ‘high-grade’ –a highly arbitrary term which basically means high income-earning 
over a short period of time– started their own tunneling and processing operations. One 
example is Jun, who started working as an abantero in Nabunturan in 1985. Back in those 
days operations were still basic and based on equal sharing. After working in several 
tunnels he hit ‘high-grade’, and he used this income to finance several of his own tunnels 
in different mining areas. He also bought a ball mill to process his ores, allowing him to 
save money that would otherwise be spent on a ball mill operator.  
Another important segment of the nascent mining elite was Sino-Filipino merchant capital. 
From the start, Sino-Filipino merchants were in firm control of gold buying, -processing 
and the trade in mining supplies. In the wake of the Diwalwal gold rush these merchants 
became directly involved in financing ASM. Meanwhile by the end of the 1980s the 
transition from corporate large-scale mining to informal ASM had come full circle, and in 
tandem with the (semi-)skilled labour force, many of those (formerly) employed in the 
higher echelons of large-scale mining became engaged in the booming ASM-sector. Aside 
from financing mining operations, these people would also bring along machinery, mining 
expertise, and in some cases entire teams of skilled miners. Consider the story of Romeo, 
who started working in APEX mining as an assistant-miner in 1981. Because the risks 
associated with the job were out of line with low wages, many of his colleagues left the 
company in the 1980s. By 1990 APEX was no longer in a position to pay the salaries, 
leading to increased social unrest and eventually the stoppage of the mining operations. He 
then decided to join some of his colleagues, who had been invited by one of the APEX-
engineers to the nearby province of Agusan del Sur, where he worked in an operation that 
was “very similar” to that of APEX. 
Finally, attention should be drawn to the relationship between armed groups and ASM 
(this relationship is discussed in more detail in chapter 7). Without falling prey to wild-
west like clichés, in the 1980s and early 1990s eastern Mindanao was a highly volatile and 
militarized region. Despite attempts on the part of the martial law regime to establish some 
degree of control over Mindanao’s resources (presidential decree 1899, the first law on 
small-scale gold mining, is but one example), particularly in the uplands this control was 
virtually non-existent. Instead, a range of armed groups –ranging from army battalions 
over communist rebels of the New People’s Army (NPA) to Muslim rebels of the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)– were roaming eastern Mindanao. In those mining areas 
where some degree of stability was attained, it usually hinged on ‘gentlemen’s 
agreements’ between ASM-financiers and armed actors who provided ‘protection’ 
services. Consider the following interview excerpts:   
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“The situation was very insecure, many groups were clashing. Some were Muslims, 
NPAs and the army. Their relationship with the mining was very close. They were 
all asking for a share, and in return they say “we will protect you”, but in reality 
everybody pays because everybody is a threat.”16  
“In the 1980s the NPA maintained peace and order in the area. (…)  Financiers 
could operate as long as they paid their contribution. The NPA would ask for 
‘shifting’ in the good tunnels. (…) Even today the NPA monitors the area and asks 
money from those with ‘high-grade’. (…) In 1986 the army entered the area and we 
had to evacuate to Nabunturan. After a week we returned and the operations 
resumed. The army detachment stayed until 1992 and also did shifting. (…).”17  
While the rank-and-file of these groups were often directly involved in ASM, either as 
diggers or as portal guards, several of their commanders started financing tunnels. The 
volatile security situation resulted in armed actors having a comparative advantage over 
their ‘civilian’ peers, and many of those (formerly) affiliated with armed groups became 
figures of authority inside mining areas. Over time, highly heterogeneous commercial-
military networks emerged which came to preside over the ASM-sector.  
THE 1990S: ASM-EXPANSION AND REGULATORY STABILIZATION 
Throughout the 1990s ASM continued to expand at a gradual but persistent pace, despite 
relatively low gold prices. In line with dynamics observed elsewhere (Bryceson & 
Jønsson, 2011), the sector witnessed increasing degrees of labour mobility, with migrant 
miners moving between different mining areas in search of good mining opportunities. In 
tandem with rising degrees of labour mobility, financiers also began to diversify 
geographically. Capitalizing on a network of informants throughout the region, whenever 
an area was deemed ‘high-grade’, the bigwigs try to work their way in. While this often 
entails absorbing existing tunnel operators and the landowner in the new tunnel 
management and associated revenue sharing arrangements, in other cases financiers have 
been known to start new, bigger tunneling operations, aimed at ‘undermining’ the others, 
or simply to revert to the use of force to monopolize access to gold-bearing land.  
The expansion of tunneling went hand in hand with the increased availability of 
processing facilities. Landowners –many of whom gradually started to neglect farming– 
and financiers increasingly invested in their own ball mills, which meant not only that ores 
could now be more readily converted into gold locally, but also that people had a greater 
sense of control over the commodity chain, which further added to ASM’s appeal and 
accessibility. The late 1980s also saw the introduction of carbon-in-pulp (CIP) processing. 
                                                          
16 Interview with former miner, Maawab, January 2012. 
17 Interview with landowner and barangay official, Nabunturan, October 2012. 
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Although it would take years before CIP-processing became accessible for smaller ASM-
operators, the higher recovery rates associated with CIP-processing dramatically improved 
the profitability of ASM, also because silver could now be extracted. Taken together, these 
different trends –increased mobility of capital and labour, and better and more accessible 
processing facilities– created ‘multiplier effects’, with mining skills and technology 
gradually diffusing throughout Compostela Valley. As a result, throughout the 1990s 
tunneling operations of varying sizes and with various degrees of capitalization were 
mushrooming throughout the region. 
A final factor that should be taken into account is the changing political environment, 
which became increasingly amenable towards the survival and arguably the further 
expansion of ASM. Slowly but surely, local state institutions emboldened by the local 
government code of 1991 were penetrating the uplands, with the barangay (the lowest 
political-administrative unit in the Philippines) in particular becoming an important source 
of fiscal-regulatory authority. Barangay politics inside mining areas were increasingly 
dominated by local miner-landowners who had a stake in maintaining a degree of 
regulatory stability, also to protect their own interests in ASM. For this purpose, the 
barangay started to undertake a range of regulatory interventions, while relying on the 
Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO), a barangay militia, for the enforcement of peace 
and order. This gradual emergence of a barangay-centered regulatory order, which will be 
discussed in much more detail in chapter 5, became a factor in its own right enabling the 
expansion of ASM. 
THE NEW GOLD RUSH  
Particularly in recent years, and partly as a result of skyrocketing gold prices, ASM 
underwent a renewed, dramatic expansion. Several new gold rush sites emerged (notably 
in Nabunturan and Maragusan), while areas that were deemed exhausted were 
rehabilitated or have even become ‘high-grade’. This process was galvanized by a further 
‘democratization’ of processing, with the municipality of Nabunturan in particular (due to 
its location along the national highway) witnessing a proliferation of CIP-plantas. For 
many financiers, higher gold prices made it worthwhile to invest in a planta, as illustrated 
by the following interview excerpt. 
“We started with our progressive operation in the 1990s. We started with a ball 
mill but some years ago we realized that it is best to own your own planta, 
otherwise you lose lots of money. For outsiders we charge 65000 pesos plus 
additional expenses per 20 tonnes.”18  
                                                          
18 Interview with mining financier and planta owner, Nabunturan, February 2012. 
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In addition, Compostela Valley now boasts several laboratories that employ professional 
chemists. In combination with better processing methods, the assay (mineral content) 
readings provided by these laboratories significantly reduced the ‘geological risk’ inherent 
to gold mining, enabling gold to be detected even in those areas where gold veins are not 
visible. Consider the following account given by a landowner-miner in Nabunturan:  
“We started exploring in our area because there is now a CIP in Nabunturan. It is 
easier to extract gold, even when the assay is not very high or the veins are not big 
(…) When we find a vein, we bring some rocks to the laboratory, and when there is 
a high assay we look for a financier (…) We need to be quick in order to access the 
high-grade, before others do.”19  
Meanwhile the supply of new labour recruits shows no sign of abating. Rather, there is 
now an apparent oversupply of labour in some mining areas, as illustrated by the hordes of 
people engaged in river panning or in reworking the tailings (mocking) of bigger tunneling 
operations. During one field visit, the author spent several hours talking to people in what 
they called the ‘unemployment shelter’. What all of them had in common was the fact that 
they were mainly young migrants from a rural background. Being non-local usually 
implies being bereft of a connection to local landowners and barangay officials, who are 
often prime gatekeepers in local labour markets. While the livelihood trajectories of 
today’s miners exhibit a significant degree of variation, there are also important 
similarities, not least with regards to persistently high levels of mobility, both in spatial 
and sectoral terms. For many miners, ASM fits in with a longer and seldom progressive 
trajectory of livelihood diversification, which usually involves job-hopping between 
inferior and temporary jobs that straddle the formal-informal divide.  
Two brief examples can illustrate these observations. The first one is that of Jorito, who 
started his career as a fisherman in Zamboanga in the early 1980s. While his income was 
decent, the job was very dangerous, so he moved on to become a ‘truckboy’ (truck 
assistant) for several months. He then became an employee in his aunt’s rice store free of 
charge, before finding a job in a banana plantation in Panabo City. Here he met his 
girlfriend, who was from Nabunturan. In 1989 they moved to Nabunturan, where Jorito 
became engaged in mining, first as a ‘sacker’ filling ore bags; then as an abantero moving 
between different tunneling operations while maintaining the coffee farm of his parents-in-
law. In 2010 he started a self-financed tunnel together with his neighbors, but due to small 
and discontinuous income he is now on the lookout for abantero work. However, 
competition is tough these days. The second example is that of Raymond, who was born in 
Davao del Sur, where his parents worked as farm workers in a DOLE plantation. When he 
was 13 years old he started working night shifts in a bakery to contribute to the family 
income. After he met his girlfriend he decided to look for a better job, ending up working 
                                                          
19 Interview with landowner, Nabunturan, October 2012. 
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intermittently in construction and farming. 2001 was a dramatic year, as his partner died 
and both of his parents lost their jobs in the plantation. Together with his parents he moves 
to Kapalong, but a lack of income soon lures him to Nabunturan, where his brother-in-law 
works as a miner. Soon however his brother-in-law heads leaves for Manila, leaving him 
stuck with no contacts. He tries to make ends meet by combining a range of jobs, 
including tire repair and logging. In 2012 his brother-in-law returns and helps him to 
access a corpo. Today he works as an abantero, and for the first time ever he manages to 
earn a decent living. While this is not the right place to discuss the structural problems 
facing the Philippine economy, these examples hint at a profound crisis in (rural) labour 
markets. Long-term observers have suggested that economic crisis and underdevelopment 
in the Philippines (and in Mindanao in particular) have now assumed a (quasi-)permanent 
character (Bello et al., 2005). Despite impressive growth rates, economic development 
continues to be highly uneven, and labour markets have proven incapable of absorbing a 
growing labour surplus (Ofreneo, 2013).  
Finally, as will be discussed in much more detail in chapter 5, the heterogeneous class of 
ASM-financiers has become further entrenched in local politics. The governor, provincial 
board members, municipal mayors and countless barangay captains in Compostela Valley 
are now known to have a stake in ASM. In different mining areas included in the research, 
barangay officials are now facilitating and in some cases even administratively sanctioning 
agreements between financiers and landowners, usually in exchange for ‘fees’ and 
‘donations’. The provincial government is constructing roads that connect the mining 
areas to the lowland areas, and has put in place a sophisticated checkpoint system to tax 
ore transport, regardless of whether or not the ASM-activities in question are officially 
recognized by the national government. While falling short of full-blown formalization, 
this seemingly chaotic plethora of regulatory interventions nonetheless imbue ASM with a 
degree of regulatory predictability that facilitates its further expansion. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past few decades, small-scale gold mining has emerged as an increasingly 
important livelihood for tens- if not hundreds of thousands of people in Compostela 
Valley. In line with findings in the existing ASM-literature, ASM-expansion in 
Compostela Valley is primarily rooted in persistent (agricultural) poverty and a pervasive 
crisis in labour markets. However, while this poverty-driven narrative can duly account for 
the seemingly unremitting supply of new labour recruits, it is unable to explain the 
profound transformation that the sector has undergone since it first emerged in the 1970s-
1980s. More precisely, rudimentary panning and tunneling activities in line with the vast 
majority of ASM-activities worldwide, were increasingly accompanied- and replaced by 
more capitalized and mechanized tunneling operations that push the edge of what is 
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encapsulated by most existing definitions of ASM. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, these 
more capitalized operations and the more complex working practices associated with it 
have significantly improved the sector’s capacity to absorb surplus labour. Underlying this 
remarkable transformation is the increased involvement of a heterogeneous class of 
mining financiers. Whether having worked their way up the mining hierarchy, or 
becoming engaged in ASM from the outside, this involvement is not so much driven by 
subsistence needs as by a desire to accumulate income. Compared to earlier literature 
(arguably with the notable exceptions of Macmillan, 1995; Graulau, 2011 and to a lesser 
extent Clifford, 2011), I have made efforts to understand the composition of this nascent 
ASM-elite. Furthermore, attention has also been drawn to how these ‘capital interests’ 
have gradually acquired political power, contributing to the creation of a regulatory 
environment that is permissive if not amenable towards the further expansion of ASM.  
The relevance of these findings transcends Compostela Valley. While in many countries 
and regions (particularly in sub-Saharan Africa), ASM persists as a rudimentary 
subsistence activity, in countries like Suriname (Heemskerk, 2004), Brazil (Graulau, 
2011), Guyana (Clifford, 2011), but also in Ghana (Hilson, 2011) and Tanzania (Fisher, 
2007), ASM is undergoing a similar –albeit perhaps less outspoken– transformation, with 
an increased incidence of more complex ASM-arrangements that boast higher degrees of 
capitalization and mechanization. It would be an interesting and rewarding exercise to 
understand the processes fuelling this expansion elsewhere. In line with the analysis 
provided in this chapter, critical efforts should thereby be made to identify the ‘capital 
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CHAPTER 4: 




Verbrugge, B. (Forthcoming / Accepted for publication). The Economic Logic of 
Persistent Informality in Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining: Accumulation through 
Exploitation in the Southern Philippines. Development and Change. 
BACKGROUND: 
Taking up the question of persistent informality, I was surprised to find such a blatant 
disconnect between the ASM-literature and academic debates on informal sector activity. 
In this article I attempt to bridge this divide, leading to a radical re-interpretation not only 
of the reasons for persistent informality, but ultimately also for the massive expansion of 
ASM in recent decades.  
ARTICLE ABSTRACT: 
The article critically evaluates existing causal explanations for the persistence of 
informality in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), which share a legalistic focus on 
entry barriers and political impediments that prevent or discourage the formalization of 
poverty-driven ASM-operators. These explanations  fail to fully explain the situation in 
cases such as that of the Philippines, where ASM is characterized by a differentiation 
between a poverty-driven workforce and a dominant stratum of ASM-entrepreneurs. Even 
where otherwise hampered formalization frameworks provide ASM with a degree of legal 
recognition, said recognition is usually limited to these more powerful ASM-interests, 
while excluding the workforce at large. An integrative approach to analysing informality 
in ASM is then proposed, which complements the existing legalistic focus on entry 
barriers with a structuralist concern over the exploitation of informal labour. Seen from 
this perspective, the massive expansion of ASM in the Philippines can alternatively be 
seen as the product of a transition away from capital-intensive large-scale mining, to a 
flexible regime of accumulation built around the exploitation of informal ASM-labour. 
This observation urges us to pay more critical attention to the economic logic and the 
vested interests underlying the (selective) persistence of informality in the workforce. 
  52 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite notable efforts on the part of host governments to regulate ASM, informality 
remains one of the sector’s defining features (Siegel & Veiga, 2009). Existing analyses of 
persistent informality in the sector tend to emphasize the fiscal, administrative, and 
political barriers that prevent “poverty-driven” (Hilson, 2010) ASM-operators from 
gaining legal access to mineral-bearing land (Hilson, 2013; Van Bockstael, 2014). 
However, these explanations fail to fully understand the situation in Compostela Valley, 
where ASM has reached a more advanced stage, and is characterized by a growing 
differentiation between a dominant stratum of ASM-entrepreneurs and a massive 
workforce. While existing causal explanations for the persistence of informality in ASM 
can duly explain why the former fail to secure the necessary permits and licenses, they are 
incapable of explaining why informality in the workforce and in employment 
arrangements persists, even in cases where a permit has been issued.  
To develop a more holistic understanding of the diverse causes and consequences of 
informality for different categories of actors involved in the ASM-sector, including the 
workforce, this chapter proposes an integrative approach for analyzing informality in 
ASM. Such an integrative approach bridges the divide between the existing ASM-
literature and structuralist informalization approaches, which treat the massive expansion 
of informal sector activity in recent decades as an intricate product of economic crisis and 
-restructuring. More precisely, dwindling opportunities for accumulation in the formal 
sector have induced a massive shift towards strategies of accumulation that rely on the 
exploitation of cheap and flexible informal labour (Castells et al., 1989; Tabak & 
Crichlow, 2000). Applying this integrative approach to the predominantly informal ASM-
sector in Compostela Valley reveals how, following a profound crisis in the capital-
intensive large-scale mining sector in the 1980s and early 1990s, a massive transition 
occurred to more flexible ASM, whereby accumulation revolves around the exploitation of 
a massive informal workforce. In short, while informality is indeed partly a product of 
entry barriers and political impediments that serve to exclude ASM-operators from the 
formal economy, persistent informality in employment arrangements is also a matter of 
exploitation, and serves the interests of a dominant stratum of ASM-entrepreneurs.  
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TOWARDS AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH FOR 
ANALYZING INFORMALITY IN THE ASM-
SECTOR  
COMPETING THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INFORMAL SECTOR 
ACTIVITY20 
Entry, exit, and exclusion as dominant causal explanations  
Insofar as the informal sector received attention prior to the 1970s, it was often 
approached from a modernist viewpoint, as a remnant of traditional societies that is bound 
to disappear with economic progress (Tabak & Crichlow, 2000). The continued expansion 
of the informal sector in subsequent decades, both in developing and in developed 
countries, sparked intense academic debate. Initial explanations for the persistence of the 
informal sector were steeped in a pervasive dualism, which assumes a strict dichotomy 
between the formal and the informal sector. One influential approach, closely associated 
with the International Labour Organization, saw the informal sector as a marginal 
economy populated by petty entrepreneurs (ILO, 1972). These dualist approaches treat 
informal sector growth as‘counter-cyclical: expanding in times of crisis, and contracting in 
times of growth.  
With the ascendance of neoliberal development paradigms, more optimistic, legalistic 
approaches to informality emerged. Closely associated with the work of Peruvian 
economist Hernando de Soto (2000), legalistic approaches view the informal sector as a 
reservoir of “plucky micro-entrepreneurs” (Chen, 2008: 22) who lack formal property 
rights due to various fiscal-regulatory barriers that prevent their entry in a formal sector 
dominated by a “mercantilist” elite that deliberately aims to exclude them (de Soto, 1989). 
These observations legitimized minimalistic formalization programs that focus on the 
registration of (previously unregistered) property rights. In recent years a related 
voluntarist approach has gained popularity. While also paying attention to fiscal and 
regulatory barriers in the formal economy, the focus lies on how these provide rational 
economic actors with incentives to exit the formal economy (Maloney, 2004). 
While these leading approaches to informal sector activity continue to resonate widely, 
they have been criticized on a number of accounts. For one, by depicting the informal 
sector as a homogeneous group of self-employed individuals, they fail to recognize the 
heterogeneous and segmented character of informal sector activity (Biles, 2008). 
Furthermore, the dualist assumptions underpinning these approaches preclude a fuller 
                                                          
20 This section draws on Chen (2008), who provides an excellent overview of different theoretical approaches to 
informal sector activity. 
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understanding of how the informal sector is entangled with the formal sector, and how the 
expansion of informal sector activity is embedded in the “longue durée” of capitalism 
(Tabak & Crichlow, 2000). 
Structuralist informalization approaches and the exploitation of informal labour  
Engaging with these criticisms are neo-Marxist, structuralist approaches to informal sector 
activity. Closely associated with the work of Alejandro Portes (Castells et al., 1989; Portes 
& Schauffler, 1993), structuralist approaches do not study the informal sector as a distinct 
set of economic activities, but draw attention to informalization as a long-term systemic 
process, embedded in the ebbs and flows of global capitalism (Tabak & Crichlow, 2000). 
The expansion of informal sector activity in recent decades is not simply seen as a bottom-
up reaction to economic crisis or over-regulation, but as a capitalist response to a crisis of 
accumulation in the formal sector. More precisely, to counter declining profit rates and to 
avoid “the costs of social security obligations and other substantial overhead costs of 
formal sector operation” (Meagher, 1995: 260), employers have increasingly reverted to 
the exploitation of a cheap informal labour reserve.  
Analytically, structuralist approaches focus on three distinct features of informal sector 
activity21. First, they aim to understand the heterogeneous and differentiated character of 
the informal sector. Portes and Schauffler (1993) distinguish between subsistence-, 
autonomous-, and subordinate informal sector activity. While the first two categories form 
the domain of respectively dualist and legalistic approaches, the third category involves 
those activities linked with production and consumption in the formal economy, and forms 
the focal point of structuralist approaches. Similarly, Harriss-White distinguishes between 
small-scale informal activity (i.e. those activities with minimal entry barriers and “below 
size thresholds for taxation and labor regulation”) and interstitial informal activity, which 
takes place “in and around registered or formal businesses or state bureaucracies” 
(Harriss-White, 2010: 171). In reality, off course, informal sector work is characterized by 
complex employment arrangements that cut across these categories (Biles, 2009). 
Nonetheless, for analytical purposes it is still useful to distinguish between informal self-
employment (including both informal own-account workers and informal employees) and 
informal wage employment (Chen, 2008).  
Secondly, attention is drawn to the intricate connections that connect the formal to the 
informal economy. The defining logic of these connections is the exploitation of informal 
labour by formal sector interests. This exploitation can occur directly, with companies 
hiring workers “off the books", or indirectly, through outsourcing and subcontracting as 
“the primary means of linking the formal and the informal economy” (Peterson, 2010: 
224). Attention has also been drawn to the role of middlemen who recruit and discipline 
                                                          
21 This section draws heavily on Meagher, 1995. 
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informal labour, and act as “the link between providers of capital in the form of raw 
materials or semi-products’ and ‘workers whose labour adds value to them” (Breman, 
1999: 455).  
A third focal point22 is the enabling role of state institutions and social networks in 
processes of informalization. Although many states simply lack the capacity to regulate 
the informal economy, “the expansion of informality since the 1970s (…) demands the 
complicity of the state” (Meagher, 1995: 265). For one, “ambiguous and inconsistent 
policy, and policy that is difficult to enforce, represent an implicit encouragement of 
informalization” (Ibid.: 277; see also Fernandez-Kelly & Garcia, 1989). The enabling role 
of the state in the informalization of the economy was –somewhat paradoxically– further 
galvanized by structural adjustment, which supported a “deinstitutionalization and 
decentralization of the economy” (Meagher, 1995: 278). Finally, state actors may be 
politically inclined to condone or even support informal sector activity, because it provides 
the population with valuable opportunities for survival and accumulation, thereby 
contributing to sociopolitical stability (Rubbers, 2007). Where social networks are 
concerned, for our purposes it is particularly important to understand them as an 
organizational structure that connects “the employer to a supply of “trustworthy” labour” 
(Weiss, 1987: 229).   
Towards an integrative approach 
While these different approaches to informal sector activity clearly have explanatory 
power in the face of persistent informality, each of them offers only a partial explanation 
for persistent informality as it presents itself to a particular section of the informal 
economy (Chen, 2008). Whereas legalistic and voluntarist approaches are clearly more 
relevant in the case of the informal self-employed, persistent informality in the workforce 
often stems from a combination of exclusion (from existing regulatory frameworks) and 
exploitation, and is better understood through a structuralist prism.  
What is needed, then, is an integrative approach for analyzing informality, which couples 
a nuanced understanding of the structural characteristics of the informal economy to an 
analysis of different types of informality; combining causal explanations that focus on 
entry, exit, exclusion as well as exploitation (Chen, 2008). Similarly, Biles proposes to 
study the informal sector through the holistic concept of regulation, which pays attention 
not just to “the legal status of the activity” but also to “the relationship between employer 
and employee (access to social protections and benefits such as health care and pensions), 
and conditions within the workplace (e.g. working conditions, hours, and wages)” (Biles, 
2009: 116).  
                                                          
22 While Meagher (1995) discusses the role of the state and social networks separately, for analytical purposes I opted 
to discuss them together.  
  56 
 
THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE PERSISTENCE OF INFORMALITY 
IN ASM 
Informality: a question of entry, exit and exclusion? 
As discussed in chapter 3, ASM-observers have long been preoccupied with disproving 
images of a sector composed of opportunist fortune-seekers. An academic consensus has 
emerged that attributes ASM-expansion to a pervasive subsistence crisis, caused by 
interrelated processes of structural adjustment, de-agrarianization (e.g. Banchirigah, 2007; 
Hilson, 2010; Hilson & Garforth, 2012), and in some cases even by armed conflict (Hilson 
& Van Bockstael, 2011). This poverty-driven view of ASM as a survival activity whose 
“low barriers to entry mean that smallholders only require a pick and shovel to start 
working” (Kamlongera, 2011: 1131) is surprisingly akin to earlier dualist understandings 
of the informal sector, which treat it as a marginal subsistence economy.  
Meanwhile the idea that poverty-driven ASM-operators require enforceable property 
rights is now well-established in policy circles, and many countries have set up permit- 
and licensing schemes (Siegel & Veiga, 2009). However, efforts to formalize ASM have 
largely failed to materialize. Causal explanations for the persistence of informality are in 
line with dominant legalistic approaches to informal sector activity, emphasizing the 
fiscal-administrative barriers and political impediments that prevent and/or discourage 
formalization (Tschakert & Singha, 2007; Maconachie & Hilson, 2011; Hilson, 2013; Van 
Bockstael, 2014). The prevailing sentiment in many countries is nicely captured by 
Banchirigah’s observations about Ghana: “Although the government has long legalised 
ASM, requiring prospective applicants to follow a series of streamlined regulations to 
obtain a concession, ineffective policies and bureaucratic inefficiency have impeded 
formalisation, making illegal activity more appealing.” (Banchirigah, 2008: 29).  
With regards to political obstacles, important questions have been raised over elite capture 
of the formalization process. In Tanzania, formal licenses accrue primarily to those actors 
with the necessary procedural knowledge and political connections. Another major reason 
for the persistence of informality in many countries is government support for large-scale 
mining (Hilson & Potter, 2005; Banchirigah, 2007). In several of these countries, ASM-
formalization was a “legislative afterthought”, introduced after mining companies 
monopolized access to mineral-bearing land (Banchirigah & Hilson, 2009). Hilson even 
sees informality as “an intentional construct on the part of policymakers and donors” 
(Hilson, 2013: 56), who prioritize large-scale mining over ASM, while “making it 
extremely difficult for individuals to secure the necessary paperwork and licenses to 
participate in the latter” (Ibid.: 54). 
Still others have noted how at least some ASM-operators may not necessarily be interested 
in acquiring a formal license (Geenen, 2012), and may instead be satisfied with access that 
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is negotiated informally (Van Bockstael, 2014). Meanwhile Cartier and Bürge have noted 
that “Operating without a license offers many gold miners greater mobility and flexibility 
in their search for commercially viable gold deposits and also suits more rudimentary, 
temporary and seasonal mining activities” (Cartier & Bürge, 2011: 1089).   
Whither differentiation and exploitation? 
Causal explanations for the persistence of informality in ASM that focus on entry, exit, 
and exclusion resonate widely, and give rise to policy recommendations that focus on 
‘democratizing’ registration procedures and on segregating mineral-bearing land for ASM 
(Hilson, 2013). However, based on the critical overview of theoretical approaches to 
informal sector activity provided above, several shortcomings can be identified. These 
shortcomings essentially stem from rather simplistic images of a dual mining economy 
that is assumed to be bifurcated between formal, capital-intensive large-scale mining; and 
informal, poverty-driven and rudimentary ASM (for a recent example see Canavesio, 
2014). While these images may well capture the situation in some countries, these overly 
simplistic dualistic assumptions bar us from fully appreciating the complexity of ASM, 
and the reasons fuelling its persistent informality, in cases like Compostela Valley.  
For one, images of an exclusively informal ASM-sector do not always correspond to 
realities on the ground. Instead, in countries with a longstanding tradition of ASM-
regulation such as Ghana and Tanzania, the sector has “evolved into a highly intertwined 
group of semi-formal sectors operating with varying degrees of legal registrations.” 
(Teschner, 2012: 308). Furthermore, as Chachage (1995) has demonstrated for the 
Tanzanian case, there has been a long history of interaction between large-scale mining 
and ASM, with the latter typically in a subordinate position. Arguably more problematic is 
that explanations which treat ASM as a poverty-driven subsistence sector often fail to 
account for its heterogeneous and differentiated character. In recent years, our 
understanding of the different working practices, employment arrangements, and 
organizational practices in ASM has improved immensely (e.g. Jønsson & Fold, 2009; 
Cartier & Bürge, 2011). Furthermore, research in countries as diverse as Tanzania (Fisher, 
2007), Guyana (Clifford, 2011) and the Philippines (see chapter 3) has revealed a 
formative role for outside financiers. More precisely, the injection of outside capital has 
led to a growing differentiation between ASM-operations in terms of their level of 
capitalization and professionalization, but also to a differentiation between a class of 
ASM-entrepreneurs and a poverty-driven workforce. In all, however, attempts to explain 
persistent informality in ASM remain disconnected from these more nuanced 
understandings of the structural characteristics of the sector. One notable exception is 
Fisher, who couples a discussion of formalization efforts in Tanzania to an empirical 
analysis of working- and sharing arrangements in ASM. In doing so, she argues that while 
formalization efforts benefit “certain wealthier categories of people, who fit into the 
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model of an ‘entrepreneurial small-scale miner’” (Fisher, 2007: 735), they simultaneously 
neglect existing employment arrangements, thereby reinforcing rather than mitigating 
existing practices of exclusion and exploitation.  
Towards an integrative approach for analyzing informality in ASM 
In short, existing analyses of persistent informality in the ASM-sector are strongly 
influenced by dualist, legalistic and (to a lesser extent) voluntarist approaches to informal 
sector activity. What is lacking in the ASM-literature is an engagement with structuralist 
concerns over the exploitation of informal labour, and its position in broader strategies of 
accumulation. In short, there is an urgent need for an integrative approach for analyzing 
informality in ASM, which complements more ‘mainstream’ concerns over entry, exit and 
exclusion with a critical structuralist concern over exploitation. Such a structuralist lens 
obliges us to look at (1) Historical processes of differentiation in the ASM-sector; (2) 
Possible (historical) linkages between ASM and large-scale mining; and (3) The role of 
state actors and social networks in the recruitment and possibly the exploitation of 
informal labour. In the remainder of this chapter, I will illustrate the added value of such 
an integrative approach in the case of Compostela Valley province.  
THE CASE OF COMPOSTELA VALLEY 
PROVINCE  
REGULATORY EFFORTS AND PERSISTENT INFORMALITY 
Since the start of the 1980s gold rush, successive governments have undertaken efforts to 
extend the state’s regulatory control over ASM23. In 1984 president Marcos created a 
highly permissive permit system for ASM through Presidential Decree No. 1899. In 1991, 
Republic Act No. 7076  (the ‘People’s Small-Scale Mining Act’) put in place more 
stringent requirements for ASM, creating provincial/city mining regulatory boards 
authorized to segregate ‘people’s small-scale mining areas’ (Minahang Bayan) wherein 2-
year renewable contracts may be awarded to ASM-cooperatives registered with the 
securities and exchange commission and the cooperative development authority. Both PD 
1899 and RA 7076 reflect international understandings of ASM, defining small-scale 
mining as “artisanal with heavy reliance on manual labor and without the use of 
explosives and/or blasting accessories (…) prohibited from using sophisticated and/or 
heavy equipment, i.e. excavators, loaders, backhoes, dozers, drilling machines and/or 
                                                          
23 Relevant laws and regulations can be consulted on the website of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau: 
www.mgb.gov.ph. 
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related or similar equipment for the extraction and/or breakage of materials”24. Several 
other administrative- and executive orders further specified and tightened existing 
regulations, particularly in the domain of land use, safety, and environment.  
Despite these different regulatory efforts, most ASM-operations continue without the 
required permits. Furthermore, while the bangko sentral (central bank) retains a formal 
monopoly on gold buying, after reaching an all-time high of 42.9 billion Philippine Pesos 
(around US$ 1 billion) in 2010, official gold sales have plummeted, and there has been a 
massive increase in illegal gold smuggling (Francisco, 2012). In the remainder of this 
chapter I aim to provide an explanation for the persistence of informality in the ASM-
sector based on the integrative approach outlined in the previous section. For the sake of 
analytical clarity, this explanation will be structured along the lines of the four major 
causal explanations for informality as identified by Chen (2008): entry, exit, exclusion 
and, last but not least, exploitation.  
ENTRY, EXIT AND EXCLUSION: VIABLE EXPLANATIONS FOR 
PERSISTENT INFORMALITY? 
Informality as a deliberate exit strategy? 
At least in part, informality is a matter of lacking state capacity, with numerous state 
officials complaining how limited human and financial resources prevent them from 
monitoring ASM-activities, which often take place in remote areas. This situation is 
further complicated by the transient nature of ASM –which is often described as a “hit-
and-miss” activity– and the presence of armed groups, some of which (particularly the 
communist New People’s Army) are hostile towards (national) government actors.  
While lacking state capacity offers opportunities to evade government supervision, ASM-
operators also have clear incentives to do so. Government officials repeatedly suggested 
that exit is indeed a viable causal explanation for the lack of official permits: “We are 
waiting for them, they should join forces, form a cooperative, and apply for a permit. Then 
they should come to our office and comply with the registration procedures. But they do 
not respond, it seems that they are not interested in being regulated.”25. ASM-operators, 
many of whom no longer qualify as small-scale according to existing definitions, would 
indeed have a major problem if they would have to comply with the strict “mine safety 
rules and regulations” provided by Administrative Order 97-30, or the ban on mercury use 
–still a widely used method for gold extraction– introduced by Executive Order 79. 
Furthermore, the dramatic rise in illegal gold trading since 2011 is clearly the result of the 
                                                          
24 DENR Memorandum Circular No. 2007-07: Clarificatory guidelines in the implementation of the small-scale 
mining laws. Retrieved from http://mgb.gov.ph/Files/Policies/dmc-2007-07.pdf. 
25 Interview with provincial government official, Nabunturan, October 2012. 
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imposition of a 2 percent excise tax and a 5 percent withholding tax on gold sales 
(Francisco, 2012).  
Informality due to entry barriers?  
While ASM-operators thus have clear incentives to evade government regulation, most 
still expressed a sincere hope to obtain a permit. However, a range of fiscal and 
administrative barriers prevent most of them from actually doing so. Applicants need to 
comply with a seemingly endless list of requirements in order to qualify for a permit or 
contract, including notarized application forms, survey plans prepared by a land surveyor, 
a surety bond, a technical evaluation report from the MGB, Environmental Compliance 
Certificates from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, business permits 
and zoning certifications issued by local governments, a mining plan prepared by an 
engineer, and proofs of financial and technical capability issued by a financial 
institution26. These different administrative requirements carry significant costs, in the 
form of filing-, processing-, clearance- and registration fees. These costs are further 
inflated by pervasive rent-seeking, with respondents admitting to having paid “standard 
operating procedures” or “under the table” to smoothen the permit (renewal) process. 
Respondents from different provinces mentioned permit costs ranging from PHP 100,000-
300,000 (US$ 2500-7500), an amount most ASM-operators can never produce. 
Informality as a product of an exclusivist formal economy? 
In addition to these entry barriers, various political impediments conspire to exclude 
ASM-operators from the formal economy. In addition to pervasive rent-seeking on the part 
of state officials, the allocation of permits is also plagued by nepotism and patronage. It is 
crucial for ASM-operators to have connections at the level of the provincial governor, who 
retains a high degree of control over the allocation of permits through the Provincial 
Mining Regulatory Board. Ultimately, this gives rise to the fairly paradoxical situation 
whereby those able to comply with the permit process are often amongst those who no 
longer qualify as small-scale miners according to existing legal definitions.  
Another key requirement for ASM-operators to even qualify for a permit is to obtain the 
consent of existing surface- and/or mineral rights holders. In some cases, land- and 
associated royalty rights are claimed by a tribal community under the Indigenous People’s 
Rights Act of 1997. Furthermore, and in line with the situation in countries like Ghana 
(Hilson, 2013), the national government seems to be prioritizing large-scale mining over 
ASM, awarding increasingly large tracts of mineral-bearing land to large- mining 
companies, who are reluctant to (legally) condone the presence of ASM inside their 
concession. Finally, large portions of mineral-bearing land have been declared as protected 
areas by the national government, effectively making them off bounds for mining. 
                                                          
26 This list was provided by the Provincial Agriculturalist Office (PAGRO) of Compostela Valley province. 
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Whither persistent informality in/for the workforce?   
Most analyses end here, providing causal explanations which focus on entry, exit and/or 
exclusion. However, such explanations cannot fully account for the situation in places like 
Compostela Valley where, despite a clear stipulation in RA 7076 that “All persons 
undertaking small-scale mining activities shall register as miners (…) and may organize 
themselves into cooperatives in order to qualify for the awarding of a people’s small-scale 
mining contract”, the workforce remains effectively excluded from existing formalization 
efforts. Instead, even where a cooperative has been issued a contract, its membership is 
often restricted to financiers and royalty-receiving landowners. In an attempt to remedy 
this shortcoming, I now turn to a historical, structuralist analysis of ASM in Compostela 
Valley, which pays central analytical attention to processes of differentiation in the sector, 
to historical linkages between ASM and large-scale mining, and to the role of state actors 
and social networks in the informal mining sector. The central argument that will be 
presented is that the massive expansion of predominantly informal ASM-activities in 
Compostela Valley can alternatively be seen as a process of informalization in the mining 
sector, epitomized by a transition away from capital-intensive large-scale mining, to a 
flexible regime of accumulation built around ASM and the exploitation of informal labour. 
ASM-EXPANSION AND THE INFORMALIZATION OF MINING IN 
COMPOSTELA VALLEY 
Boom-bust cycles in the Philippine mining sector 
While the Philippines have a long history of artisanal gold mining (Caballero, 1996), 
during American colonial rule in the first half of the 20th century the country saw the 
emergence of a modern mining sector (Habana, 2008). In 1936, Commonwealth Act 137 
put in place a mineral tenure system that enabled the government, as the exclusive owner 
of mineral resources, to grant private large-scale mining concessions (Lopez, 1992). While 
the nascent corporate mining sector displaced and/or absorbed many of the artisanal 
miners as unskilled wage labour, it did not destroy ASM altogether. Instead, cursory 
evidence suggests that the expansion of large-scale mining gave further impetus to ASM, 
as “The exposure of deeper lode veins made by the big mines made readily available more 
mining holes and enriched the panning streams to these small mines” (Habana, 2008: 37). 
Power relations soon tilted in favor of the mining companies, which became “the main 
gold buyers, principal employers, and sources of credit and patronage.” (Ibid.: 33). 
However, the corporate mining boom came to a grinding halt with the outbreak of the 
Second World War.  
In the post-war decades war metallic mining expanded dramatically, and the 1950s and 
1960s saw the emergence of ‘mining giants’ like Philex and Atlas, which opened mining 
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projects throughout the country (Ofreneo, 2009). Under the impetus of rising gold prices, 
the 1970s became “undoubtedly the busiest for the mining industry as a whole. Old, 
dormant gold mines were reopened, new gold mines developed, existing copper mines 
expanded, and new copper projects undertaken” (Lopez, 1992: 264). While respondents 
indicated that these mining companies also employed cheap, unskilled local labour, 
particularly for infrastructure development, they ultimately relied on capital-intensive 
mining methods and skilled mining labour, which was reportedly among the best-paid in 
the country.  
By the 1980s, however, a combination of factors triggered a major crisis in the mining 
sector. The global oil crisis of the 1970s-1980s and the associated drop in mineral prices 
rendered capital-intensive large-scale mining increasingly unprofitable (Lopez, 1992; 
Santos, 2001; Ofreneo, 2009). The outbreak of a severe debt crisis led to rising pressures 
on the Marcos regime, with civil unrest and armed insurgency on the rise, particularly on 
the southern island of Mindanao (Abinales, 2000). Creditors lost faith in the Philippines, 
leading to unprecedented levels of capital flight (Hutchcroft, 1991). Faced with these 
uncertain prospects, president Marcos and his entourage were increasingly preoccupied 
with enriching themselves through “Crony business failures associated with an unstable 
environment which discouraged long-term local investment in favor of short-term gains” 
(Pinches, 1996: 112).  
The situation in the mining sector was no different. In 1974 President Marcos promulgated 
Presidential Decree 462, which sought to get rid of neocolonial ties with the US by putting 
a 40 per cent constitutional bar on foreign ownership. However, it also led to a retreat of 
foreign financial and human capital from the mining sector (Lopez, 1992). The subsequent 
‘Filipinization’ of the mining sector coincided with a proliferation of ‘one-of-kind 
arrangements and special deals’ (Clad, 1988: 76), whereby the Marcos government 
granted loan guarantees to selected local mining projects, many of which later defaulted 
on their debt obligations (Santos, 2001). In 1981 the government suddenly raised mining 
taxes, revealing once more the regulatory volatility in the mining sector (Lopez, 1992; 
Santos, 2001). In this environment, a growing number of mining companies fell prey to 
corruption, mismanagement, and rising production costs. 
The post-war mining sector of Compostela Valley provides a good illustration of these 
trends. From the 1950s onwards, Compostela Valley witnessed the entry of several big 
copper mining projects. After reaching their apex in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
however, these projects fell prey to an interplay between fledgling mineral markets and 
corporate mismanagement. The workforce bore the brunt of the crisis: “The crippling 
price crisis in the metals market and the recession-depression in the Philippines in the 
first half of the 1980s forced many mining companies to institute all kinds of cost-saving 
measures, including ways to reduce labour costs” (Lopez, 1992: 376). Increased social 
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unrest further galvanized the process of decay. APEX mining, still the biggest mining 
project of Compostela Valley, is a good example. Starting out as a copper mining project 
in the early 1970s, in response to rising gold prices in the 1980s APEX pursued an 
aggressive expansion of its gold mining operations (Lopez, 1992). However, by the early 
1980s the company’s operations went into decline, and by the mid-1980s the APEX-
concession was effectively controlled by a small group of company guards and engineers 
who were increasingly reneging on their responsibilities vis-à-vis the workforce, which 
“received no more salaries, had no cooperative, no canteen and no more supplies”27. This 
cleared the way for militant labour activism, spearheaded by the militant Southern 
Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL), which eventually culminated in a general strike in 
the late 1980s. While the engineers managed to temporarily stave off the labour shortage 
by hiring short-term contractual labour, by 1991 APEX, like nearby North Davao mining 
and SABENA mines, was forced to shut down its operations. 
From corporate mining, over subordinate ASM, to autonomous ASM 
Worsening conditions in large-scale mining led to an exodus of (semi-)skilled workers, 
many of whom became involved in rudimentary tunneling activities that targeted surface 
gold veins. Up to this point the narrative still conforms to existing accounts of ASM-
expansion in countries like Ghana (Hilson, 2010) and the DRC (Geenen, 2011), where 
former large-scale mining labour played an important role in ‘kick-starting’ ASM. In the 
Philippines, however, this transition to ASM was not confined to the ‘rank and file’. 
Instead, upon realizing their dwindling prospects in large-scale mining, a number of those 
involved in the higher echelons of the mining companies also shifted their attention to 
ASM, and came to play a vital role in the sector’s subsequent maturation.  
By the early 1980s, the APEX-management –or what remained of it– responded to the 
expansion of ASM by in initiating an “outside project”, which consisted in buying ores 
and ball mill tailings from ASM, and processing them inside the APEX compound28. In 
return, ASM-operators received a per ton lump sum, based on assay (mineral content) 
readings provided by the APEX-management. While compensations were not necessarily 
deemed fair by the miners in question, respondents nonetheless suggested that this 
additional source of income “inspired us to dig more ores”29. Thus, instead of being 
merely a subsistence response to economic crisis on the part of a destitute workforce, the 
shift to ASM was actively supported by corporate mining interests. 
From the mid-1980s onwards ASM would gradually ‘emancipate’ itself from corporate 
mining, as epitomized by the end of APEX’ outside project in the late 1980s. Some of the 
engineers and chemists previously employed in APEX and nearby North Davao mining 
                                                          
27 Interview with former APEX-employees, Maawab, January 2014. 
28 This was confirmed by several respondents, but see also Lopez, 1992. 
29 Interview with small-scale miner, Maco, February 2014. 
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decided to pool their skills and resources to set up their own corporation, Value Minerals 
(VMI). While VMI also financed its own tunnels, its main activity consisted in buying and 
processing ores and ball mill tailings from other ASM-operators. For this purpose VMI 
established the first CIP processing plant in Compostela Valley (and possibly in the 
Philippines as a whole) that was not owned by large-scale mining30. This led to a gradual 
democratization and diffusion of CIP-processing throughout Compostela Valley, which 
dramatically increased the profitability and feasibility of ASM.  
By the early 1990s the transition to ASM had even taken place inside the large-scale 
mining concessions. Following APEX’ closure in 1991, while many of its former workers 
left for one of the numerous gold rush areas in the region, others became engaged in ASM 
inside the company premises. Instead of a spontaneous effort on the part of a destitute 
workforce, this shift was orchestrated by the remaining APEX-engineers. Under the new 
set-up, they provided the workforce with materials (“sacks, picks, hammers, timber and 
nails”31) to maintain the tunnels, while retaining as much as 60 per cent of the ores. The 
remaining 40 per cent accrued to the workforce, although former workers recalled a 
company guard by the name of Chavez –known for “his big hands he used to slap you 
with”32– who played a key role in overseeing the operations, and who took an additional 
cut of the workers’ share. This manual mining episode lasted for roughly 3-4 years, after 
which APEX allegedly –the MGB claims to have no written records on this period– 
started sub-contracting its claim and infrastructure to outside investors.  
In nearby New Bataan, a similar combination of labour activism, company 
mismanagement, and decreasing copper prices led to the bankruptcy and subsequent 
nationalization of SABENA mines in the early 1980s (Santos, 2001). At around the same 
time part of SABENA’s mining concession witnessed the emergence of gold mining 
activities that were described by one respondent as “not large-scale, but also not really 
small-scale, they used blasting and a backhoe (…) there was manual labour inside the 
tunnel”33. According to several respondents company guards were involved in organizing 
these tunneling activities, and some even claimed that “the management had a helicopter 
just to take away the gold”34. While the labour force worked under a revenue sharing 
arrangement, remunerations were discontinuous, and as a result many of the workers 
started ‘going solo’. The end of this ‘illegal gold mining project’ coincided roughly with 
the end of martial law in the mid-1980s, and only several years later aforementioned Value 
Minerals (VMI) started tunneling the area anew.  
                                                          
30 Several interviews were conducted with VMI-employees in January-February 2014. 
31 Interviews with former APEX-employees, Maco, February 2014. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Interview with former SABENA-miner, New Bataan, February 2014. 
34 Ibid. 
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So far, I have demonstrated that the initial expansion of ASM in the 1980s and early 1990s 
can be understood as the product of a profound crisis in large-scale mining, with many of 
those previously involved in large-scale mining shifting their energy and resources to 
ASM. This included labourers looking for ways to compensate for their lost income, but 
also company cadres and skilled personnel who attempted to capitalize on shifting 
opportunities for accumulation. To fully understand the rationale underlying this transition 
away from capital-intensive large-scale mining to labour-intensive ASM, we now turn to 
an empirical analysis of the social relations of production in ASM, which reveals that 
accumulation strategies have (increasingly) come to revolve around the exploitation of 
informal labour. 
Differentiation and accumulation through exploitation in the ASM-sector 
Initially, ASM was a small-scale, self-financed affair, with miners and surface landowners 
each retaining an equal share of the ores. However, as demonstrated in chapter 3, the 
sector soon witnessed an increased involvement of outside financiers and skilled experts, 
enabling a capitalization and professionalization of ASM. This in turn led to a growing 
differentiation between artisanal- and more capitalized, “medium-scale” –as respondents 
themselves referred to them– tunneling operations; and between a dominant stratum of 
ASM-entrepreneurs and a massive workforce that is now falling prey to rising rates of 
exploitation. Exploitation is understood here as “the existence of a “surplus value” 
remaining when the value of a worker’s wage and the value of the means of production 
consumed by a worker are subtracted from the value of a worker’s produce. The rate of 
exploitation is the ratio of this surplus value to the value of the wage” (Burawoy, 1976: 
1056).  
In the first instance the financier advances the operational expenses for the mining 
operations. These include the price for mining tools, sacks, a generator, a water pump, and 
timber reinforcements. Some financiers also provide the workforce with food and shelter, 
and in some cases even with cash advances. Depending on the size of the operations, they 
also hire unskilled hauling-, packing and processing labour and/or (semi-) skilled workers 
such as carpenters, electricians, and sometimes even chemists and engineers. While the 
former are often hired on a casual basis and receive low piece-rate wages (e.g. per bag, per 
sack), the latter earn fairly decent wages and have longer-term job security. In addition to 
these operational expenses, and depending on the area in question, there is also a range of 
rent-seekers who will ask the financier for a share of the revenues. One, the (often 
informal) surface land claimant(s) often receive a 10-15 per cent royalty share. Local 
politicians also ask for a range of fees or “privileges”, and in many cases there is also a 
tribal association claiming land- and royalty rights under the Indigenous Peoples Rights 
Act (IPRA). Inside a Minahang Bayan, the rights-wielding cooperative will also ask for a 
royalty. Finally, Compostela Valley is home to a range of armed rent-seekers like the 
police (who also supply explosives), the army, and communist and Muslim rebels. These 
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operational expenses and rents are often deducted from the gross revenues, and put serious 
downward pressures on the net revenues that are redistributed between the financier and 
the workforce.  
The financier’s cut of these net revenues ranges from one share (with the number of shares 
depending on the number of workers) to 70 per cent. However, 40-60 and 60-40 (per cent) 
are common schemes for the distribution of revenues between the financier and the 
workforce. This workforce is invariably organized in a corpo, a group of miners operating 
a particular tunnel, which is headed by a team leader. Whereas corpo members supposedly 
retain one share each, it is not uncommon for the team leader or selected corpo members 
to receive a bonus from the financier. The situation becomes more complicated in bigger 
tunnel complexes, where tunnel portals branch out into side tunnels (destinos). While the 
main tunnel and some destinos are maintained and financed by the management, other 
destinos have independent financiers. In the latter case, there is a multi-tiered system of 
benefit-sharing, whereby the management usually retains 40 to 60 percent of the destino’s 
revenues, while the rest is shared between the financier and the corpo of the destino in 
question.  
Similar sharing schemes have been described elsewhere in positive terms (Godoy, 1988), 
and they are indeed characterized by a degree of mutuality: while financiers shift part of 
the risk to the labourers, the latter retain a chance to strike it rich, and are in many cases 
guaranteed subsistence by the financier in the form of basic food provisions, shelter, and 
sometimes even cash advances. However, these  provisions (like various other inputs) 
often come from the financiers’ own hardware store, warehouse, or gasoline station, and it 
is well known that financiers will mark up the price of these inputs. More importantly, 
many financiers now own their own processing facilities, either in the form of a ball mill 
or a more sophisticated CIP-planta, whose recovery rate (according to local respondents) 
is 2-3 times that of a ball mill. In cases where workers are paid in kind, they will process 
their ore share in a local ball mill, leaving the tailings for the owner who will then process 
these tailings in a planta for a custom milling fee (usually around PHP 80,000 or US$ 
2,000 for 20 tons). Increasingly, however, financiers process their ores directly in their 
own planta (or that of one of their associates), paying the workers a cash share and 
deducting the costs for ore transport and -processing as part of the operational expenses. 
At least intuitively, the higher recovery rate of CIP-processing should lead to a higher 
share for the workers. However, the sheer complexity of CIP-processing makes it difficult 
for workers to monitor production levels, while making it easier for financiers to cheat on 
the workforce. CIP-processing also enables the extraction of silver, the revenues of which 
are rarely (if ever) included in the revenue sharing. Ultimately, ASM in Compostela 
Valley is now characterized by high degrees of capital concentration, with financiers and 
processing plant owners –following the initial example of VMI– coalescing into cartel-like 
structures. Wherever a promising tunnel prospect arises, these ‘corporations’ will come in 
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and buy out- (by including them in the management), compete with-, or even drive out 
existing operators.  
Based on these initial observations, it can already be observed that the distribution of 
benefits in the sector favors a dominant stratum of ASM-entrepreneurs, a range of (armed) 
rent-seekers, and to a lesser extent those commanding vital skills and experience. 
Meanwhile the majority of the workforce, while depending on ASM for subsistence, is 
falling prey to high rates of exploitation. It should therefore not come as a complete 
surprise that several respondents expressed a clear preference for smaller, self-financed 
operations, because in their experience financiers will simply exploit the workforce. These 
observations about exploitation become more pressing when considering the dismal 
working- and living conditions inside ASM-areas. Miners work long hours inside narrow 
and extremely hot tunnels, faced with a constant risk of tunnel collapse, exacerbated by 
the use of explosives. There is also a high risk for pulmonary diseases and even 
suffocation, due to inadequate or non-existent ventilation. In order to cope with this 
extreme working environment, an increasing number of the workers is turning to the use 
of methamphetamines (shabu), which makes the situation even more dangerous. 
Meanwhile processing labour –and the mining population at large, for that matter 
(Appleton et al., 1999)– faces serious health risks due to a constant exposure to mercury 
and other toxics. Living conditions outside the tunnels are hard, particularly for the 
massive migrant workforce which relies on the financier for subsistence. Foodstuffs are 
basic, often not more than rice with canned sardines or dried fish, while accommodation in 
the “bunkhouse” is often not more than a plastic sheet for cover, and rudimentary beds 
made of rope. A final factor to consider is the high variability and volatility of income due 
to the geological uncertainty of gold mining. While this uncertainty is partly offset by the 
provision of subsistence needs and cash advances by the financier, which are widely seen 
as a token of goodwill, most respondents agreed that these provisions also function as a 
form of debt bondage, instilling a sense of loyalty and even obligation in the workforce 
(Breman, 1999).  
The enabling role of the state and social networks 
In this final section I will briefly consider the role of the state and social networks in 
condoning- or even facilitating accumulation through exploitation of informal ASM-
labour. In retrospect, it is remarkable how PD 1899, which was promulgated by President 
Marcos in 1984, captured the logic driving the informalization of mining, which was in 
full swing at the time. Not only did it mention that a combination of “inflation, volatile 
commodity prices, multiple increases of oil and fuel prices, stringent environmental 
control measures and high cost of capital” proved disastrous for large-scale mining, it 
also recognized explicitly that the “abundance of cheap labor in the Philippines, relative 
flexibility and simplicity of operations, minimum capital requirements (…) are among the 
arguments that lend support to the development of small-scale mining”. Ultimately, PD 
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1899 put in place a minimalistic permit system that paid little to no attention to the woes 
of the workforce. This minimalistic focus on mineral tenure (and to a lesser extent on 
environmental regulation), to the detriment of labour rights, was essentially upheld in 
subsequent regulatory efforts, if not in rule than at least in practice. As noted earlier, 
despite a clear stipulation in RA 7076 that “All persons undertaking small-scale mining 
activities” should register as members of an ASM-cooperative, in practice this is a 
privilege reserved for a dominant stratum of ASM-players. In the meantime both the 
Marcos government and successive democratic governments profited handsomely from 
ASM in the form of beefed-up gold reserves, as the central bank retains the exclusive right 
to buy ASM-gold (Clad, 1988). Seen from this perspective, the government can even be 
seen as being among the vested interests in the exploitation of informal labour. 
However, the absence of formal labour regulation does not necessarily imply an absence 
of regulation or even social protection as such, because “work and wellbeing” in the 
informal economy are often regulated by informal social institutions (Meagher, 1995; 
Harriss-White, 2010). However, whil several respondents indeed suggested that ASM has 
“developed its own system of social security”35, these ‘homegrown’ social security 
mechanisms are very limited in scope. As one respondent succinctly but cynically 
summarized the financier’s obligations: “The government is not watching over your 
shoulder. You do not have to pay philhealth or SSS36. If something happens to one of the 
miners, you just pay the family a few thousands to buy the silence”37. Furthermore, 
whereas local miners can rely on local social networks (mostly based on kinship ties), the 
growing migrant labour force usually remains bereft of such connections, and instead 
depends on the financier-patron, whose main concern is a cheap and reliable workforce.  
To guarantee a steady supply of cheap and trustworthy labour, financiers rely on a range 
of strategies that combine economic, political, and (the threat of) coercive power (Da 
Corta, 2011). In the previous section I have already drawn (cursory) attention to economic 
coercion, particularly the mechanism of debt, as an instrument to discipline the workforce. 
There is another strategy that deserves brief attention, namely the use of middlemen for 
recruiting and disciplining the workforce (Breman, 1999). Every corpo is headed by a 
team leader, usually an experienced miner who commands the respect of the other miners. 
His main tasks relate to organizing the underground mining operations and monitoring the 
workforce, ensuring the unity of the corpo and preventing workers from leaving38. The 
team leader also acts as a key gatekeeper for prospective labour recruits. Another key 
figure is the ‘runner’, who supplies the mining operations, and acts as the ‘eyes and ears’ 
of the absentee financier in the area. At least in Compostela Valley, portal guards also play 
                                                          
35 Interview with anonymous respondent, Quezon City, March 2014. 
36 Philhealth and the Social Security System are respectively a national health insurance program and a semi-
privatized social insurance program that require contributions from employers.  
37 Interview with anonymous respondent, Davao City, January 2014. 
38 Interview with team leader, October 2012, Nabunturan. 
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a vital role in monitoring the workforce. Like the aforementioned Chavez in the APEX-
operations, they often have a reputation for violence, and do not shy back from using 
(physical) force to discipline the workforce. A final albeit quintessential role is reserved 
for the landowner and his kin who, in exchange for a royalty share and priority access to 
labour opportunities in high-grade tunnels, will monitor the area and the workforce that 
resides in it. As will be demonstrated in more detail in chapters 5 and 6, the authority and 
coercive capacity of local landowners is intimately entangled with that of the barangay, 
the lowest political-administrative unit in the Philippines. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter began by critically reviewing existing explanations for persistent informality 
in ASM, which are characterized by a ‘legalistic’ emphasis on regulatory barriers and 
political impediments that prevent or discourage poverty-driven ASM-operators from 
obtaining the required permits. It was then argued that these legalistic explanations fail to 
fully explain the situation in countries like Compostela Valley, where ASM is now 
characterized by high degrees of differentiation, both within the workforce, and between 
this largely poverty-driven workforce and a dominant stratum of ASM-entrepreneurs. 
Significantly, even in cases where otherwise hampered formalization efforts now provide 
ASM with a degree of formal recognition, the registration of ASM-operators is limited to 
this dominant stratum of ASM-entrepreneurs, while excluding the workforce at large.  
In an attempt to provide a more comprehensive explanation for the different causes and 
consequences of informality for different sections of the ASM-sector, I have attempted to 
bridge the divide between the ASM-literature and theoretical debates on informal sector 
activity. This exercise led to an integrative approach to analyzing informality in ASM, 
which complements a legalistic focus on entry barriers and exclusion, with a structuralist 
concern for the exploitation of informal labour. Applied to the Philippines, this integrative 
approach revealed that the massive expansion of predominantly informal ASM can 
alternatively be understood as a process of informalization in the mining sector writ large; 
epitomized by a transition from capital-intensive large-scale mining to a regime of 
accumulation built around flexible ASM and the exploitation of informal labour. 
Ultimately, these observations force us to rethink the diverse origins and implications of 
informality in ASM. While the existing literature projects an image of poor ASM-
operators that remain excluded –deliberately or not (Hilson, 2013)– from the formal 
economy, I have also drawn attention to the vested interests in the (partial) persistence of 
informality in the form of a workforce bereft of formal-legal recognition, let alone -
protection. 
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This more critical understanding of informality, which pays central analytical attention to 
the position of the workforce in historical trajectories of differentiation within the ASM-
sector, can also inspire a future research agenda. For one, it would be very interesting to 
adopt a comparative perspective in order to explore to what extent the informalization 
angle helps shed new light on the expansion of ASM as a predominantly informal sector in 
countries like the DRC, where Rubbers (2006) describes a remarkably similar process of 
“informal privatization” in Gécamines, a mining company in Katanga province. The 
critical approach to informality in ASM proposed in this chapter may also help shed new 
light on the relationship between ASM and large-scale mining. All too often, this 
relationship is approached from a dualistic perspective, which assumes a binary distinction 
or even an antagonism between informal and rudimentary ASM-activities on the one hand; 
and a modern, formal large-scale mining sector on the other (Canavesio, 2014). While 
many countries are indeed characterized by a co-existence of large-scale mining and ASM, 
this chapter has illustrated that simplistic dualist images risk glossing over the 
heterogeneous and differentiated character of ASM, and the complexity of its (historical) 
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CHAPTER 5: 
UNDERMINING THE STATE? 
INFORMAL ASM AND STATE 
FORMATION  
ORIGINAL ARTICLE: 
Verbrugge, B. (2015). Undermining the State? Informal Mining and Trajectories of State 
Formation in Eastern Mindanao, Philippines. Critical Asian Studies, advance online 
publication. 
BACKGROUND: 
This article is due to appear in a special issue on ‘Illicit economies and the state in 
Southeast Asia’ in Critical Asian studies later this year (June 2015). It was the outcome of 
a panel at the EuroSEAS conference in 2013 in Lisbon. 
ARTICLE ABSTRACT: 
Building on critical perspectives on the state and the informal economy, this article 
provides an analysis of the “state of the state” on the eastern Mindanao mineral frontier. In 
the first instance the author explains that the massive expansion of informal small-scale 
gold mining, instead of undermining state rule, has given rise to joint institutions of 
extraction that promote the interests of local politicians and informal miners, amongst 
others. Relying on the coercive and legitimizing strengths of local state institutions, local 
politicians have created an environment conducive to the persistence and arguably the 
further expansion of small-scale gold mining. In the process, they not only beef up their 
personal authority and the state’s fiscal revenues, but also contribute to the consolidation 
of state rule on the upland frontier. Transcending the local level, this parallel process of 
small-scale mining expansion and state consolidation, the author argues, can be 
understood as the result of a long-standing tradition of decentralized state building through 
local strongmen-politicians. Finally, attention is drawn to the expansion of large-scale 
mining and how it is highly likely to upset the sociopolitical stability built around joint 
extraction regimes in the informal small-scale mining economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In chapters 3 and 4, I have presented a critical analysis of the different factors underlying 
the expansion of ASM as a predominantly informal activity. In doing so, I transcended 
dominant understandings of the ASM-sector as a subsistence economy, by drawing 
attention to the existence of complex strategies for accumulation, which essentially 
revolve around the exploitation of informal labour. In this and the following chapters, I 
provide an empirical analysis of governance dynamics in the ASM-sector. 
The existence of a sizeable informal or even “illegal” ASM-sector is often seen as a 
harbinger of state weakness. Building on critical debates on the relationship between the 
informal (mining) economy and the state, in this chapter I interrogate this proposition 
through an empirical inquiry into the anatomy of the local state on the ASM-frontier in 
Compostela Valley Province. I will demonstrate that the expansion of informal ASM, 
instead of undermining state power, has gone hand in hand with a consolidation of state 
rule in the locality. Rather than resulting from a deliberate top-down strategy on the part of 
a national state that attempts to project its fiscal-regulatory power over the “unruly 
uplands” (Scott, 2009), this localized process of state consolidation results from of a 
bottom-up engagement with the state by local elites, who attempt to legitimize and enforce 
“joint institutions of extraction” (Snyder, 2006) centered around the “informal 
formalization” (Benjaminsen & Lund, 2003) of land- and mineral rights in a volatile 
frontier setting. While local miner-politicians have come to rely on ASM as a source of 
rents and fiscal revenues and as a platform to assert their authority, a heterogeneous 
coalition of landowners, ASM-financiers and armed rent-seekers now benefits from a 
regulatory environment that is conducive to the sector’s survival, and arguably even its 
further expansion. 
This parallel process of ASM-expansion and state consolidation is then critically evaluated 
against the background of broader trajectories of state formation. It is argued that the 
mutual entanglement between the local state and informal ASM is an intricate product of a 
longstanding tradition of decentralized statebuilding through local politicians. More 
precisely, in exchange for pacifying the frontier and for upholding the normative 
supremacy of democratic state rule (Abinales, 2000; Wong, 2006), local political elites 
have long enjoyed a high degree of autonomous control over the local political economy 
(Sidel, 1999; Lara & Schoofs, 2013). So far, then, this account reads like a story of an 
advancing resource frontier that gradually becomes incorporated into the circuitries of a 
decentralized Philippine state. At the same time I offer a timely reminder of the inherent 
volatility of resource frontiers (Tsing, 2003), by drawing attention to how the looming 
expansion of large-scale mining may portend a partial breakdown of joint extraction 
regimes built around ASM, with potentially profound consequences for sociopolitical 
stability. 
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STATE RESILIENCE AND THE INFORMAL 
MINING ECONOMY 
THE PERSISTENCE OF ILLEGAL MINING: A HARBINGER OF STATE 
WEAKNESS? 
For academic observers from different disciplinary backgrounds, the existence of a 
sizeable informal, illicit, or illegal ASM-sector poses important challenges for state 
resilience. Fiscal sociologists, for one, would argue that the state’s inability to extract 
revenues from ASM weakens its financial capacity and hence its ability to deliver vital 
public services, ultimately undermining its authority and legitimacy (e.g. Levi, 1988; 
Bräutigam et al., 2008; Larsson, 2013). As Di John notes, “the extent to which the state 
monopolizes tax collection, the territorial reach of the revenue authority, tax levels, tax 
effort, the diversity of tax revenues and the manner in which tax is collected—all 
contribute to identifying the likelihood of state resilience.” (Di John, 2010: 10). 
Other authors engaged in debates on the political economy/ecology of conflict have 
suggested that the availability of lootable resources –i.e. resources that require minimal 
bureaucratic  infrastructure to extract and tax (Le Billon, 2001)– provides opportunities for 
rent-seeking outside formal government structures. This may in turn facilitate the 
formation of alternative power centers built around these resource rents, like that-
politicians who cultivate their own patronage networks (Reno, 1999), or secessionist rebel 
movements which contest state power (for a critical overview of these and related 
arguments, see Cuvelier et al., 2014). Building on these observations, authors like Reno 
(1995; 1999), Nordstrom (2001; 2004) and Duffield (2001) draw attention to what they 
describe as “shadow networks” or “shadow states”. The formation of these “shadows” has 
been facilitated by globalization, with increased global demand for illegal or even illicit 
goods, combined with the availability of a transnational structure for trading these goods, 
allowing local actors to bypass formal state structures and to connect directly with 
transnational capital. Another defining characteristic of these shadows is the pervasive 
blurring of boundaries between formal–informal, legal–illegal and state–non-state: “While 
these networks are not comprised by states themselves”, Nordstrom explains, “neither are 
they entirely distinct from, or opposite to, states—they work both through and around 
formal state representatives and institutions.” (Nordstrom, 2001: 36). Nonetheless, due to 
the authority and resources at their disposal, state actors often occupy key positions in 
shadow networks, but as rational actors that seek to maximize self-interest, rather than as 
apologists of legal-bureaucratic state rule. In the long run, this instrumentalization of the 
state for self-interest, or so it is claimed, undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
state institutions. 
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ASM figures prominently in this body of literature, albeit sometimes under a different 
designation39. First, given the specific materiality of the alluvial mineral deposits of gold, 
diamonds, and gems that are often targeted by ASM-operators are considered extremely 
lootable (Le Billon, 2001). Secondly, for geophysical reasons ASM often takes place in 
peripheral regions, where the presence of state institutions is a priori limited, and 
sometimes contested by non-state (armed) actors (Fisher, 2008). Thirdly, ASM-
communities are frequently depicted as violent and anarchic spaces, replete with uprooted 
young males that are prone to rebel against vested authorities (Le Billon, 2008). 
RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE 
INFORMAL ECONOMY 
This dominant interpretation of informal ASM as a harbinger of state weakness can be 
criticized on a number of accounts. For one, as suggested in chapter 4, Meagher (1995) 
has demonstrated that state institutions play a vital role in facilitating long-term processes 
of “informalization”, which is understood as an integral response of capitalism to a crisis 
of accumulation in the formal economy (see also Weiss, 1987). More precisely, through 
ambiguous and inconsistent policy formulation and lax law enforcement, states create 
incentives and opportunities for employers to hire informal labour. Meanwhile empirical 
studies of the state “from below” suggest a high degree of implicit or explicit support for 
informal activities on the part of local state officials, who are motivated by political (i.e. 
support from the huge number of people involved in the informal economy) and/or by 
personal (i.e. augmenting meager government salaries) reasons (e.g. Rubbers, 2007). 
Meanwhile local state officials are known to bank on the networks and authority vested in 
formal statehood to regulate access to and shape the rules in the informal economy, and to 
cultivate clientelistic ties with informal economic actors (Pattenden, 2011). 
Snyder (2006), meanwhile, develops a convincing institutionalist critique of the “resource 
curse” literature, drawing attention to the possible development of “joint institutions of 
extraction” that enable “cooperation between private and public actors who share income 
by exploiting resources” (Snyder, 2006: 948). These joint institutions of extraction allow 
for income from lootable resources to be used to “provide the revenue with which to 
govern and, thus, produce not disorder but stability” (Ibid.: 962). Still others draw 
attention to how the economic rents produced by the informal economy may become a 
constitutive part of a broader elite pact geared toward the maintenance of sociopolitical 
stability (Sherman, 2003). 
While the existence of unofficial ties between state officials and the informal economy is 
duly recognized in the literature on the shadows discussed in the preceding section, the 
                                                          
39 What is described in this PhD-thesis as ASM is referred to by other authors as small-scale mining, illegal mining, 
or simply gold-/diamond mining. 
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authors discussed here share a critical, less essentialist, and more empirically grounded 
understanding of the state. In recent years this approach has been strengthened by a body 
of literature on “the anthropology of the state” (Sharma & Gupta, 2005; Eriksen, 2010; 
Vu, 2010), which aims to criticize and transcend established perspectives on the state as a 
fixed set of formal-legal institutions. Instead, state formation is approached as a fluid and 
dynamic process involving a broad range of actors, both public and private, who draw 
upon the “idea of the state” (Trouillot, 2001; Lund, 2006) as an abstract and neutral source 
of political authority and as a legitimizing repertoire to underpin claims to public 
authority. Approached from this perspective, rather than representing an inevitable 
distortion of legal-bureaucratic rationality, the reliance of state actors on the registers of 
state rule to extend control over the informal economy can, somewhat paradoxically, 
strengthen the “fantasy of the state” (Hansen & Steputat, 2001) as a unitary, objective, and 
hierarchically organized institutional configuration. 
Combining these different critical approaches towards the informal/illegal sector and the 
state results in an understanding of the state as a dynamic institutional configuration with 
intricate ties to the informal economy. It is such an understanding that will form the 
analytical basis for my empirical analysis in the remainder of this chapter. I will 
demonstrate that on the local level, the interests of state actors and those of various other 
actors who have a stake in the ASM-sector have become intimately intertwined in joint 
institutions of extraction. These joint institutions of extraction, I then argue, are an integral 
part of a broader elite pact between local and national-level political elites, whereby the 
former receive a high degree of political and economic autonomy in exchange for 
upholding sociopolitical stability and for representing the state on the (mineral) frontier.  
JOINT INSTITUTIONS OF EXTRACTION AT THE 
ASM-FRONTIER 
FRICTION AND STABILITY ON THE UPLAND FRONTIER40 
The settlement of the Davao region and its gradual integration into the (post-)colonial state 
was intimately related to the extraction of the region’s resources (Abinales, 2000). 
Evidence suggests that Compostela Valley was left largely untainted by the initial 
expansion of plantation-based agriculture during the American colonial period. This 
changed after independence in 1946, when settlers from the north of the country started 
arriving in hordes in the more remote “frontier regions” of Mindanao (Wernstedt & 
Simkins, 1965). In tandem with the expansion of commercial logging, these settlers 
                                                          
40 While there is some overlap between this historical section and that presented in other chapters, I nonetheless 
maintain it here in order to guarantee the consistency of the arguments presented in this chapter. 
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gradually moved into the uplands, home to indigenous tribes which –in parallel with 
processes elsewhere in Southeast Asia (Scott, 2009)– retreated further into the mountains. 
While successive governments tried to support the orderly settlement of Mindanao, 
migration to the upland frontier was a largely spontaneous process, taking place without 
government supervision. As a result the uplands, most of which are owned by the state as 
public land, saw a proliferation of illegal squatters (Abinales, 2000: 100-101). 
While this process of upland migration sparked localized tensions between incoming 
settlers and indigenous inhabitants, in the immediate postwar decades the Davao region 
enjoyed a relatively high degree of sociopolitical stability (Abinales, 2000). Until the 
1970s land was still in ample supply, and existing upland settlers willingly vacated plots of 
land in return for compensation. Indeed, rather than being a question of dispossession, 
interviews with upland settlers suggest that the migrant influx led to an embryonic market 
for informal land claims, although compensations offered by newcomers were often 
ridiculously low. Furthermore, most in-migration followed a pattern of “chain migration”, 
whereby “relatives, friends and village mates follow in the footsteps of the pioneer 
settlers.” (Umehara & Bautista, 2004: 65). As a result, nascent upland communities were 
often dominated by a few settler families who came from the same home region. As these 
settler families intermarried with one another and with the region’s indigenous inhabitants, 
cross-cutting ties of kinship and solidarity began to emerge in upland communities. A final 
albeit crucial factor contributing to the stability of the Davao frontier was the role played 
by local-strongmen politicians, who relied on a combination of personal charisma, 
patronage, coercion, and the legitimacy inherent to elected officialdom to pacify the 
locality, all the while acting as a liaison between Manila-based national elites and regional 
economic power brokers (Abinales, 2000; see also Wong, 2006). I will return to the latter 
point in more detail below. 
From the late 1960s onwards, several trends conspired to undermine frontier stability. One 
important factor was the gradual exhaustion of the land frontier, which was caused in part 
by the aggressive expansion of extractive industries (particularly plantation agriculture, 
commercial logging (Vitug, 1991), and to a lesser extent corporate mining) under the 
control of national-level elites (Abinales, 2000). Indeed, growing local tensions over land 
access coincided with a centralization of power in the hands of the martial law regime of 
dictator Ferdinand Marcos, to the detriment of local strongmen-politicians who were no 
longer able to fulfill their role as frontier stabilizers. Instead, the regime increasingly relied 
on handpicked local allies and military might to maintain stability. In this increasingly 
polarized and repressive environment, the communist New People’s Army (NPA) found 
fertile grounds for expansion, and by the early 1980s the uplands of eastern Mindanao had 
become one of the hotspots in the increasingly brutal war between the NPA and the 
Marcos regime. It was in this volatile environment that ASM underwent a rapid expansion. 
In this chapter I focus on one particular factor that facilitated, and arguably even 
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supported, the further expansion of the ASM, namely its progressive entanglement with 
local state institutions. 
THE EMERGENCE OF A BARANGAY-CENTERED REGULATORY ORDER 
To gain a better understanding of the process of state consolidation on the ASM-frontier, 
let us consider the example of barangay Bukal in Nabunturan. In the 1980s, amidst 
intensifying confrontations between the NPA and the army, ASM-activities began to 
emerge in Bukal. Following the restoration of democracy on the local level in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, prominent members of local settler families formed an alliance 
with former Davao del Norte provincial governor Prospero Amatong, leading to the 
creation of barangay Bukal in 1995. For various reasons Bukal is now referred to as a 
“special barangay.” It is located entirely in public land, and a significant part of its 
territory coincides with a protected landscape. For this reason the national government has 
hitherto failed to recognize human activity in the area, including the ubiquitous ASM-
activities. Notable exceptions include a large-scale mining permit issued to ALDEVINCO, 
and a certificate of ancestral domain title (CADT) issued under the 1997 Indigenous 
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) to NASBATRICO, a tribal association which now holds 
priority rights over the mineral resources underlying their ancestral domain (USAID, 
2011a). However, for reasons I will not discuss at length here, NASBATRICO lacks both 
the capacity and legitimacy to wield these priority rights effectively. Instead its role is now 
confined to the collection of checkpoint fees, which I discuss in detail below. Finally, 
unlike other barangays Bukal is not entitled to internal revenue allotments (IRA) from the 
national government, which usually represent the number one source of local government 
revenues. Instead it depends on a combination of yearly stipends from the province and 
municipality as well as locally raised revenues. 
After Bukal’s establishment in 1995, barangay officials started registering informal land 
claims, land transfers, and other economic activities. For this purpose the barangay 
(through barangay ordinances) created several puroks, administrative subdivisions of the 
barangay. Over time the barangay emerged as the key regulatory authority in the local 
economy and in informal land markets, and became the first point of call in the case of 
land- and other disputes. Only when the barangay captain fails to mediate effectively will 
a dispute be referred to the mayor, to the formal judiciary, or to national government 
agencies. Remarkably, in addition to land tenure regimes sanctioned by the national 
government, representatives of national government agencies and even local courts usually 
take into consideration existing informal settlement patterns on the barangay level. 
Before proceeding to my discussion of regulatory dynamics in the ASM-sector, two 
additional observations should be highlighted that are crucial for understanding my 
arguments. The first one is the personal involvement of local politicians in ASM. As in 
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many other mining barangays, barangay officials in Bukal are among the vested interests 
in the ASM-sector, either as mining financiers, as owners of processing plants, or as 
landowners that receive ASM-royalties. Taking part in electoral politics in the Philippines 
is a somewhat peculiar and according to most observers a highly corrupt affair, with vote-
buying as a defining feature of elections on all levels. In Bukal, as in other mining 
barangays, the price for a vote can go upwards to PHP 2,000 (US$ 50). So what convinces 
miners to invest in politics? As Sidel (1999) explains, discretionary control over local state 
institutions in the Philippines entails privileged access to accumulation opportunities in the 
local economy. Indeed, barangay officials use their priority access to the state and its 
coercive machinery in the form of the Civilian Volunteer Organization, the purportedly 
unarmed barangay militia, to protect and expand their own economic interests. In the case 
of ASM, barangay officials often mobilize the CVO as portal guards. Furthermore, they 
can use the state indirectly, as gatekeepers in the local economy, to solicit “contributions” 
from those who desire to invest locally. Finally, local politicians have access to broader, 
vertically organized political party networks that provide access to patronage from higher-
ranking politicians (Landé, 1968). As will be discussed below, however, this image of 
local politicians as rent-seekers is somewhat misleading, as it obscures an important 
degree of reciprocity in local politics. 
The second important observation relates to the increased centrality of formal-legal 
authority in the exercise of public authority. While the barangay captain is usually a 
charismatic figure, the prestige associated with elected officialdom and having 
relationships with higher-ranking politicians are undoubtedly a boon for his personal 
authority. In this sense, the nascent barangay-centered regulatory order described above 
illustrates a broader process of state penetration, not necessarily as a fixed set of 
institutions, but as a legitimizing repertoire based on the idea of legal-bureaucratic 
rationality as an abstract and universal source of power. As will be demonstrated below, 
these two trends –i.e. the progressive involvement of local politicians in ASM and the 
increased reliance on the “idea of the state” (Lund, 2006) as a legitimizing repertoire– 
have enabled the emergence of “joint institutions of extraction” (Snyder, 2006) centered 
around the “informal formalization” (Benjaminsen & Lund, 2003) of local land- and 
mineral tenure relations by local politicians. 
THE REGULATION OF INFORMAL MINING: FROM BROKERAGE TO 
INFORMAL FORMALIZATION 
Understanding the machinations of regulatory authority inside mining areas requires a 
basic understanding of the process through which ASM-operators secure access to 
mineral-bearing land. Whenever they want to explore or operate in a given area, they will 
need the consent of existing surface land claimants, who will typically receive a 10 percent 
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royalty share. In case local self-financed miners or financiers are familiar with the 
landowner in question, said access is negotiated directly. In other cases, the financier will 
usually approach barangay authorities as the assumed representatives of local landed 
interests, and as the pivot of local security arrangements. A barangay official will then step 
in and connect the financier with the landowner in question. In return, barangay officials 
solicit a range of “contributions” from financiers. In some cases these donations are 
monetary in form; in other cases they are granted the “privilege” to operate a high-yielding 
tunnel (shifting). These contributions are particularly prominent in election periods, when 
rival politicians seek to woo financiers into beefing up their campaign funds. Here it is 
also important to mention that when a financier or landowner hits “high-grade,” he will 
often be confronted with a range of other armed rent-seekers, which may include army, 
police, CVOs, rebels, and/or indistinct extortionist groups. As will be demonstrated in 
chapter 7, in many cases these armed rent-seekers develop some kind of “live and let live” 
arrangement with local politicians. 
Over time barangay officials have transcended –but not cast off– their role as brokers in 
the local economy. Instead, as ASM-operations expanded further, they developed more 
sophisticated ways to extract rents from- and expand their regulatory control over- ASM-
activities. In several of the mining areas that I visited during my research, I found that the 
barangay is now not merely facilitating, but is actively registering and sanctioning 
agreements between financiers and landowners, particularly in cases where it concerns 
bigger tunneling operations. After an oral agreement is reached between the respective 
parties, a written agreement is drafted by the purok or the barangay, specifying the parties 
involved, the revenue sharing modalities, and the conditions of withdrawal. The 
registration of this agreement and the tunnel in question typically come with a registration 
fee, which is but one example of a broader range of fees the barangay, and increasingly 
also the municipality and province, are now imposing on ASM-operators, gold buyers and 
owners of processing plants. Upon paying these fees, ASM-operators are issued with 
“official” receipts and a range of stamped documents, like community tax certificates, 
environmental permits, barangay- and municipal clearances, and business permits. 
These fiscal-regulatory efforts in ASM were given renewed impetus when a massive new 
gold rush enveloped Compostela Valley in the late 2000s. In ten “collection centers” 
(read: roadblocks) spread out over seven municipalities (see table 1), representatives from 
different local government units, together with tribal organizations holding a certificate of 
ancestral domain, and in some cases also with ASM-permittees, started taxing ore 
transport. At the time of the research in 2012-2013, Bukal had two such checkpoints. In 
the first one of these checkpoints, the barangay and municipality were collecting 
respectively PHP 300 (US $8) per dump truck, and PHP 30 (US$ 0.8) per bag of ores. In 
the other checkpoint, the Mansaka tribal association (Nasbatrico) was charging PHP 500 
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(US$ 12) per truck. Similar to the issuance of permits and clearances mentioned above, 
these payments invariably come with stamped receipts. 
While revenue data were difficult to collect on the barangay level, barangay officials in 
Bukal explained that in addition to their own checkpoint revenues, they are now entitled to 
municipal collections in excess of PHP 100,000 (US$ 2,000) per year. The province of 
Compostela Valley, meanwhile, keeps detailed accounts of these “mining revenues,” 
which are booked either as donations or as environmental user’s fees (see tables 1 and 2). 
In total, these revenues far outstrip the share of excise tax collected from formal ASM- 
and large-scale mining operations (see table 2). In 2012, the province collected PHP 13.6 
million (some US$ 340,000), and while lower than in previous years –mainly due to the 
devastating impact of typhoon Pablo– this amount still adds up to approximately 65 
percent of fiscal revenues from mining, and some 13 percent of locally raised revenues. At 
the same time, the significance of these revenues should not be exaggerated, as local 
governments continue to rely disproportionately on external resources, particularly the 
internal revenue allotment, which accounts for about 80 percent of provincial income. 
Examining these different fiscal-regulatory interventions, several legal contradictions 
emerge. To be sure, most of the interventions described above, including donations to 
local government units, now have a legal basis in the 1991 local government code, which 
defines the mandate of local government units in the era of decentralization. Furthermore, 
these regulatory interventions have gone hand in hand with a range of local government 
executive orders and -ordinances aimed at “rationalizing” (as local government officials 
described it) ASM. However, the legal status of many if not most of the actual ASM-
operations remains fundamentally unclear. For this reason, local politicians supported the 
formation of ASM-cooperatives throughout the province. These cooperatives have 
subsequently applied for an official ASM-permit, but for various reasons including the 
overlap with large-scale mining concessions, most of these requests are still pending. 
However, the formation of legally registered (with the Cooperative Development 
Authority) ASM-cooperatives and the administrative trail left behind by these 









DONATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL USER’S FEE TOTAL 
 
Rates to be collected 
and start of collection  
Rates to be 
collected   
Tagnocon, Nabunturan P 10 (Aug. 2010)  P 35,780  P 5 P 23,180 P 58,960 
Camanlangan, New Bataan P 10 (Sept. 2011)  P 443,115  P 5 P 221,370 P 664,485 
Bugac, Mainit, Nabunturan P 5 (Nov. 2011)   P 52,365 P 5 P 52,635 P 105,000 
Golden Valley, Mabini P 5 (Nov. 2011)  P 328,903 P 5 P 329,403 P 658,306 
Ngan, Compostela P 5 (Sept. 2011)  P 11,550 P 5 P 11,550 P 23,100 
Mainit, Nabunturan P 5 (Dec. 2010)  P 867,800 P 5 P 867,800 P 1,735,600 
Mt. Diwalwal, Monkayo N/A (May 2011)  P 5 P 298,463.50 P 298,463.50 
New Leyte, Maco N/A (May 2012)  P 5 P 71,970  P 71,970 
Panoraon, Maco N/A (May 2012)  P 5 P 58,661 P 58,661 
Pamintaran, Maragusan P 15 (July 2009)  P 3,238,991  P 5 P 0 P 3,238, 991 
TOTAL  P 4,978,504  P 1,935,032.50 P 6,913,536.50 





2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Sand and Gravel tax P 2,052,168.48 P 2,535,159.97 P 2,431,745.26 P 2,269,868.26 P 2,740,493.70 
Small Scale Mining     P 1,008,130.00 P 356,248.90 P 1,511,265.00 
Environmental User’s Fee     P 1,070,472.74 P 1,641,860.83 P 4,601,425.43 
Miscellaneous (Donation)   P 6,930,110.00 P 15,582,346.00 P 13,476,122.50 P 9,029,209.58 
Occupation Fee       P 236,715.00 P 129,570.00 
Excise Tax     P 317,994.65 P 4,039,431.91 P 2,620,839.00 
TOTAL P 2,052,168.48  P 9,465,269.97  P 20,410,688.65 P 22,020,247.40 P 19,632,802.01 
Table 2. Comparative statement of revenue collected from mining operations42 
COERCION, LEGITIMACY, AND RECIPROCITY IN JOINT INSTITUTIONS 
OF EXTRACTION 
Two fundamental and interrelated questions remain. First: why do ASM-operators and 
landowners comply with paying these donations, permit fees and transport taxes? 
Secondly: where does the money go? Initial clues with regards to the first question may be 
derived from the literature on the determinants of tax compliance, which argues that 
sustainable tax efforts hinge on a combination of coercion (i.e. the capacity of authorities 
to monitor and enforce compliance) and legitimacy (Levi, 1988; Levi & Sacks, 2008). At 
the same time, local politics in the Philippines are often depicted as a coercive and in some 
cases even predatory affair, dominated by “local bosses” and warlord-politicians (Sidel, 
1999; Kreuzer, 2009). 
                                                          
41 Table compiled from data retrieved from Office of the Provincial Treasurer, Compostela Valley. Last updated April 
2013. 
42 Ibid. 
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Clearly, the role of coercion in local politics should not be underestimated. When asked 
about the consequences of not paying transport fees, financiers replied that their trucks 
could be confiscated by the provincial government or even by local officials of the DENR 
(a national government agency). It is also important to consider that Compostela Valley is 
home to armed groups who are all involved, to various extents, in the ASM-sector, 
primarily but not exclusively in the form of protection-cum-extortion activities. Threats 
and actual acts of violence by these groups have targeted mining and processing 
equipment (which sometimes mysteriously “catches fire”), ore transport, and in some 
cases even the physical integrity of financiers and/or their labourers. These armed groups 
sometimes cultivate indistinct ties with local politicians, giving rise to “peculiar coercive 
formations” (centered around local politicians and their private armies) that typically 
include people from all sorts of backgrounds, including (former) military, police, and even 
rebels (Hedman & Sidel, 2000: 58). Over time, CVOs have come to occupy a central 
position in these peculiar coercive formations. They are often mobilized by barangay 
officials to protect their investment, as one landowner and former barangay captain 
explained: “The CVO is in control of the mining area, and no goons are allowed. Many of 
the CVOs are NPA returnees, some of them are also the relatives of landowners or 
barangay officials, and they are all locals.”43 In this opaque security environment, 
financiers are ever-wary of reprisal and, in Le Billon’s words, “sustain their access to 
resources and protect their investments by paying whoever is in power” (Le Billon, 2001: 
569). Furthermore, it is also clear that part of the revenues extracted from ASM goes into 
the private coffers of politicians and local state officials. Even when leaving aside the 
“contributions” from ASM-financiers to politicians, a significant discrepancy still exists 
between what the province claims as official checkpoint rates (PHP 10-15 per bag) and 
what financiers claim to be paying (PHP 30). Furthermore, politicians maintain a high 
degree of discretion over the expenditure of these local revenues, which usually end up in 
a “general fund” that typically serves as a prime resource for patronage. 
While coercive and even predatory traits are thus evident in local politics in mining areas, 
my empirical analysis has also revealed a high degree of reciprocity between local 
politicians and ASM-interests. Snyder (2006) describes such reciprocal arrangements as 
“joint institutions of extraction” (see section 2). On the one hand, local politicians devote 
money to interventions that indirectly benefit ASM-operators, including the construction 
of roads connecting the mining areas to lowland areas (where most of the processing takes 
place), and the provision of basic services like water and electricity. In addition, local 
politicians are in charge of maintaining the (supposedly voluntary) CVO, which provides 
at least some sense of security –however arbitrary– inside mining areas. More 
fundamentally, the broad range of fiscal-regulatory efforts described above seem to have 
induced a process of “informal formalization” (Benjaminsen & Lund, 2003) in local 
                                                          
43 Interview local landowner and barangay official, Nabunturan, October 2012. 
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informal –at least according to the national government– tenure regimes. The wide array 
of “official” documents, agreements, permits, and clearances, and associated fees and 
stamped receipts, all explicitly refer to state-sanctioned legality as an abstract and 
universal source of legitimate authority (Sharma & Gupta, 2005). On the one hand, this 
process of informal formalization contributes to a broad acceptance of rent extraction by 
local state officials as something normal and mundane, as explained by one ASM-
financier: “Everywhere we go we ask permission from the barangay (…) They ask fees 
and donations; they do their work; we do not complain.”44 At the same time this process 
of informal formalization also benefits the interests of various other actors involved in the 
ASM-sector, by imbuing local tenure regimes with a sense of regulatory predictability. For 
landowners, the registration and sanctioning of landowner–financier agreements by the 
barangay further consolidates their informal land- and associated royalty claims. For 
ASM-financiers, complying with these contributions, fees, and donations should be 
understood as part of a broader strategy aimed at securing access to a high-value, 
geographically fixed resource in a frontier setting with an uncertain security environment 
and, at first sight, indistinct surface tenure systems. This reciprocity between ASM-
interests and local politicians is reminiscent of Sikor and Lund’s observation about the 
recursive constitution of property and authority: “The process of recognition of claims as 
property simultaneously works to imbue the institution that provides such recognition with 
the recognition of its authority to do so. This is the ‘contract’ that links property and 
authority.” (Sikor & Lund, 2009: 1). 
LOCALIZED JOINT EXTRACTION REGIMES AND 
TRAJECTORIES OF STATE FORMATION 
This section transcends the locality, in an attempt to understand how the localized joint 
institutions of extraction described in the preceding section are embedded in broader 
trajectories of state formation. I argue that the existence of joint institutions of extraction 
centered around informal ASM-rents and the informal formalization of tenure regimes can 
be seen as a product of a longstanding tradition of decentralized statebuilding. More 
precisely, while the Philippines has a long history of de jure centralization, already during 
American colonial rule, local- and provincial-level powerbrokers retained a high degree of 
autonomy from Manila (Hutchcroft, 2000), including discretionary control over the state’s 
coercive machinery (Sidel, 1999; Hedman & Sidel, 2000). This local autonomy persisted 
after independence, when local elites were absorbed in a nascent mass democracy built 
around political party networks which served primarily as mechanisms for the 
disbursement of patronage to local politicians, who in turn delivered local votes to their 
                                                          
44 Interview with ASM-financier, Nabunturan, October 2012. 
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national-level counterparts (Landé, 1968). And while the Marcos regime (1972–1986) 
achieved some success in reining in selected local power brokers, it did not overturn the 
localist basis of Philippine politics altogether (Hutchcroft, 2000). Instead, the local 
government code of 1991, which is often presented as a radical move away from a 
historically rooted centralism and a response to the authoritarian excesses of martial law 
(on decentralization in the Philippines see Eaton, 2001), was in fact a confirmation and 
arguably even a radicalization of this long-standing tradition of decentralized rule 
(Hutchcroft, 2000). According to Sidel, this history of decentralized state building has 
given rise to a highly coercive form of local politics, with local “bosses” relying on 
discretionary control over local state institutions and the state’s coercive apparatus to 
wield control in the local (informal) economy (Sidel, 1999; Hedman & Sidel, 2000; Lara 
& Schoofs, 2013). With economic modernization, political-economic control began to rely 
on more sophisticated forms of regulation (e.g. zoning ordinances, licenses, and 
franchises), with local politicians transforming themselves into brokers operating on 
behalf of landed interests and commercial capital (Sidel, 1999).  
In the preceding section I have partly confirmed these observations, while at the same time 
qualifying them by drawing attention to a significant degree of reciprocity in local politics, 
in this case built around joint institutions of extraction that serve the interests of local 
politicians, local landowners and ASM-financiers. In this section I draw attention to a 
second form of reciprocity centered around informal ASM-rents –in addition to the joint 
institutions of extraction on the local level– namely that connecting the interests of local 
politicians and national-level elites. In the first instance, while local politicians derive 
personal wealth and fiscal revenues from ASM, the Bangko Sentral (Philippine Central 
Bank) has long bought ASM-gold on a “no questions asked” basis, and ASM has long 
been the number one source of national gold reserves. Perhaps more fundamentally, 
reciprocity between local- and national-level elites resides in local politicians’ 
contributions to sociopolitical stability and state resilience on the upland frontier 
(Abinales, 2000; Wong, 2006). Not only do local politicians use their authority and the 
resources at their disposal for local conflict resolution (Adam & Verbrugge, 2014), they 
also contribute to “pacifying, confronting, co-opting and surrendering” (Wong, 2006: 
262) forces that compete with the state, including armed insurgents. Secondly, local 
politicians’ increased reliance on the fiscal-regulatory repertoire of the state to expand 
control over informal ASM –which in turn strengthens their own authority– 
simultaneously contributes to a reproduction of the “idea of the state” (Lund, 2006) and a 
broad acceptance of legal-bureaucratic rule in the “unruly uplands” (Scott, 2009). In short, 
it can be argued that the existence of joint institutions of extraction around informal ASM 
is a product of an elite pact between national-level elites and local politicians, with the 
latter fulfilling a key role in “sustaining the state’s administrative reach and politico-
military control” (Lara & Schoofs, 2013: 249).  
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However, there are now important indications that (sections of) national level elites are 
reneging on their part of ‘the deal’, by taking measures aimed at combating “illegal” 
ASM. In the long run this may lead to a fragmentation or even a breakdown of joint 
institutions of extraction, with possibly important consequences for sociopolitical stability. 
In the first instance, as has been discussed in the introductory chapter, by imposing a 5 
percent withholding tax and a 2 percent excise tax on gold sales in 2011, the government 
(the central bank) has effectively given up on its share of ASM-rents, driving ASM-
operators into the arms of unofficial gold traders. Furthermore, Executive Order 79, which 
was introduced by the Aquino government (2010-) in 2012 in an effort to rationalize the 
mining sector and to attract more investors, contains several measures aimed at combatting 
illegal ASM (see La Viña & De Leon, 2012 for a more elaborate discussion).  
Arguably the most important threat for the stability of local institutional arrangements 
built around informal ASM, however, is the looming expansion of large-scale mining. 
Following the enactment of the 1995 Mining Act the national government, through the 
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), has started issuing permits to large-scale mining 
companies. As a result, as Figure 1 illustrates, most ASM-areas in Compostela Valley are 
now encapsulated by large-scale mining concessions. At the time of the research in 
barangay Bukal, the activities of ALDEVINCO (the rights-wielding company) were 
limited to handing out cease-and-desist orders (issued by the MGB) to ASM-operators, 
and negotiating with barangay authorities to enable a smooth (future) entry into the 
locality. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8, however, in different other 
mining areas throughout the province the entry of large-scale mining has already 
generated tensions and even conflicts over access to mineral-bearing land. Rather than 
playing out simply between ASM-operators and large-scale mining companies, these 
conflicts involve indistinct and dynamic coalitions of politico-military actors that defy 
easy categorization in terms of state/non-state and in some cases even 
insurgency/counterinsurgency. However, in line with the analysis presented above, local 
(would-be) politicians play a key role in these coalitions.  
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Figure 1. Approximate location of small-scale mining areas (black dots/crosses) and their overlap with 
large-scale mining concessions45 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have presented an empirical analysis of the ‘state of the state’ on the 
ASM-frontier. Building on critical debates on the relationship between the informal 
economy and the state, I demonstrated that, rather than being detrimental to state power, 
the expansion of informal ASM went hand in hand with a consolidation of state rule in the 
purportedly “unruly” uplands (Scott, 2009). This parallel process of ASM-expansion and 
state consolidation is epitomized by the emergence of “joint institutions of extraction” 
(Snyder, 2006) that serve the interests of an indistinct coalition of local miner-politicians 
and a range of other ASM-interests. While local miner-politicians now rely on the sector 
as a source of fiscal revenues and as a platform to assert their authority, ASM-financiers 
and informal landowners benefit from a range of regulatory interventions undertaken by 
these same politicians, chief among which the legitimation of otherwise informal land- and 
mineral claims. 
                                                          
45 The mining tenements map was provided by the Provincial Agricultural Office (PAGRO) of Compostela Valley 
(situation as of June 2011). On this map I have attempted to indicate the location of SSM areas (black crosses) that 
were identified through personal observations and a map hanging in the barangay hall of Mt. Diwata, Monkayo 
municipality. 
  87 
 
Transcending the locality, I then argued that these joint institutions of extraction on the 
local level are a constitutive part of a broader, historically rooted elite pact between local- 
and national-level political elites, whereby the former, in exchange for their prerogatives 
in the informal ASM-sector, fulfill key roles as frontier “stabilizers” and as agents of 
democratic state rule. At the same time attention was drawn to different trends that 
indicate a willingness on the part of (sections of) the national level elite to renege on their 
part of this elite pact, thereby possibly undermining local institutional arrangements built 
around informal ASM-rents, and possibly also the sociopolitical stability produced by 
these arrangements. The most important of these “threats from above” is the looming 
expansion of corporate large-scale mining.  
To be sure, the long-term effects of large-scale mining expansion are as of yet 
undetermined, and much will depend on the inclusiveness of the new institutional 
arrangements accompanying said expansion. Local politicians are now working towards 
what they describe as a “win-win solution”, convincing mining companies to consider the 
interests of different actors that currently derive their wealth and power from ASM (which 
includes themselves). However, most mining companies are instead opting for 
militarization, in an attempt to monopolize access to mineral resources. And even if some 
of these companies would eventually prove willing to toe the consensual line, the hoped-
for win-win solution is unlikely to meet the needs of the tens of thousands who now 
depend on ASM for their everyday survival. In the long run, both social justice and 
sociopolitical stability would be best served by more inclusive solutions aimed at 
accommodating local populations as a whole, rather than merely those individuals who 
command the necessary “policing power” to subdue local resistance. In chapter 8 I delve 
further into these unfolding institutional struggles over access to mineral resource wealth 


















































Verbrugge, B., Cuvelier, J., & Van Bockstael, S. (2015). Min(d)ing the land: The 
relationship between artisanal and small-scale mining and surface land arrangements in the 
southern Philippines, eastern DRC and Liberia. Journal of Rural Studies, 37, 50-60. 
BACKGROUND: 
Frustrated with (1) the lack of empirical evidence about the relationship between ASM and 
land tenure; and (2) a tendency to portray ASM-landowner relations as antagonistic and 
defined by dispossession; together with two of my colleagues we set up a comparative 
exercise, combining our field research experience in three different countries. As the main 
author, I did not only take the initiative for this comparative effort, but I also took the lead 
in editing the article and in developing the theoretical and conceptual framework for our 
comparative analysis.  
ARTICLE ABSTRACT: 
This article examines the relationship between artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) 
and surface land tenure arrangements, through a comparison of mining areas in the 
southern Philippines, the eastern DRC and Liberia. In all three cases, ASM takes place in 
peripheral regions outside central state control, where both land- and mineral tenure are 
characterized by high degrees of informality. Based on our comparative analysis, we 
highlight three core propositions. First, the relationship between ASM and surface land 
claimants is not (merely) characterized by antagonism, but involves a significant degree of 
negotiation and mutual benefit-sharing. Secondly, even in places purportedly characterized 
by a weak state presence, people make constant references to state-sanctioned legality to 
underpin their (often overlapping) claims to mineral resource wealth; whether as miner or 
as a surface landowner claiming royalties. Thirdly, people's ability to effectively use state-
sanctioned legality as a mechanism to access mineral wealth -and to exclude others from 
accessing this wealth- is not distributed equally, and hinges on access to vital financial and 
political resources. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“mining is an industry distinguished from others by the exceptional characteristic 
that the interests of landlord and capitalist there join hands” (Marx, 1887: Chapter 
15, section 9) 
While the relationship between ASM and (smallholder) agriculture has received its fair 
share of attention in the ASM-literature (e.g. Maconachie & Binns, 2007; Hilson & 
Garforth, 2012), the relationship between ASM and surface land arrangements remains 
poorly understood. Instead, there is still a widely held belief that “local livelihoods rarely 
profit from mining activities” (Schueler et al., 2011: 528) due to their detrimental impact 
on the environment (including soil quality) and due to the dispossession of local 
communities. In recent years, however, evidence has begun to emerge which suggests 
“symbiotic relationships (…) between artisanal miners and local communities, 
presumably due to the shared socio-economic benefits derived from the partnership 
between the two parties” (Nyame & Blocher, 2010: 50). For example, Pijpers (2014) 
draws attention to the existence of lease arrangements between farmers and miners in sub-
Saharan Africa. In their ethnographic explorations of the west-African mining frontier, 
Grätz (2004), Werthmann (2009) and Mégret (2011) draw attention to the negotiated 
nature of ASM-sites, providing an initial overview of negotiation patterns between 
migrant miners and local settler communities. After an initial phase of resource 
appropriation, which may involve significant conflict between local settlers and migrant 
miners, some form of mutual understanding often develops around the economic benefits 
produced by ASM, which usually includes some kind of revenue-sharing arrangements 
between miners and local landowners (Grätz, 2004).    
Building on these initial observations about the relationship between ASM and surface 
land claimants, this contribution presents a case-oriented comparison between the 
Philippines, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Liberia. Our comparative 
analysis will pay central attention to the context-specific historical-institutional trajectories 
that explain the current situation (Byres, 1995)46. These three cases share a number of 
similarities that can be treated as constants, thus guaranteeing their comparability 
(Lijphart, 1971). In all three cases, ownership of subsurface mineral resources and 
significant tracts of surface land is vested in the ‘landlord state’. However, these landlord 
                                                          
46 All three authors have done extensive field research, relying on a range of flexible qualitative research methods 
which allowed us to work our way around thorny political issues, and to establish relationships of trust with 
respondents. The Philippines section is based on nearly 8 months of field research (2011-2014); the DRC section is 
based on 2 months of field research (2012 and 2014) and a close coordination with the Bukavu-based NGO Action 
pour la Paix et la Concorde (APC); and the Liberia section is based on several field visits conducted between 2010 
and 2012.  
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states have proven incapable or unwilling to effectively wield these rights, and instead 
harbor a range of informal resource claimants that operate on the fringes of state-
sanctioned regulatory systems, including a sizeable and predominantly informal ASM-
sector that has expanded massively in recent decades (see Smith, 2011 for the DRC; and 
Hilson and Van Bockstael, 2011 for Liberia). Indeed, as Fisher (2008) rightly notes, 
mineral resource extraction now takes place “at the margins of mineral resource 
governance”, where state authority is weak and fragmented, and where access  –
understood here broadly as “all possible means by which a person is able to benefit from 
things” (Ribot & Peluso, 2003: 156)– to mineral resources is subject to negotiation 
between a broad range of stakeholders (see also Luning, 2008). Adding to these 
complexities is the fact that all three case study regions can be described either as a 
conflict- (DRC and Philippines) or post-conflict setting (Liberia) and are, to various 
extents, home to armed actors involved in ASM. In the eastern DRC, both state and non-
state armed groups are levying taxes on mineral exports, selling minerals for their own 
profit, and trading mineral rights for financial and military support. In the southern 
Philippines, the communist New People’s Army, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and 
various paramilitary groups are engaged in protection-cum-extortion activities, while the 
Philippine National Police is delivering explosives to ASM-operators. Meanwhile during 
Liberia’s long civil war(s), diamond and gold mines were controlled by various armed 
actors. More recently, the UN Group of Experts has warned that mining camps along the 
border with Côte d’Ivoire have provided “temporary employment, a means of subsistence 
and in some case a point of assembly” for Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militias (UN, 
2013).  
Based on these preliminary observations, our comparative exercise is guided by two 
central research questions. First, in an environment (purportedly) characterized by a weak 
state –and consequently, one can assume, by a weak enforcement of formal tenure 
regimes– who, if anyone, is able to claim rights to surface lands and associated ASM-
benefits? Secondly, on what basis does such claim-staking occur i.e. how are these claims 
legitimated, and how can this be related to the exercise of public authority more broadly? 
In the second section we present the three case studies, written respectively by Boris 
Verbrugge (the Southern Philippines), Jeroen Cuvelier (Eastern DRC) and Steven van 
Bockstael (Liberia). We then move on to a brief comparative analysis of these cases. In an 
attempt to provide (initial) answers to the research questions outlined above, we highlight 
three core propositions that can serve as a basis for future research. First, the relationship 
between ASM and local land claimants, rather than being defined by antagonism or 
dispossession, almost invariably involves a degree of negotiation and mutual benefit-
sharing. Second, despite the assumed weakness or even absence of state institutions, 
claims to surface land and associated mineral rents often involve implicit or explicit 
references to state-sanctioned legality. In an attempt to explain this paradox, we make an 
incursion into the anthropological literature on the state, which treats it as “an open field 
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with multiple boundaries and no institutional fixity” (Trouillot, 2001: 127), underpinned 
by “the idea of the state” (Lund, 2006) as a particularly powerful legitimizing repertoire. 
Third, the ability of local landowners to effectively claim surface lands and associated 
mineral rents hinges on their ability to navigate within this multi-layered and increasingly 
fragmented state arena. 
ASM-LANDOWNER RELATIONS IN THREE WEAK 
STATE ENVIRONMENTS 
CASE 1: STATE PENETRATION MEETS LANDOWNER INTERESTS IN THE 
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES 
Upland tenurial complexities 
Most ASM in the Philippines takes place in the mountainous upland interior of the 
peninsula. According to the Philippine constitution, ownership over most of these uplands, 
and the mineral resources underlying them, is vested in the Philippine state (USAID, 
2011a). However, demographic growth and social dislocation in the lowlands have spurred 
subsequent waves of upland migration and -settlement (Umehara & Bautista, 2004; Scott, 
2009). In response to these realities, since Philippine independence in 1946 successive 
national governments have created a range of tenurial mechanisms that aimed at 
recognizing this reality (USAID, 2011a). Examples include logging permits, community-
based forestry arrangements, but also mineral tenure arrangements for large-scale mining 
and ASM (Torres, 2012). While large-scale mining permits are awarded by the Mines and 
Geosciences Bureau, a national government agency, the authority to segregate small-scale 
mining areas (Minahang Bayan) has been devolved to local governments under Republic 
Act 7076, as part of a broader move towards decentralization. Whereas these different 
tenurial instruments fall short of full-blown property rights, Certificates of Ancestral 
Domain Titles (CADT) granted to tribal communities under the 1997 Indigenous Peoples 
Rights Act recognize customary ownership rights over ancestral domain, including all 
(mineral) resources inside this domain (USAID, 2011a). This principle contradicts the 
principle of state ownership of public land, and for this reason the IPRA has repeatedly 
(and so far unsuccessfully) been challenged in court.   
Notwithstanding this broad range of tenurial mechanisms, a significant share of upland 
settlement and economic activity, including most ASM, remains bereft of national 
government recognition. As demonstrated in chapter 4, the persistence of informality is 
the result of a combination of diverse factors. In any case, the uplands now harbor an 
extremely complex tenure regime, characterized by a messy overlap between formal and 
informal claims to land and other natural resources. Consider the example of barangay 
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Bukal. Located entirely in public land, Bukal partly coincides with Mainit Hot Springs 
protected landscape, a conservation area. Another part overlaps with a large-scale mining 
permit issued to ALDEVINCO, a corporate mining outfit that emerged from ALSON, a 
logging company that was active in Bukal in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, the 
barangay is now fully encapsulated by the ancestral domain of a Mansaka tribal 
association. However, realities on the ground suggest that Bukal is first and foremost an 
informal –and according to the national government illegal– small-scale gold mining area. 
In what follows a concise analysis will be presented of the historical interaction between 
ASM-expansion and local land tenure arrangements in Bukal.  
Migrant settlers and the inception of informal land markets 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, in the decades after the Second World War, 
Christian settlers from the north of the country increasingly penetrated the Compostela 
Valley uplands. In combination with the gradual introduction of cash crops, this settler 
influx led to a breakdown of clan-based land tenure arrangements. Rather than merely 
dispossessing local ‘indigenous’ Mansaka, however, this migratory influx sparked the 
development of a market in informal land claims, with newcomers purchasing or bartering 
a piece of land from existing inhabitants. However, due to ignorance and sometimes also 
fear, particularly on the part of the Mansaka tribals, the compensations that were offered 
for the land in question were often very low, with respondents even mentioning a radio or 
a horse.  
For different reasons, the initial settlement of present-day Bukal was relatively peaceful 
(see chapter 5). Probably the most important factor was the fact that land access was –and 
continues to be– dominated by a few extended settler families. Most of the in-migration 
followed a pattern of ‘chain migration’ whereby “relatives, friends and village mates 
follow in the footsteps of the pioneer settlers” (Umehara & Bautista, 2004: 65). Most 
newcomers had pre-existing (kinship) ties within these families, who increasingly 
intermarried. Henceforth, Bukal witnessed the emergence of cross-cutting solidarity ties.  
From the 1970s onwards, stability on the Mindanao frontier was increasingly undermined 
by rising social tensions, resulting from (para-)military aggression on the part of an 
increasingly authoritarian Marcos martial law regime, and declining land availability due 
to demographic growth and extractive industry expansion (Abinales, 2000). By the 1980s 
Compostela Valley had become one of the hotspots in the war between the martial law 
regime and the communist insurgents of the New People’s army, who found fertile 
grounds for recruitment in the uplands (ICG, 2011). In the case of Bukal, the expansion of 
commercial logging seems to have been a major source of local grievances. While 
tensions subsided in the 1990s, the persistence of the communist rebellion continues to 
have a restraining effect on outsiders in their dealings with upland landowners, some of 
whom are still (often correctly) suspected to cultivate ties with the NPA.  
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ASM-expansion and the rise of the landowner-rentier 
In the 1960s migrant settlers with prior experience with mining in their home regions 
started panning for gold in the rivers and creeks of Compostela Valley, mainly as a 
sideline to upland farming. Panning was a community affair, with gold-bearing rivers and 
creeks considered open-access for local settlers. From the 1980s onwards Compostela 
Valley witnessed an expansion of small-scale tunneling activities that targeted surface 
gold veins. These initial tunneling activities were likewise a predominantly local affair, 
involving local labour and taking place in close coordination with local landowners. While 
some of these landowners received a share of the proceeds, most contented themselves 
with the share received by their labouring kin.  
In parallel with the gradual capitalization and professionalization of ASM (described in 
chapters 3 and 4), local landowners came to play an even more central role in the ASM-
sector. For one, landowners are usually more knowledgeable about the local security 
situation, and came to act as a liaison between the financier and armed rent-seekers. In 
addition, landowners play an important role in recruiting and disciplining local labour. 
Finally, the landowner became an important point of call in the case of disputes between 
different tunnel operators. In return, landowners benefit from the presence of ASM in 
different ways. Under a scheme popularly known as “back-financing”, they became 
entitled to a share of the ores (graba). To increase this share, some landowners invested in 
processing equipment (particularly ball mills), which were used not only to process their 
royalty share, but also the revenues of local miners. In return for these milling services, in 
addition to a custom milling fee, landowners are usually left with the ball mill tailings, 
which can be re-processed in sophisticated carbon-in-pulp processing plants that have a 
much higher recovery rate (plantas). Furthermore, the landowner and his or her relatives 
retain priority access to labour opportunities in high-grade tunnels located in their land. 
Finally, in more established mining areas such as Bukal, some landowners responded to 
the growth of the mining settlement by subdividing their land into residential lots. 
According to one landowner, 150 m² of residential land now earns him 30000 pesos 
(roughly US$ 500), and while still cheaper than a titled lot in the lowlands, this is still 
rather expensive considering the lack of official title47. 
State penetration meets landowner interests 
The gradual expansion of ASM prompted an alliance between local landowner-miners and 
the provincial governor. This eventually led to the creation of barangay Bukal, in 1995. 
Unsurprisingly, those elected as barangay kagawads (council members) were members of 
prominent local settler families. With the assistance of a growing number of puroks 
(administrative subdivisions of the barangay), barangay officials started sanctioning 
informal land markets, providing landowners with a range of documents that recognized 
                                                          
47 Interview with landowner, barangay Bukal, October 2012. 
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their essentially informal land claims48. By the mid-2000s, when a new and massive gold 
rush enveloped Compostela Valley –mainly as a result of skyrocketing gold prices– 
barangay officials had effectively emerged as the institutionalized representatives of local 
landowners. Barangay authority is backed up by the coercive capacity of the Civilian 
Volunteers Organization (CVO), a state-sanctioned auxiliary force that operates at the 
behest of barangay officials. At least in the case of Bukal, the CVO is composed almost 
entirely of communist rebel returnees.  
Increased investment in ASM in turn led to a higher incidence of more capitalized, but still 
informal tunneling operations. Under the new sharing schemes accompanying this novel 
incarnation of ‘small-scale’ gold mining, landowners typically receive ten per cent of the 
revenues. While most respondents described these ten per cent as ‘non-negotiable’, some 
landowners do manage to negotiate up to fifteen per cent. While it was not immediately 
clear why this was the case, initial observations suggest that those landowners whose land 
had been confirmed high-grade, or those landowners who are well-connected politically, 
are better positioned in royalty negotiations. The barangay captain of Bukal, for example, 
receives fifteen instead of ten per cent in his capacity as landowner. Finally, it is important 
to note how even in these bigger operations, the landowner and his family retain priority 
access to good labour opportunities in high-grade tunnels. 
In an effort to strengthen the barangay’s fiscal-regulatory control, and to simultaneously 
safeguard the interests of local landowners –many of whom have kinship connections 
inside the barangay– the barangay created standardized documents stating mining rules 
and sharing modalities. After an agreement is reached between a landowner and a 
financier, these documents are signed by both parties, by the barangay captain, and by the 
purok leader. Whenever a conflict arises between different landowners, or between a 
financier and a landowner, the barangay will step in to mediate. At the time of the 
research, for example, the barangay captain was mediating in a conflict between two 
landowners who were both claiming royalties from the same tunnel. In another case, “A 
Korean financier entered without an agreement (…) the barangay officials went there with 
the CVO and he was told to leave”49. 
Thus, rather than taking place at their expense, informal landowners in Bukal have 
benefited in different ways from the expansion of ASM. Meanwhile the ability of informal 
landowners to claim benefits from ASM has increasingly come to rely on the regulatory 
and coercive power of local state institutions. In fact, throughout Compostela Valley 
province, local politicians –many of whom are landowners and/or financiers themselves– 
are now actively sanctioning informal land claims, supporting the formation of ASM-
associations that apply for official permits. Notwithstanding notable exceptions, however, 
                                                          
48 On the involvement of local state officials in informal land markets in Mindanao see also Gulane, 2013. 
49 Interview with landowner, barangay Bukal, October 2012. 
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these formalization efforts have hitherto proven unsuccessful, which brings us to a final 
albeit crucial caveat, namely the way in which formal tenure regimes (i.e. those sanctioned 
by the national government) risk upsetting the informal institutional arrangements 
described above.  
The looming threat of formal tenure regimes 
Finally, Bukal serves as a potent example of how formal tenure regimes, i.e. those 
sanctioned by the national government, now risk upsetting these localized tenure 
arrangements. First, most ASM in Bukal takes place inside a conservation area, and 
environmentalists are pressuring local politicians to put a stop to the mining activities. So 
far however, these attempts have been unsuccessful, in part because some of the 
politicians in question allegedly have a stake in the mining. Secondly, Bukal is part of the 
ancestral domain of NASBATRICO, a Mansaka tribal association that is (successfully) 
claiming royalties from ASM in a checkpoint near the entrance of the protected landscape. 
For various reasons however, NASBATRICO is not considered a legitimate land claimant. 
A third and possibly more fundamental threat stems from ALDEVINCO50, a large-scale 
mining company which currently holds an exploration permit over part of Bukal. At the 
time of the research, ALDEVINCO was undertaking legal measures to exclude ASM from 
its concession, and it is uncertain how the future entry of large-scale mining may impact 
on existing tenure regimes, which harbor an important degree of mutuality between ASM 
and local landowners. 
CASE 2: NGO-SANCTIONED FORMALIZATION IN THE EASTERN DRC 
Land rights in the Kivu Provinces 
In the eastern DRC, people’s relationships to land are shaped by different, coexisting sets 
of rules, including customary laws, and statutory land and -mining laws. Customary land 
arrangements exhibit a high degree of intra-regional variation, and are characterized by 
high levels of negotiability (Utshudi Ona and Ansoms, 2011). Overall, in return for regular 
tribute payments to the customary chief or Mwami, an applicant can acquire usufruct 
rights over a piece of customary land. While the person in question cannot acquire full 
property rights –the land remains customary at all times– he does have the right to lease 
portions of the land to other people that are in turn obliged to pay tribute to the lessor (Van 
Acker, 2005).  
After Congolese independence in 1960, this customary system started showing signs of 
erosion. In 1973 President Mobutu introduced the General Property Law, which declared 
all land property of the state. From then on, the only way to legally obtain land rights was 
                                                          
50 The successor of ALSON, the logging company. 
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through a state-controlled administrative procedure involving registration and surveying 
(Van Acker, 2005: 84). This law was meant to put an end to the dual land system 
introduced by the Belgian colonial administration, which made a distinction between state 
land, and indigenous customary land. Since the General Property Law did not recognize 
customary land rights, a significant part of the population was suddenly at risk of 
becoming landless (Geenen & Claessens, 2013).  
Throughout the following decades, land rights underwent a process of commercialization 
(Utshudi Ona and Ansoms 2011: 28). Tenure insecurity increased considerably, not only 
as a result of the state’s inability to effectively implement the new land laws –leading to a 
de facto persistence of the dual land system– but also due to the civil wars that hit the 
region in the second half of the 1990s (in 1996-1997 and 1998-2003) (Stearns, 2011). 
Forced displacement, the presence of armed groups, the growing inaccessibility and 
exhaustion of land, and rising social and ethnic tensions all contributed to the fact that 
people in the eastern DRC were increasingly experiencing difficulties to gain a livelihood 
through agriculture and cattle breeding, traditionally the most important sources of income 
in the region (Vlassenroot, 2012).  
Finally, developments in the mining sector are also of vital importance to understand the 
complexity of land relations in eastern DRC. During colonial times, the country’s 
immense mineral wealth was almost exclusively exploited in an industrial manner, by 
large-scale private mining companies receiving big concessions from the colonial 
authorities (Rubbers, 2006). After Congolese independence, the nationalization and 
mismanagement of the mining industry by the Mobutu regime led to a gradual decline of 
industrial mining, and a concomitant emergence and growth of ASM. ASM-expansion 
gained full momentum in the 1980s, when Mobutu took a number of measures to 
‘liberalize’ the sector. Ordinance-law 82-039 of 1982 stated that the state commissioner 
(commissaire d’état) has the possibility to designate deposits of gold, diamonds or other 
precious materials as open to artisanal mining, provided that the “technical and economic 
factors characterizing these deposits” do not meet the necessary conditions for industrial 
mining.  
During the Congolese wars (1997-2002), ASM witnessed a further, dramatic expansion as 
a survival activity for thousands of men, women and children (Smith, 2011). At the same 
time, political-military elite networks started dominating the scene, developing various 
strategies to control and derive revenues from ASM: levying taxes on economic activities 
in mining areas, negotiating security arrangements with the mining population, creating 
systems of forced labour, selling minerals on the international market through their own 
commercial networks, and signing contracts with businessmen eager to work in areas 
under their control (Nest, 2011). Overall, the most important consequences of the wars 
were a militarization of mining areas and an ‘informalization’ of mining, with a growing 
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importance of unofficial rules for the organization of the mining process.  
On the other hand, since the period of political transition (2002-2006), the Congolese 
Government has faced increasing pressures from international financial institutions to 
institute a series of reforms aimed at formalizing, liberalizing and streamlining regulations 
in the mining sector, in order to stimulate investment. Another important driver behind 
these reforms is the so-called ‘conflict minerals’ issue. At the international level, it is 
believed that the easiest and most effective way to end the conflict is to prevent armed 
groups from making money through the sale of minerals extracted in areas under their 
control. Recent years have thus witnessed the launch of a large number of government- 
and industry-led initiatives to promote transparency and traceability in the supply chains 
of the so-called 3T minerals (tin, tungsten, tantalum) and gold (Seay 2012).   
Mining reforms and formalization: the case of Nyabibwe  
One of the main testing grounds for the aforementioned reforms is Nyabibwe, a small 
mining town in South Kivu’s territory of Kalehe. From 1980 to 1984, Nyabibwe’s Kalimbi 
mine was operated in a semi-industrial manner by the Société Minière de Goma (SMDG). 
After the departure of SMDG, in a climate of pervasive regulatory volatility, Placide 
Chirimwami, a big landowner who had made a career for himself as a trader of coffee and 
cinchona, stepped forward and presented himself as the new owner of Kalimbi, although 
he lacked the official documents to support his claim. Because Chirimwami failed to evict 
the artisanal miners who had more or less taken over the mine, he tried to win their 
sympathy by setting up an organisation called COOMBECKA (Coopérative du Bien-être 
de Kalehe), which was officially recognized as a mining cooperative by the provincial 
authorities of South Kivu in 1993. During the Congo wars, Chirimwami managed to stay 
in control of Kalimbi thanks to his good contacts with rebel groups and Congolese army 
officers (Channel Research, 2013: 9-10).  
Despite its turbulent history, Nyabibwe’s Kalimbi mine was selected as a pilot site for 
several high-profile reform initiatives aimed at formalizing ASM, and breaking the 
assumed link between ASM and armed conflict. Within a time span of only a couple of 
years, the mine witnessed the arrival of the Certified Trading Chains (CTC) project of the 
German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR), the traceability 
and due diligence initiative of the International Tin Research Institute (iTSCi), the Conflict 
Free Tin Initiative (CFTI) of the Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the regional 
tracking and traceability mechanism of the International Conference on the Great Lakes 
Region (ICGLR) (Levin, 2013). Moreover it is one of the only sites in South Kivu to have 
received a ‘green’ label. Joint Assessment Teams (équipes conjointes), composed of 
representatives from the different institutions involved in the regulation of Congolese 
ASM (public services, civil society members, the UN, BGR), have been carrying out field 
missions to evaluate –on behalf of the National Ministry of Mines– to what extent the 
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social and security conditions in and around the mines meet a number of internationally 
agreed upon standards. On the basis of these standards they can attribute green, yellow or 
red labels, and only minerals originating from mines with a green label can be legally 
traded and exported (Bashwira et al., 2014). 
Given Nyabibwe’s selection as a testing ground for several mining reform initiatives, the 
Congolese government at the national level knew something had to be done about the 
contradictory governance arrangements at different levels of government. In fact, in 2010, 
when the first initiatives reached the Kalimbi mine, it was not even part of an Artisanal 
Mining Zone (Zone d’Exploitation Artisanale or ZEA), meaning that, according to the 
Congolese mining code, engaging in artisanal mining activities was technically illegal 
there. Between 2007 and 2012, the Canadian mining company Shamika Resources, 
through its subsidiary Shamika Congo Kalehe Sprl, held an exploration license (from the 
national ministry of mines) for the area covering the Kalimbi mine in Nyabibwe. During 
the same period, the provincial government of South Kivu took a completely different 
stance on the issue of artisanal mining in Kalimbi, as it officially recognized 
COOMBECKA as a mining cooperative (cfr. supra). The contradiction was eventually 
solved by making Kalimbi part of an Artisanal Mining Zone (ZEA) after the expiration of 
Shamika’s exploration license on 30 June 2012.  
As a result of the various reform initiatives, Nyabibwe evolved from a relatively isolated 
and marginalized place that largely escapes government control, into an island of 
transparency and formality. Whereas in the past, ASM took place in an atmosphere of 
opaqueness and informality, today the international attention for Nyabibwe has become so 
immense that both local authorities and the various actors engaged in mining feel 
compelled to demonstrate their respect for the rule of law. State services are closely 
monitoring the implementation of the aforementioned traceability mechanisms, mining 
cooperatives are making sure that all artisanal miners are officially registered and are 
paying their taxes, and NGOs are making efforts to raise local stakeholders’ awareness of 
the need to comply with the new transparency measures.  
As the following sections will show, Nyabibwe’s newly acquired status as an island of 
formality also had an impact on the interaction between local landowners and ASM. There 
are important indications that ASM-formalization has contributed to the formalization of 
land rights at the local level. International NGOs and civil society groups committed to 
sensitizing the population about the mining reforms appear to have raised awareness 
among local landowners about their rights. Some of these landowners now feel strong 
enough to break out of the customary arena by legalizing their traditional land titles, and 
by claiming compensation from artisanal miners operating on their land. It needs to be 
stressed that this is a new development. Before the arrival of the mining reform initiatives, 
local landowners with traditional land titles pertaining to pieces of land close to the 
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Kalimbi mine refrained from demanding such compensations because they felt intimidated 
by Placide Chirimwami, the local strongman in charge of the COOMBECKA mining 
cooperative.    
A dispute between local landowners and mining cooperatives  
For most people in South Kivu, it is difficult to secure access to land through the formal 
system. Not only do they lack the necessary knowledge and financial means to acquire a 
registration certificate, they also have to deal with lengthy and elaborate procedures, and 
with the challenge of having to cover long distances to visit a land registration office 
(Utshudi Ona 1 Ansoms, 2011). Nevertheless, in 2011, 7 families of local landowners in 
Nyabibwe decided to join hands in order to obtain an official land certificate from the land 
registry (cadastre). They substantiated their claim by referring to the fact that in the early 
1970s, they secured a customary land title from the customary chief for the land where the 
Kalimbi mine was situated. Having been informed that according to the Congolese mining 
code, miners are obliged to pay compensation when operating on someone else’s land, the 
landowners thought it wise to have their traditional land title formalized, as they believed 
that this would greatly increase their chances of receiving said compensation.   
Unfortunately for them, things did not go as planned, as the two mining cooperatives 
(COOMBECKA and COMIKA) initially refused to recognize their land title and were 
unwilling to offer them compensation. Chirimwami’s COOMBECKA even filed a lawsuit 
against the landowners for illegal occupation, but lost the court case. The ruling stated that 
landowners were entitled to receive 4% of the 10% production that a mining cooperative 
retains as royalty (Channel Research, 2013: 10). On 22 September 2011, an agreement 
was reached between local landowners and the COMIKA cooperative. It was agreed that 
the cooperative would hand over 4 per cent of the mining production to the landowners by 
way of compensation. Farmers who had acquired user rights on plots of land in Kalimbi 
from the landowners and had been working there before the beginning of the mining 
activities, would, on their turn, receive compensation from the landowners. However, 
COMIKA does not appear to have respected the abovementioned agreement. It was not 
until January 31-February 1 2013, when the Bukavu-based NGO Observatoire 
Gouvernance et Paix (OGP) organized a roundtable with the aim of finding a peaceful 
solution to the conflict outside of the courtroom that the two mining cooperatives agreed 
to give 3 per cent of their daily mining production to the landowners. For their part, the 
landowners would have the obligation to set aside 0.5 of those 3 per cent for community 
development. Still, there are indications that the issue is not entirely solved. In early June 
2014 an international delegation led by Martin Kobler, the head of the UN Stabilization 
Mission in the DRC, wanted to visit the Kalimbi mine. They were reportedly stopped by 
one of the families of local landowners, who expressed anger and dissatisfaction with the 
way the compensation problem was handled by the mining cooperatives. The delegation 
  101 
 
was only allowed to enter the mine after long negotiations with the local landowners51. 
CASE 3: THE POWER OF FORMALITY IN AN OPAQUE REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT IN LIBERIA  
Tenurial complexities in Liberia 
Land rights in Liberia are strongly determined by the historical origins of the Liberian 
state, founded on behalf of a small group of freed slaves and/or their descendants living in 
the United States that were sent 'back to Africa'. After the formal creation of the Liberian 
republic, in 1847, it took several decades before those areas outside direct settler control 
(the Hinterland) began to be integrated in the Liberian polity (Ellis, 2007; Gerdes, 2013). 
Settlers acknowledged the existence and legitimacy of customary land arrangements in the 
Hinterland early on (Alden Wily, 2007: 17). Instead of simply dispossessing the chiefs, 
they started purchasing –admittedly on highly unequal terms– lands from native 
communities, particularly those along the coastline. These purchased lands became public 
land, which could in turn be privatized through purchase by settlers and corporations. 
Several ‘indigenous’ groups living near Americo settlements responded to these shifts by 
setting up corporations in order to collectively buy land, such as the Kru Corporation 
which managed New Krutown in Monrovia. The land bought was generally managed on a 
collective basis, with some reference to customary practices (Falkman, 1972). This 
provides an early illustration of the complex entanglement between customary and 
statutory tenure systems. 
After the Second World War, the laws governing the Hinterland were revised. Where 
customary land rights had previously been guaranteed, the 1956 Aborigines Law reduced 
these rights to protected occupancy and usufruct rights on land which was now state-
owned (Alden Wily, 2007: 121). However, the Aborigines law was not included in a later 
codification of Liberian law (Ibid.:129-134), resulting in uncertainty regarding the status 
of customary land rights in contemporary Liberia. According to Stevens (2014), there has 
never been a clear definition of public lands in Liberian legal history, precisely because of 
the political implications of accepting customary land tenure as equal to statutory land 
ownership. 
A recent World Bank report on land tenure suggested that "there is perhaps no country in 
Africa where less is known of customary systems of land tenure than in Liberia" (World 
Bank, 2008). In general terms, customary land is linked to lineage and identity. While 
‘ownership’ is vested in the community, individual families can be granted inheritable 
plots of land, and ‘autochthonous’ Liberians can return to their homeland after many years 
and still be guaranteed access to land. In this sense we can refer to farmers that do not 
                                                          
51 Interview with researcher from Bukavu-based NGO, Bukavu, June 2014.  
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have statutory claims to land as landowners under customary law, even though ownership 
is vested in the community. Meanwhile ‘strangers’ can obtain access rights through the 
‘stranger-father’ institution, whereby the ‘stranger’ needs to find an autochthonous ‘father’ 
that will be responsible for ensuring the stranger’s adherence to customary rules and 
norms. The stranger and his descendants are thenceforth locked into a politically 
subordinate position (Boas, 2009).  
The creation of a state-sponsored version of ‘customary’ law as part of the government’s 
post-1945 unification policy, that deviated from ‘authentic’52 indigenous laws, further 
added to the “ambiguity and confusion” (Unruh, 2008: 15) in land tenure arrangements, 
and had a detrimental impact on the tenure security of customary landowners in particular. 
Combined with other socio-political grievances, this insecurity became one of the key 
factors which fuelled the 1990s civil war (Richards, 2005). Meanwhile for elites, tenurial 
chaos means an opportunity “to acquire or preserve tenuous rights of land occupation, 
ownership, and use” (Unruh, 2008:15), leading to “one of the most extensive programs of 
private land acquisition outside of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese 
dependencies” (Liebenow, 1969: 209). 
While many rural communities were able to formalize customary land claims through 
payment of a deed (World Bank, 2008; Corriveau-Bourque, 2010), these deeds represent 
no ironclad guarantee for tenure security, with problematic record-keeping and the 
issuance of fraudulent deeds often resulting in overlapping land claims. The 1974 Land 
Act attempted to rectify this situation by introducing a new land registration system, but 
the 1980 coup permanently halted these efforts (Brandy & Marquardt, 2013: 4). In post-
conflict Liberia, fraud and malpractice continued, rendering the trustworthiness of the 
registration system “highly questionable” (Bruce, 2014). Overall, “massive confusion that 
exists on a range of legal, administrative, boundary, claim and ownership issues” 
constitutes the root land tenure problem in post-conflict Liberia (Brottem and Unruh, 
2009: 999). Nevertheless, observers have noted an erosion of customary land governance 
systems, not only due to the destabilizing influence of the civil war and the persistence of 
youth unemployment, but also because of the increased perception of statutory land laws 
as being better suited to defend land claims against competing interests (Namubiru-
Mwaura et al., 2012). In 2009, the Liberian Land Commission was created to clear up this 
confusion. The country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission named land reform as one 
of the key priorities to increase the long-term stability of the country, and various donors 
supported its work. The new Land Rights Act that is currently being finalized explicitly 
champions the equal protection of land rights, both private as well as customary. 
 
                                                          
52 It should be noted here that the authors do not subscribe to the view that there exists a ‘customary’ sphere of 
governance that has remained unchanged over time. Indeed, most of the literature rejects the notion of a fixed set of 
‘customary’ rules predating colonial times. 
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Artisanal mining and surface land arrangements 
With the exception of iron-ore operations, large-scale mining remains largely absent from 
Liberia, whereas ASM is ubiquitous in the country. While artisanal gold mining has 
rapidly gained in prominence since the 2008 financial crisis, artisanal diamond mining is 
historically the dominant form of Liberian ASM. The following section provides some 
initial observations regarding the interaction between these artisanal miners and surface 
land claimants. 
Many of today’s artisanal mining communities have their origins in the artisanal mining 
boom of the late 1950s and 1960s, when miners came to virgin areas in the hopes of 
finding a profitable diamond deposit. Since all mineral rights belong to the government, 
only a government-issued mining license is required to commence mining, provided that 
the landowner does not object. Given the ambiguities surrounding customary land tenure, 
it can reasonably be assumed that, particularly during this early period of the mining boom 
–which took place after the enactment of the Aborigines Law in 1956– any objections 
presented by customary landowners were not as seriously considered as those of statutory 
claimants. 
Although it is likely that many of these first mining camps were established within the 
peripheries of tribal lands, given the dearth of information on the history of (customary) 
landownership in the country, it is difficult to ascertain the precise histories of these 
settlements, or the modalities through which rights of access and tenure were negotiated or 
appropriated. Based on initial fieldwork observations, access to land in such settlements is 
often governed through a combination of statutory and ‘customary’ claims. Following the 
importance of ‘clearing the bush’ among indigenous Liberians’ conceptions over who has 
legitimate access rights to land, the first miners to arrive would then become customary 
landowners, performing a role akin to that of customary authorities for later arrivals. 
The arrangements between surface landowners and miners are affected by two additional 
factors. First, the maturity of mining sites. In established mining sites, many landowners 
are directly involved in mining operations. Research in recent years has unearthed an 
intimate entanglement between ASM and smallholder farming. In some cases landowners 
are undertaking mining activities themselves, often on a seasonal basis. In recent years, 
landowners are increasingly striking arrangements with groups of mostly itinerant laborers 
(Hilson & Van Bockstael, 2011; 2012). In this case, landowners' relations to artisanal 
mining are best described in terms of investment rather than dispossession.  
In a boom-type emerging mining site however, the sudden influx of miners in a non-
mining community can lead to disputes and resentment. An interesting example is the 
town Mano River Kongo, just a few minutes walking from the border with Sierra Leone in 
Grand Cape Mount County. In 2009 diamonds were discovered, leading to a rush of 
prospective miners flooding the town. Most inhabitants recognized the discovery of 
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diamonds as "God's sparkle to help the town"53 and were benefiting handsomely, either by 
investing in mining operations, receiving rents as landowner, or by operating commercial 
businesses. At the same time, they were apprehensive over the fact that many miners were 
Sierra Leonean, and would repatriate their winnings instead of investing them in the town. 
More significantly, initial discoveries led many miners to dig very closely to the side of an 
unpaved road, which was the only connection this border town had with the rest of the 
country. The local community insisted that the miners join together and construct, or 
finance to construct, an alternative road instead. When this was refused, local attitudes 
towards mining soured, and the government was forced to issue a blanket temporary 
mining ban. Nevertheless, here too, the interaction between miners and landowners is 
more complex than dominant narratives suggest. 
A second important variable determining the relationship between miners and landowners 
is the regulatory status of both parties. In most cases the landowner will receive some kind 
of compensation for the use of (part of) his land for artisanal mining activities. The 
modalities governing these rents are not specifically detailed in the Minerals and Mining 
Law –and most artisanal miners are not even covered by this law– beyond stating their 
entitlement “to just, prompt and adequate compensation”. However, the MML gives 
broad discretionary powers to the Minister of Lands, Mines, and Energy to intervene in 
case the landowner refuses mining operations (Republic of Liberia, 2000: 24-25). In 
practice, the type and extent of landowner benefits are subject to a great deal of 
negotiation, and can take the form of a lump sum, a regularly repeating constant payment, 
or a piece-rate payment depending on the mines’ production. In the context of the highly 
complex (mineral- and land) tenure situation in Liberia, the regulatory status of both the 
landowner and the miner will strongly influence the negotiating position of both parties.  
It is very uncommon for miners lacking statutory or customary land rights to not negotiate 
access rights (and appropriate compensation) with landowners, unless the mining takes 
place in a ‘virgin’ area. Whether land is owned under customary or statutory land tenure 
arrangements, in order to be able to mine peacefully in close proximity to a rural 
community, it is necessary to obtain the permission of the landowner, or at least one 
influential community member that can assuage the community at large according to the 
‘stranger-father’ custom. Sometimes a previously agreed upon payment is deemed 
unsatisfactory by the landowner, who may believe the mining operations to be more 
profitable than reported. In that case, the argument is about being given a ‘fair’ share of 
the profits, rather than being in competition over how to use the land. Many disputes also 
revolve around the proper demarcation of land, and can involve miners and non-miners, 
both of whom are confronted with the informality of land ownership. Often, these conflicts 
are resolved through specific traditional dispute resolution mechanisms (Namubiru-
Mwaura et al., 2012). In other cases disputes over mining claims are intimately related to 
                                                          
53 Interview with a local miner, Mano River Kongo, January 2012. 
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some of the ethnical dimensions of the Liberian war: Sawyer (2005) describes how 
Mandingo, who are considered perpetual ‘strangers’ by many Liberians, saw their land use 
rights revoked by local Mano and Gio communities after the war. Mediation by the 
Ministry of Lands, Mines, and Energy led to a ‘rolling registration’ scheme whereby 
Mandingo mining claims were considered on a case-by-case basis, and “honored 
interchangeably and periodically with Mano/Gio claims” (Sawyer, 2005 : 8). 
The situation is different in cases where a non-landowning miner has secured a mining 
license. In these cases, customary landowners are particularly vulnerable, since they do not 
enjoy equal protection under the Liberian justice system. Here, the informal ways in which 
access to land is being negotiated among miners and non-mining landowners are highly 
dependent on the goodwill of the prospective miner. In some cases miners will even be 
able to secure mining licenses from local officials of the Ministry of Lands, Mines and 
Energy, without prior negotiations with the landowner (Namubiru-Mwaura et al., 2012: 
86). As a recent study underscored, “even when they were located nearby, state 
institutions [that could help resolve property disputes] were often only accessible through 
interpersonal relationships and side payments” (Blattman et al., 2014: 8). This 
observation rings true both for land tenure and for formal mining claims, which are only 
accessible for those artisanal miners that have a financial backer or ‘supporter’, while 
others are excluded from the formal realms of the mining economy (Van Bockstael, 2014). 
A study on customary land tenure in Grand Cape Mount County similarly pointed to the 
fear that “people with money” would purchase all mining claims and potentially 
disenfranchise customary landowners. However, others within the same community noted 
the peaceful cohabitation between miners and farmers, stressing the linkages between 
smallholder farming and artisanal mining (Namubiru-Mwaura et al., 2012:86).  
Finally, while a landowner in possession of a private deed to the land is in a superior 
negotiating position, the government-owned mineral rights supersede all other ownership 
or occupancy rights of the land in question, provided that the latter are adequately 
compensated. However, this specification presupposes an entire realm of due process 
measures that are missing in contemporary Liberia. In practice, the government can freely 
exercise its authority to expropriate property as "eminent domain" without much constraint 
(USAID, 2011b). The biggest threat to landowners is therefore not a small artisanal 
mining operation, with whom the community usually negotiates terms, but rather the 
discovery of a significant diamond/gold deposit that attracts foreign capital, and can 
ultimately lead to forced displacement of an entire community without much due process. 
Artisanal miners’ access to land as well, is far more likely to be endangered by competing 
claims of more advanced mining operators which, under the 2000 Mining and Minerals 
Act, can be prioritized over previously existing ASM-activities. 




A first and more general proposition that can be derived from these three case studies, and 
one that is in keeping with scant existing research (Grätz, 2004; Nyame & Blocher, 2011), 
is that relations between ASM-operators and local landowners are not necessarily defined 
by antagonism. Instead, both the Liberia and the Philippines cases suggest a high degree of 
involvement of landowners in ASM, either as seasonal miners (Liberia) or as financiers of 
ASM-activities (Liberia and the Philippines). In addition, in all three cases there exists a 
degree of negotiation between ASM and local surface land claimants, which ultimately 
gives rise to some form of benefit-sharing. This benefit-sharing often (but not always) 
becomes institutionalized in the form of royalty arrangements, whereby landowners are 
entitled to a fixed (percentage) share of the mining revenues. However, the extent and 
form of these royalties is subject to a degree of variation, both within and between the 
different case study regions. In the Philippines case, for example, the range of benefits 
ASM offered for local landowners varied not only from one landowner to another, but was 
also more diverse, involving not just royalties but also priority access to good labor 
opportunities for the landowner and his relatives, and a competitive edge in the local gold 
processing market.  
STATE WEAKNESS AND THE RESILIENCE OF STATE-SANCTIONED 
LEGALITY AS A LEGITIMIZING REPERTOIRE 
In all three cases ASM takes place in peripheral regions where (central) state authority is 
weak, and where state institutions co-exist or even compete with other actors for public 
authority (Lund, 2006). In the DRC and in Liberia, customary institutions continue to play 
a more prominent role in local authority structures and in local tenure regimes then in the 
Philippines. One possible explanation might lie in the practice of indirect rule in Sub-
Saharan Africa, which relied strongly on the integration of traditional, customary 
institutions in the colonial state apparatus54 (Mamdani, 1998). In many parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa, customary chiefs have managed to secure a good position in the 
postcolonial political-economic arena, often making a career for themselves as politicians, 
businessmen or civil servants thanks to their dexterity in combining different registers of 
power and in constructing their public image on the basis of a highly eclectic and personal 
mix of all sorts of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ attributes (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & 
van Dijk, 1999). Meanwhile in the Philippines, the idea of statutory law and formal tenure 
seems to enjoy wider acceptance, and is now actively acted upon by local politicians who 
                                                          
54 While Liberia was strictly speaking never colonized, it had many characteristics of a settler colony. 
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are spearheading a process of  “informal formalization” in informal tenure regimes, 
epitomized by an increased reliance on written accounts and references to legality 
(Benjaminsen and Lund, 2003). In part, this reliance on state-sanctioned legality as a 
regulatory instrument and a legitimizing instrument for tenure claims can be traced back to 
US colonialism, which relied disproportionately on (elected) politicians –rather than 
customary authorities– as ‘agents of democratic state rule’ (Abinales, 2000). 
In recent years and decades, however, Liberia and the DRC have also witnessed a further 
erosion of customary authority in favor of state-sanctioned legality, which is fast 
becoming the primary frame of reference to claim access to surface lands and subsurface 
mineral resources. In Nyabibwe, customary land claimants have approached the land 
registry to formalize their land claims, seemingly in an effort to secure rents from legally 
recognized ASM-cooperatives which now play a key role in regulating access to mineral 
wealth. So how to make sense of this ostensible paradox, i.e. the (alleged) weakness of 
state institutions on the one hand, and the continuous implicit and explicit references to 
state-sanctioned legality as a mechanism to access natural resources on the other?  
The burgeoning literature on ‘the anthropology of the state’ (Trouillot, 2001; Sharma & 
Gupta, 2006) may provide us with some clues. On the one hand, pressured by the forces 
unleashed by globalization, many states have undergone a radical process of 
decentralization and privatization, whereby the state has effectively shed off a range of 
regulatory powers to local (semi-)private actors who are staking (sometimes competing) 
claims to public authority (Hibou, 2004). Important examples from our case studies 
include local strongmen-politicians and their armed militia in the Philippines; or mining 
cooperatives and NGOs in the DRC. At the same time our case study findings indicate that 
even in regions with a purportedly weak presence of the (central) state, state-sanctioned 
legality exhibits surprising resilience as a frame of reference underpinning claims to 
authority and natural resource access (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2007; Nielsen, 2013). In 
order to solve this paradox, then, we should transcend a focus on the state as a fixed set of 
institutions that exercises control over a given territory. Instead, the state is best seen as 
“an open field with multiple boundaries and no institutional fixity” (Trouillot, 2001: 127), 
punctuated with references to the ‘idea of the state’ (Lund, 2006) and legality as abstract, 
impersonal sources of authority that stand above society, and that serve as a particularly 
powerful legitimizing repertoire (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001). In the Nyabibwe case, this 
idea of the state and state-sanctioned legality as a legitimizing repertoire is actively acted 
upon by the NGO-community which, in coordination with state authorities, is taking part 
in various initiatives to reform and formalize ASM, with seemingly important spill-over 
effects in land tenure arrangements. 
While state-sanctioned legality thus persists as a strong normative and legitimizing 
principle, particularly in countries with a weak state bureaucracy the rather chaotic process 
  108 
 
of state decentralization and -privatization has resulted in a (further) fragmentation of the 
state (Hansen & Steputat, 2001). And while formal state actors continue to fulfill an 
important role as “licensing and franchising authority” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2007: 
139), governments themselves are subject to high degrees of system-internal pluralism, 
with government institutions co-existing uneasily or even competing for supremacy (von 
Benda-Beckman, 2002). In this fragmented and multi-layered state arena, opportunities 
arise for actors to use references to state-sanctioned legality as a mechanism to claim and 
legitimize access to authority and (mineral) resources –whether directly (as miners) or 
indirectly (as landowners claiming royalties)– while attempting to exclude others. 
POWER AND ACCESS TO MINERAL RESOURCES IN A FRAGMENTED 
STATE ARENA 
This leaves us with a final yet quintessential question: if the interaction between ASM-
operators and surface land claimants takes place in a dynamic and negotiated institutional 
field, underpinned by ubiquitous references to state-sanctioned legality, “who benefits and 
who loses from instances of “negotiability”” (Peters, 2004)? While we do not aim to 
provide conclusive answers to this question, based on the empirical material presented in 
this chapter we can nonetheless offer some tentative insights. In brief, and this is 
admittedly somewhat of a truism, the state arena is not a level playing field. Rather, those 
who command vital financial resources and political connections, and who have 
knowledge of bureaucratic procedures, are better equipped to position themselves within 
this multi-layered and fragmented state arena and to use (references to) legality as an 
access mechanism, than those bereft of such resources.  
This observation is particularly apparent in the Liberian case, where those in possession of 
a formal mining permit or land title have a clear edge in negotiations over access to 
mineral wealth, either as a miner or as a royalty-receiving land claimant. Here, the ability 
to secure a formal mining claim depends on having access to vital financial and political 
capital –in the Liberian case usually provided by a ‘supporter’. So far, these observations 
confirm existing findings in the formalization literature. Here it is useful to refer to Fisher 
(2007, 2008), who convincingly argued that in Tanzania, efforts to formalize ASM have 
largely ignored local institutional realities and associated power relations, thereby 
potentially reinforcing the exclusivist tendencies inherent to these arrangements.  
Based on our empirical evidence, we can and should make two additional observations 
that can deepen our knowledge and stimulate further research on local regulatory 
dynamics in mineral-rich regions. First, given the existence of mutually beneficial 
arrangements between (informal) land claimants and ASM-operators, there is an urgent 
need to better understand these arrangements as a basis for more appropriate policy 
interventions. This suggestion can be illustrated on the basis of the Nyabibwe case, where 
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the formalization of ASM is now having important spill-over effects in local land markets, 
providing incentives to informal, customary land claimants to formalize their land claims 
in order to strengthen their claims to ASM-rents.  
Secondly, all three cases suggest that legality and formality have themselves –arguably to 
different extents– become the subject of negotiation and contestation, thus upsetting the 
dominant and fairly rigid approach towards the formal-informal divide. In this blurred 
space between formality and informality, opportunities for agency and emancipation arise. 
In the Philippines, access to formal tenure regimes is clearly subject to high degrees of 
elite capture, with national government policies seemingly biased towards corporate 
mining. Rather than facing marginalization in the informal economy, however, local 
landowner-miner-politicians have initiated a process of informal formalization 
(Benjaminsen & Lund, 2003) in local tenure arrangements, using the state as an instrument 
to defend ASM-interests. In Nyabibwe, local customary landowners feel stimulated by the 
strong presence of state institutions and NGOs to formalize their land claims in an effort to 
claim ASM-rents.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analyzed the relationship between ASM and surface land claimants, by 
comparing three distinct geographical settings characterized by the (purported) absence of 
state-sanctioned regulatory order. Let us briefly summarize the main findings that emerged 
from this comparative effort. While the tenurial situation in many ASM-areas is indeed a 
far cry from formal tenure regimes as they appear on national government maps, this does 
not imply that the relationship between ASM and surface land claimants is inevitably 
antagonistic, unstable, or even unpredictable. Instead, both the southern Philippines, 
eastern DRC, and Liberia cases revealed a significant degree of negotiation between local 
(informal) land claimants and ASM, leading to fairly predictable institutional 
arrangements that enable mutual benefit-sharing. While these institutional arrangements 
persist partly or even completely outside the formal-regulatory reach of the central 
government, they are nonetheless replete with implicit and explicit references to state-
sanctioned legality. These references should be understood as part of a broader effort of 
diverse actors to position themselves in a multi-layered “state arena” that has become 
increasingly fragmented as a result of processes of decentralization and privatization. In 
this environment, formality and legality are themselves subject to negotiation and 
contestation; and while this negotiation may entail significant conflict, it also offers 
opportunities for emancipation.   
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CHAPTER 7: 




Verbrugge, B., & Adam, J. (submitted). Questioning the state-rebel divide in Mindanao. A 
Comparative Analysis of North Cotabato and Compostela Valley province. Asian Journal 
of Social Sciences. 
BACKGROUND: 
Based on our joint expertise on the dynamics of armed conflict in Mindanao, my colleague 
Jeroen Adam and me set out to contest prevailing images of a state-rebel antagonism. As 
the main author of this article, I took the lead in the editing process and in developing the 
analytical framework (i.e. the changing role of the local state as a structure of 
accumulation and -legitimation). In addition to writing the Compostela Valley case, I have 
also contributed significantly to the North Cotabato case, which resulted from field 
research that we undertook together in the framework of a research commissioned by the 
Justice Security Research Programme, an LSE-based research consortium. 
ARTICLE ABSTRACT: 
This article challenges the pervasive notion of rebel groups in the southern Philippines as 
non-state actors opposing the penetration of the state. Instead, through a historically 
informed analysis of local politics in two Mindanao provinces with a presence of Muslim 
and communist armed insurgents respectively (North Cotabato and Compostela Valley), it 
will be demonstrated that particularly since the end of the Marcos martial law regime and 
subsequent democratization and decentralization efforts, local state- and rebel structures 
have become increasingly intertwined. On the one hand, this observation can be explained 
with reference to particular historical-institutional trajectories, which led to the 
establishment of the local state as a vital instrument for accumulation and for political 
legitimation. On the other hand, the current situation can only be fully understood when 
considering the wider set of social structures that cut across the state-rebel divide, prime 
amongst which those defined by kinship.   
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INTRODUCTION 
For over thirty years now, the Southern Philippine island of Mindanao is home to two 
armed insurgencies. While most attention is devoted to the Muslim rebellions of the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the 
Western and Central parts of the island, since the 1980s the remote uplands of Eastern 
Mindanao have become one of the strongholds of the Maoist New People’s Army (NPA), 
the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Whereas in the former 
case, the conflict was clearly framed in religious terms, in the case of the CPP-NPA the 
conflict obviously obtained a class-based character. Despite this different framing, most 
analysts trace the origins of these armed insurgencies to grievances resulting from the 
aggressive penetration of a (post-)colonial state –particularly the authoritarian Marcos 
regime– keen on exploiting Mindanao’s abundant natural resource wealth. Underlying 
these analyses is a strong tendency to treat both the Muslim and Communist rebellion as 
“ideology-based armed conflicts” directed against the state, and espousing “alternative 
state-visions” (Human Development Network, 2005: 2).  For instance, in a recent article 
Podder describes MILF-structures as a “parallel system of governance that shadows 
elected government functionaries”, and that functions according to Islamic principles 
(Podder, 2012: 502). In another contribution, Hall argues that the demobilization of 
MNLF-fighters in the 1996 should be seen as a movement from non-state to state spaces 
(Hall, 2009: 24). 
In this chapter we critically interrogate this assumed dichotomy between informal rebel 
structures and formal state structures, on the basis of an empirical analysis of local-level 
politics in two Mindanao provinces with a strong historical presence of Muslim and 
Communist insurgents respectively: North Cotabato and Compostela Valley. Our analysis 
will reveal that already during the authoritarian Marcos martial law years (1972-198155), 
but particularly following democratization and decentralization in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the often taken-for-granted distinction between local state- and rebel structures 
does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. Instead, both provinces have seen the emergence 
of indistinct alliances and networks that connect local politicians to paramilitary and rebel 
forces, particularly but not exclusively on the barangay level. Drawing on existing 
literature and our own fieldwork experience, we offer two related explanations for this 
seemingly counterintuitive observation. First, the mutual entanglement between state- and 
rebel structures can only be fully understood when taking into account the historical-
institutional legacies of a particular trajectory of decentralized statebuilding, which 
established the local state as a “structure of accumulation” (Harriss-White, 2003) in the 
local economy (Sidel, 1999), and as an instrument for the legitimation of claims to public 
                                                          
55 While martial law was lifted in 1981, most observers agree that the Marcos regime retained many if not most of its 
authoritarian features until its ultimate demise in 1986 (Wurfel, 1991). 
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authority (Abinales, 2000). Secondly, moving beyond a purely state-centric analysis, 
critical attention is also drawn to how local state- and rebel structures are embedded in the 
wider social fabric, and to how various social relations –prime amongst which those 
associated with kinship– connect people at different sides of the state-rebel divide. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After providing some theoretical 
reflections about the ‘state of the state’ in the Philippines, we will present our empirical 
analysis of local-level politics in North Cotabato and Compostela Valley province. In both 
cases, we draw upon a combination of existing literature and primary data collected during 
different field visits over the past three years. Finally, we present a critical discussion of 
the most important findings of our analysis, and their implications for a broader research 
agenda.  
THE ‘STATE OF THE STATE’ IN THE 
PHILIPPINES 
THE EBBS AND FLOWS OF THE LOCAL STATE AS A STRUCTURE OF 
ACCUMULATION 
(Post-)colonial origins of the local state as a structure of accumulation 
As discussed in previous chapters, despite a long history of political-administrative 
centralism, local politicians have played a key role in (post-)colonial trajectories of 
statebuilding. While a class of ‘native politicians’ or principalia had already emerged 
under Spanish colonialism, their role became more pronounced during the first half of the 
twentieth century, when American colonial rulers imposed a system of democratic 
suffrage, and came to rely on local politicians as bridging figures between Manila and the 
periphery (Hutchcroft, 2000), maintaining social stability (Wong, 2006) and espousing the 
symbols of the state, prime amongst which upholding the democratic process (Abinales, 
2000). In exchange for this dual role as statebuilders, local politicians retained a high 
degree of autonomy from Manila, and could bank on priority access to the local state as a 
‘structure of accumulation’. The idea of the local state as a “structure of accumulation” 
was coined by Barbara Harriss-White in the context of rural India, to describe the ways in 
which the local state plays an enabling role in processes of capitalist accumulation, and 
simultaneously acts as a “regime of private extortion” for state officials (Harriss-White, 
2003: 80). Similarly, in the Philippine context, Sidel has argued that American colonialism 
has given rise to a set of local state institutions which were not “simply a resource for 
patron-client relations”, but also a “complex set of predatory mechanisms for private 
accumulation” (Sidel, 1999: 146).  
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The capacity of the local state as a structure of accumulation was further expanded in the 
post-war decades. In the face of a persistently weak national army, local politicians started 
recruiting their own ‘private armies’ (Anderson, 1988), which were later effectively 
replaced by paramilitary militias and vigilantes (Kowalewski, 1992). All too often, 
however, ‘counterinsurgency’ and the maintenance of social stability served as a pretense 
for the ruthless protection of private political and economic interests (Kreuzer, 2009). 
Together, these “legacies served to blur the lines between state/society, civil/military, 
military/para-military, and legal/illegal, with a variety of peculiar coercive formations –
notably so-called ‘lost commands’, ‘private armies’ and ‘fanatical sects’– operating at the 
behest of entrenched local ‘warlords’ and landed oligarchs” (Hedman & Sidel, 1999: 58). 
Furthermore, state resources like government jobs and so-called ‘pork barrel funding’ 
(funds used by congressmen to reward political allies in their home province) gradually 
replaced land as the most important source of patronage and private accumulation (Nowak 
& Snyder, 1974; Magno, 1989). These patronage resources are disbursed through 
vertically organized political party networks, which are an important instrument in the 
hands of provincial-level delegates in congress to keep in check their local-level 
counterparts (Landé, 1968; Hutchcroft, 2000). In parallel with economic modernization 
and -diversification, the local state also became increasingly important as a set of 
regulatory instruments to control access to the local economy (Sidel, 1999; Lara & 
Schoofs, 2013). Finally, local politicians can bank on the formal-democratic legitimacy 
inherent to statehood and state officialdom to shore up their local authority and standing 
(Abinales, 2000; Wong, 2006). We return to this point in more detail below. 
The Marcos conundrum and the closure of the state as a structure of accumulation  
When Ferdinand Marcos assumed the presidency in 1965 he embarked upon a path of 
centralization, culminating in the proclamation of martial law in 1972. Relying on a multi-
pronged strategy, he succeeded in reining in on some of the prerogatives of local 
politicians. By centralizing control over the armed forces and the police, the coercive 
capacity of local strongmen was diminished (Hedman & Sidel, 2000). Furthermore, by 
centralizing control over patronage resources –significantly beefed up by international 
capital inflows– in the presidency, Marcos created a key instrument to win over the loyalty 
of local elites. Meanwhile the abolishment of congress and pork-barrel funding weakened 
the power base of the provincial-level political elites that had long dominated Philippine 
politics (Wurfel, 1991). In addition to creating regional planning bodies to coordinate and 
implement the regime’s development plans, Marcos also designed a series of institutions 
on the local level to curb the autonomy of municipal- and provincial-level strongmen, and 
to shorten the distance between the regime and the local population. The barangay (the 
lowest political-administrative unit in the Philippines) came to fulfil a vital role in the new 
constellation, not only as a service-hatch for development funds and as a 
counterinsurgency tool, but also as an instrument to shore up the regime’s democratic 
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legitimacy (Wurfel, 1991). Finally, local elections were tightly monitored, and served 
primarily as instruments to reward the regime’s allies and to disenfranchise its enemies 
(Franco, 2001).  
To some extent, then, the Marcos regime succeeded in restructuring the political elite, and 
in reversing the traditional flow of power between the national and the local level, with 
local elites becoming increasingly dependent upon access to the president for patronage. 
Ultimately however, it failed to do away with the localist tendencies in Philippine politics, 
and continued to rely on regional elite support to implement the regime’s increasingly 
authoritarian agenda, and to fend off mounting opposition against the regime (Hutchcroft, 
2000; Franco, 2001). For example, provincial governors loyal to the regime continued to 
wield significant influence over the appointment of provincial-level army commanders, 
and over local paramilitary militias like the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) 
(Hedman & Sidel, 2000). Important here is that Marcos excluded sections of local and 
regional elites from access to the state machinery (Abinales, 2000). As will be discussed 
below, some of these disenfranchised elites responded by throwing in their lot with the 
nascent rebel movement, in an attempt to reclaim their formerly privileged position within 
the state.  
Democratization, decentralization, and the restoration of the local state as a structure of 
accumulation 
As a result of a worsening economic crisis and authoritarian excesses, by the 1980s the 
Marcos regime faced mounting opposition from a broad range of societal forces, including 
(but by no means limited to) the armed rebellions of the communist New People’s Army 
(NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP); and that of the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The military mutiny and people power revolt 
that eventually overthrew Marcos and swept Corazon Aquino to power in 1986 ushered in 
an uncertain transition period, marked by a profound spirit of popular empowerment. The 
new 1987 constitution reflected this spirit, calling on congress to produce several pieces of 
legislation that can facilitate progressive social change. This included “a Local 
Government Code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local 
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization”56. The Local 
Government Code (LGC) was passed in 1991 in the form of Republic Act 7160, and 
devolved a series of fiscal and regulatory responsibilities to local government units 
(LGU): regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays (Legaspi, 2001). 
Examples include the enforcement of national environmental- and building laws; land 
reclassification and -subdivision; food inspection; and discretion over the issuance of 
business permits and -franchises. In addition, LGUs were given increased discretion over 
employment and procurement. Arguably even more important was the increased financial 
                                                          
56 The 1987 constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A. X, s. 3 
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capacity of LGUs, which now dispose of a range of instruments to extract local fiscal 
revenues. Furthermore, the introduction of a substantial and guaranteed share of national 
government revenues, in the form of natural resource rents and Internal Revenue 
Allotments (IRA), gave the local executive more room for maneuver vis-à-vis his national-
level counterparts. In relative terms, the barangay in particular profited disproportionately 
from these new fiscal arrangements (Clark, 1999). Finally, the LGC reestablished mayoral 
control over the Philippine National Police. 
Ultimately, while the LGC was presented as a response to the authoritarian excesses of the 
martial law regime, it was not a radical move away from a historically rooted centralism 
(Legaspi, 2001). Instead it is perhaps better seen as a restoration, and arguably even a 
further consolidation, of the local state as a structure of accumulation. Indeed, critical 
observers were quick to point out that “the Local Government Code of 1991 and 
subsequent decentralization efforts nor the pattern of sustained economic growth in the 
Philippines in the 1990s have seriously undermined the institutional and social 
foundations of boss rule.” (Hedman & Sidel, 2000: 108).  
WHITHER THE STATE IN PHILIPPINE SOCIETY? 
This perspective on the local state as a predatory structure of accumulation has been 
criticized on a number of accounts. For one, its top-down perspective leaves little room for 
understanding agency and social change, as it underestimates how throughout Philippine 
history, the elitist democratic system has systematically been challenged from below 
(Quimpo, 2005). Furthermore, its depiction of ‘warlord-politicians’ as selfish, profit-
maximizing actors fails to recognize the discursive production of political authority within 
the confines set by societal norms (Wong, 2008). Finally, its state-centric perspective fails 
to recognize that “Normative and cognitive order in many areas of Philippine life 
(religion, kinship, identity), while strongly influenced by the state, are not necessarily 
dominated by it.” (Pertierra, 1999: 300; see also Pertierra, 2006). 
While we do not aim for an exhaustive evaluation of these points of criticism, for the 
purposes of this chapter (i.e. understanding the intricate relations between local state- and 
rebel structures) it is nonetheless important to make two additional observations about 
state-society relations in the Philippines. First, in line with recent scholarship in the field 
of political anthropology, we recognize that formal-bureaucratic authority inherent to 
statehood is only one possible source of public authority (Lund, 2006) and that more often 
than not, public authority is a hybrid of legal-bureaucratic-, personalistic-, militaristic-, 
religious- and/or traditional authority. Similarly, in the context of the Philippines, both 
Wong (2006) and Abinales (2000) have argued that local strongmen-politicians’ capacity 
as statebuilders hinges on their ability to fuse legal-bureaucratic and more personalistic 
forms of authority, embedding themselves in local social structures. At the same time, and 
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partly as a product of the particular historical-institutional trajectories in the Philippines 
described earlier in this section, but also in line with trends observed elsewhere (Hansen & 
Steputat, 2001), state-sanctioned legality has emerged as a central- and arguably even the 
primary frame of reference for staking and legitimizing claims to public authority. In 
short, in addition to being a vital structure of accumulation in the local economy, the local 
state is also a crucial instrument for the legitimation of public authority. 
A second observation –albeit one that is closely related to the former– is that it is 
paramount to pay attention to the ways in which both state- and rebel structures are 
embedded in wider sets of social relations, particularly those constituted by kinship. In this 
regard, this chapter builds on a literature that aims to understand how access to the state is 
mediated through multiple social institutions, including kinship and family relations, and 
the specific social status ascribed to these social identities (Harriss-White, 2003; Van 
Klinken 2014). It has been argued elsewhere that Philippine politics is a ‘family affair’ 
(McCoy 1993), with politics at different levels –but arguably more so on the local level– 
dominated by alliances between powerful and less powerful families, bound together by 
intermarriage and patron-client ties. According to McCoy (1993: 9-10), the emergence of 
powerful political family dynasties in the Philippines can be explained by reference to the 
growing importance of rents in the Philippine economy. Rents are defined by McCoy as 
restrictive state licenses which allow holders to gain a monopoly or oligopoly over 
particular markets. In other words, McCoy argues that privileged access to the state 
enables privileged control over markets by one and the same elite coalition. For specific 
historical reasons, in the Philippines this elite coalition is dominated by extended family 
networks. Crucially, due to this specific ‘oligarchic’ nature of the state in the Philippines, 
the supposed distinction between formal state institutions and non-state market institutions 
becomes a highly artificial one, as overarching kinship structures colonize both spheres.  
Taking up these theoretical insights about the local state as a structure of accumulation and 
as an instrument for the legitimation of public authority that is firmly embedded in the 
local social fabric, we now turn to our empirical analysis of local politics in rebel-
influenced territories in North Cotabato and Compostela Valley province.  
THE MNLF, THE MILF, AND THE RISE OF 
COMMANDER POLITICS IN NORTH COTABATO  
(POST-)COLONIAL STATE BUILDING AND THE DATU STRONGMEN 
The Spaniards never really gained a foothold in Mindanao, and it was only with the advent 
of American colonialism in the early twentieth century that successful attempts were made 
to integrate the island into the colonial body politic. American statebuilding efforts 
  118 
 
revolved around a strategy of indirect rule through a traditional Muslim elite, the so-called 
datus, who were gradually incorporated in the colonial administration (Abinales, 2009; 
2010). In exchange for pacifying the locality and making the colonial state acceptable in 
Muslim communities, the datus could reinforce their political and economic pre-eminence 
by relying on privileged access to the financial and coercive resources, as well as the 
legal-bureaucratic authority inherent to statehood.   
This strategy of indirect rule persisted after independence in 1946, albeit under different 
modalities, with Muslim elites becoming incorporated in a nascent mass democracy 
(McKenna, 1998; Abinales, 2010). Local politics in Muslim Mindanao increasingly 
gravitated towards ‘politics as usual’ as practiced elsewhere in the Philippines, organized 
around factional competition between family alliances embedded in political party 
networks that stretch all the way to congress, and act as prime vehicles for the 
disbursement of patronage (Beckett, 1993). In the post-war decades, this highly elitist 
constellation guaranteed the legitimacy of the Philippine nation-state in Muslim 
Mindanao, with the region enjoying a considerable degree of sociopolitical stability. These 
observations already represent an important qualification of the dominant historical 
narrative of Muslim Mindanao as one of eternal resistance against (post-)colonial state 
intrusion. Instead Muslim elites were engaged in a delicate balancing act: while 
maintaining a degree of autonomy from Manila, they also sought to capitalize on access to 
the state as a strategic resource to expand their political and economic preeminence, 
inevitably leading to their integration in the mainstream body politic.  
MARTIAL LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF MUSLIM SEPARATIST 
MOVEMENTS 
This mutual accommodation between Muslim ‘politicos’ and the (post-)colonial state 
came under increasing strain from the late 1960s onwards (Abinales, 2000). Mounting 
tensions were particularly apparent in the province of Cotabato, where post-independence 
politics had been dominated by the powerful Pendatun and Matalam families, which acted 
as a bridge between Manila and the Muslim population, and could tap into the state’s 
resource base to appease the local population (Beckett, 1993: 295-296; McKenna, 1998: 
130). Due to various factors, the Pendatun-Matalam coalition gradually lost its pre-
eminence to a nascent Christian settler elite. From the 1950s onwards, there was a massive 
influx of Christian migrants that sought to escape a mounting social crisis in other parts of 
the peninsula (Wernstedt and Simkins, 1965). Many of these migrants ended up in the 
fertile valleys of Cotabato, where the Muslim population was minoritized by the early 
1960s (Borras and Guttierez, 2004). Land pressures were mounting, with many Christian 
settlers obtaining private property titles, to the detriment of the native pagan and Muslim 
communities, that were increasingly facing dispossession.    
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While this process of dispossession was an important cause for the start of the Muslim 
rebellion in the late 1960s (Rodil, 2004; Borras, Lara & Vellema, 2011), this rebellion 
cannot be divorced from a broader logic of electoral politics. Christian demographic 
growth went hand in hand with the rise of a Christian political class, sections of which 
garnered the support of the Marcos regime (Mckenna, 1998; Franco, 2001: 223). This 
changing political landscape risked leaving important sections of the Muslim elite bereft 
of privileged access to the state. Partly for this reason, Muslim elites accepted the 
subdivision of Cotabato in a Christian-dominated south and a Muslim-dominated north in 
1965 (Abinales, 2000: 164). By 1971, however, Muslims also lost the electoral edge in 
North-Cotabato when Carlos Cajelo, with the blessing of president Marcos, was elected as 
the first Christian provincial governor (Beckett 1993: 297). In preparation for the 1971 
elections, several Christian mayors in North Cotabato, together with the Philippine 
constabulary, supported the formation of vigilante groups known as Ilaga (‘rats’), which 
formed the vanguard for the increasingly violent dispossession of Muslim communities, 
and for a concomitant expansion of Christian political-territorial control (Franco, 2001: 
215-221). Often the evicted lands were converted into private property for Christians, 
preventing Muslim communities from returning to their land once the violence had settled 
down.  
In response to their looming loss of political-territorial clout vis-à-vis Christian settler 
elites, sections of the disenfranchised Muslim elites resorted to identity politics. Presenting 
himself as the protégé of the Muslim population, long-time governor of Cotabato Udtog 
Matalam initiated the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) in 1968. In addition, local 
Muslim elites also created vigilante units (Franco, 2001: 222). The ensuing tit-for-tat 
violence between Christian and Muslim vigilantes was one of the key arguments for the 
Marcos regime to declare martial law in 1972. Later that year, radical Muslim students 
established the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a guerilla army that vowed to 
fight for an independent ‘Bangsamoro’ or ‘Muslim nation’. The MNLF launched a series 
of attacks on military outposts, to which the Marcos regime responded by declaring open 
war against the MNLF. This also entailed the creation of paramilitary Civilian Home 
Defense Forces (CHDF), which played a major role in what is best described as the ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ of large parts of North Cotabato. The Muslim population was increasingly 
displaced to the remote border regions with the neighboring provinces of Lanao del Sur, 
Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao, where the MNLF found fertile grounds for recruitment 
(Franco 2001: 223).  
The MNLF’s establishment put elite Muslim families in a bit of a spot: “If they supported 
the martial law government they risked rebel retaliation and the loss of political 
legitimacy. If they supported the rebels, they invited government reprisals and the 
forfeiture of their political positions”. (McKenna, 1998: 162-163). Thus, their response 
was mixed. Some rejected the rebellion and threw in their lot with the martial law regime 
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(for a case study on Lanao see Carter Bentley, 1993). Others adopted a more ambiguous 
stance, paying lip service to Muslim grievances while rejecting the radical demands of the 
MNLF, while advocating a stance of ‘critical collaboration’ vis-à-vis the regime. A third 
group, which mainly comprised of younger students and who openly criticized the 
moderate stance of the traditional Muslim elite, opted to join the rebellion. This strategic 
maneuvering by large parts of the Muslim elite remained as the war progressed. 
Importantly, this cannot only be explained solely on the basis of self-interest on the part of 
these elites. Instead, while some Muslim politicians were not keen on joining an armed 
rebellion and preferred the comfort and security of political office, others were very much 
aware that a continuation of direct armed confrontation would only result in more 
bloodshed, and that a rapprochement with the Philippine state was ultimately inevitable.   
Hence, pretty soon after the proclamation of Martial Law, the MNLF-leadership entered 
into peace negotiations with the Marcos regime, eventually resulting in the 1976 Tripoli 
Agreement. This presented the MNLF-elite with opportunities to renegotiate the terms and 
conditions of its integration in the Philippine state. Vice versa, the agreement presented the 
Marcos regime with additional leeway to invite the ‘surrender’ of MNLF-commanders. 
For this reason the regime developed the so-called ‘‘attraction and amnesty” programs, 
which were meant to absorb former MNLF-fighters in local political structures. These 
programs attracted thousands of returnees (so-called balikbayan), including the former 
vice-chairman of the MNLF Abul Khayr Alonto (Molloy, 1988). Ultimately, this policy of 
attraction led to a further fragmentation of MNLF-structures, which increasingly came to 
resemble a loose coalition of local factions and commanders detached from the central 
command, cultivating relations with local politicians (Noble, 1981; Molloy 1988). 
Ultimately, Marcos’ downfall in 1986 opened the way for more serious negotiations with 
the MNLF, which eventually led to the establishment of the Autonomous Region in 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1989, and a final peace agreement in 1996 that foresaw in 
the integration of approximately 5750 ex-combatants in the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) (Hall, 2014).  
Meanwhile, the peace process failed to satisfy some of the more radical elements within 
the MNLF. In 1977, several MNLF-leaders disgruntled with the peace talks formed a 
breakaway group: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF vowed to 
continue the rebellion against the Philippine state under the leadership of the late Hashim 
Salamat. The MILF’s popularity received a boost after the establishment of the ARMM in 
1989. The eventual ARMM was a heavily diluted territorial entity compared to what was 
originally envisioned in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement: following a plebiscite it only 
included the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, later (in 
2001) joined by the island of Basilan (except for Isabela city) and the city of Marawi 
(Rood, 2012: 257-258). Furthermore, the ARMM and its MNLF-leadership were 
increasingly facing allegations of corruption and mismanagement, leading to their further 
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de-legitimation in the eyes of large sections of Muslim society, which became increasingly 
susceptible for MILF-recruitment (Bertrand, 2000; Lara 2014). Yet, despite their more 
‘radical’ stance, by the end of the 1990s the MILF-leadership had also entered into peace 
negotiations with the government. Failing to satisfy either one of the warring parties, these 
negotiations were interrupted by episodes of open armed confrontation in 2000, 2003 and 
2008. Only as recently as October 2012, a peace agreement was finally signed, and the 
two  parties are now no longer officially at war. In September 2014 this peace agreement 
culminated in a legal framework, the ‘Bangsamoro Basic Law’ which, pending the 
approval of Congress and the Supreme Court, should enable the creation of a new 
Bangsamoro autonomous region that will replace the current ARMM.   
To summarize, with this short historical overview we have tried to illustrate that Muslim 
elites, rather than simply resisting their integration in the (post-)colonial state framework, 
were intimately involved in statebuilding efforts. Even the separatist Muslim rebellions, 
while usually seen as a radical rejection of the Philippine nation-state, can in part be 
understood as an effort on the part of disenfranchised Muslim elites to reclaim their 
formerly privileged position inside the state. At the same time, ordinary people’s support 
for the MNLF-rebellion was primarily informed by a sense of profound injustice caused 
by dispossession and government oppression. As a former MNLF-rebel explained: “After 
Martial law, it was declared that all the Bangsamoro should be killed… Even the students 
in Cotabato city were being killed during that time. All the Bangsamoro quit from 
studying. Not only the male students, also the female students were being killed. All of 
them have the feeling they have to defend themselves. That was why I joined the MNLF. 
No choice”57 
DEMOCRATIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION AND THE RISE OF 
COMMANDER POLITICS 
Dynamics in Midsayap were very much in line with those found elsewhere in (North) 
Cotabato, with a first, peaceful face of Christian in-migration, wherein many migrants 
entered into tenancy arrangements with Muslim landowners which were considered as 
mutually beneficial. By the 1970s, as land became more scarce, the settlement process 
took a violent turn. With the support of Christian mayor Dequiña, Christian settlers formed 
the Ilaga (Rodil, 2004: 187); while young Muslim men joined the ‘Blackshirts’, which 
were later absorbed in the MNLF. However, Muslim resistance proved impotent in the 
face of the shrewd counterinsurgency tactics of the martial law regime, which increasingly 
relied on the brutal paramilitary Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF). The resulting 
violence led to the displacement of the Muslim population to neighboring Maguindanao 
province, particularly to the municipality of Datu Piang.  
                                                          
57 Interview Bapa Ibrahim, Cotabato City, August 2014. 
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After 1976, this policy of confrontation was complemented by the aforementioned 
amnesty programs, which aimed at inviting the surrender of MNLF-commanders. In 
Midsayap, the local MNLF-strongman, Kumander Dante, heeded the call to join the 
government side. The dissolution of Dante’s leadership led to a fragmentation of local 
MNLF-structures, with several of Dante’s subordinates (by the names of Abusama, Tubog 
and Harrison) appropriating ‘commandership’ themselves, and folding back on their own 
territorial fief. By the mid-1980s southern Midsayap had effectively been transformed into 
a patchwork of competing territorial units, organized around the military might of  
‘commanders’ with increasingly indistinct affiliations. As one respondent stated: “Some 
are in the army, others are in the MNLF or in the MILF. Since the end of martial law there 
are also more commanders with plenty of weapons who are independent”.58 These local 
commanders were mainly preoccupied with localized struggles over territory, and the 
people and resources residing inside it. It was in this heavily militarized and fragmented 
context that democratization and decentralization were introduced.  
The first barangay elections after the restoration of democracy were postponed until 1989 
for logistical reasons. They passed off without major upheaval mainly, respondents 
claimed, because of the lack of incentives to run for barangay positions, which were not 
yet remunerated. Nonetheless, in barangay Mudsing the elections turned out to be a 
harbinger for the conflict which came to grip major parts of Midsayap for years to come. 
Dagalas Urgad, the acting barangay captain under the Marcos regime, was defeated by 
Abusama Mangadta, an MNLF-commander. Urgad was ‘dishonored’ by this loss and 
turned to his cousins, who had completed their military training in Malaysia, for support. 
They were joined by commander Tubog, Abusama’s former MNLF-companion who had 
allegedly joined the MILF in the second half of the 1990s –although others claimed Tubog 
was simply a ruthless criminal, cattle-rustler and jueteng (a gambling game) bigwig. 
Abusama in turn coalesced with commander Asraf Tayuan, a high-ranking MNLF-
commander who maintained close ties with Nur Misuari, was acting barangay captain of 
Kudarangan, and later joined the MILF as well.  
Throughout the 1990s the conflict between the Abusama/Tayuan alliance and the Dagalas 
Urgad/Tubog alliance escalated into a full-blown turf war, displacing local inhabitants 
who evacuated to the neighboring barangays of Nabalawag, Nes, Tugal and Lower Glad. 
The violence further intensified in the run-up to the 1992 elections, the first to be held 
after the Local Government Code of 1991, which were eventually won by Abusama. 
Respondents unanimously agreed that decentralization, and more specifically the 
introduction of internal revenue allotments (IRA) and monthly stipends for barangay 
officials, had immensely raised the stakes of ‘capturing’ the local state.59 The direct 
involvement of these commanders in local politics also presented them with opportunities 
                                                          
58 Interview civil society members barangay Nabalawag, Cotabato city, March 2013. 
59 Interview Civil Society Members barangay Tugal, Cotabato city, March 2013. 
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to strengthen their coercive capacity, as control over barangay-level politics allowed them 
to legitimize their armed subordinates, transforming them into (supposedly unarmed) 
Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVOs) (also known as barangay tanods). In short, 
control over local state institutions had a galvanizing effect on the resource base and the 
political-territorial clout of both alliances, contributing to a further escalation of the 
conflict.  
To fully comprehend the machinations of electoral politics in this volatile environment, 
attention also needs to be paid to the interaction between different local government 
levels. Commander Abusama had entered into an alliance with the Dequiña family, the 
dominant Christian political dynasty at the municipal level. In exchange for delivering the 
Dequiñas the local vote, Abusama was allegedly supplied with money and weapons. 
Indeed, local commanders, who typically exert high degrees of territorial control, came to 
play a leading role in vote brokerage. During a focus group discussion, one respondent 
stated that “Commanders are supported financially by politicians. With this money they 
can buy weapons, but now they also buy big cars. It is still very common for politicians to 
work with commanders.”60 In the early 1990s Abusama and his peers in neighboring 
barangays could also capitalize on ongoing counterinsurgency operations. AFP-battalions 
and paramilitary Citizen Armed Force Geographic Units (CAFGUs)61 –primarily 
composed of Christian residents from barangays Nes and Salunaya, as well as Abusama’s 
own men– would not only set up camp in their territory, they also targeted their enemies 
under the guise of counterinsurgency operations against the MILF.62  
An important factor enabling the rise of ‘commander-politicians’ was the aforementioned 
fragmentation of the MNLF, and its gradual absorption into state structures. The 
concomitant decrease in the frequency and intensity of counterinsurgency operations 
provided room for the penetration of the MILF in selected barangays in Midsayap. For 
certain families and personalities, particularly those that did not reap the benefits of this 
rapprochement between the MNLF and the state, the rise of the MILF provided 
opportunities to contest existing political-territorial arrangements. The 1994 elections in 
Nabalawag for example were “a very tense affair”, with the barangay captain being 
challenged by a candidate associated with the MILF.63 One of the main reasons fuelling 
the conflict between Abusama and Tubog was the refusal by commander Dante (their 
former superior in the MNLF who now occupied an important position inside the ARMM) 
to grant the latter access to the 1996 reintegration program; whereas the former was 
reaping the benefits of the program. Tubog therefore seceded from the MNLF, and 
                                                          
60 Interview political leaders, barangay Upper Labas, municipality of Midsayap, March 2013. 
61 After the CHDF was disbanded in 1987, it was decided that it needed a successor. Hence the creation of the 
CAFGU under the tutelage of the Philippine Army.  
62 Interview relative Abusama, Cotabato city, April 2013. 
63 Interview political leaders barangay Nabalawag, Cotabato city, March 2013. 
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subsequently turned to the MILF.64 While Tubog’s precise affiliation with the MILF 
remains unclear –some claimed he merely acted as a ‘guide’ assisting the movement’s 
penetration in Midsayap65– it is nonetheless clear that several MILF-commanders were 
amongst his close allies, and that his rising influence went hand in hand with MILF-
expansion in Midsayap. Ultimately, Abusama’s murder in 1998 reigned in a gradual shift 
of power towards the Tubog alliance, which began to appropriate power in Mudsing and 
the surrounding Muslim-dominated barangays. This resulted in another armed 
confrontation in 2001 between Tubog and Puwa Mangadta, a relative of the 
aforementioned commander Abusama who was now on the side of the MILF (Unson, 
2001). In the 2002 elections, Tubog became barangay captain in Tugal, while his wife 
defeated Abusama’s brother in Mudsing, and his close allies became the dominant 
political players in nearby barangays Rangaban and Nes. Ultimately, Tubog was murdered 
in April 2006.   
As a result of this rivalry between the Tubog and the Abusama alliance in the second half 
of the 1990s, southern Midsayap witnessed a further bout in political violence, which left 
at least 7 barangay officials and many more ordinary people dead. Apart from these 
intermittent violence clashes, this type of commander politics also had a huge influence on 
different aspects of daily life with people particularly complaining about the high levels of 
extortion which were accompanied by constant intimidation. For instance, every harvest 
time, aides of the commanders entered peoples’ houses with empty sacks which were then 
supposed to be filled.66 This put a heavy burden on these communities which already were 
affected by high levels of poverty.67 Next, this type of socio-political environment proved 
to be polarizing and resulted in strong societal divides which were defined along loose 
family relations. Next, these societal divides also had a clear spatial definition. 
Importantly, for this specific case at least, these emerging alliances cannot be understood 
as being based on reciprocal patron-client relations. Rather, these can best be described as 
what a respondent referred to as the establishment of ‘small empires’68, wherein free and 
fair elections were a mere fiction and these commanders/local politicians acted as true 
autocrats. Therefore, for the majority of respondents, the emergence of these feuds and 
highly autonomous commanders/politicians throughout the nineties were remembered 
with bitterness. This was not only because of the negative effects this had on daily 
livelihoods and fundamental democratic rights, but for many people, these feuds came to 
symbolize a diversion from a legitimate struggle for the rights of the Bangsamoro people 
towards a pointless intra-Muslim conflict driven by greed.     
                                                          
64 Interview political leaders barangay Tugal, Cotabato city, March 2013. 
65 Individual interview former MNLF rebel leader, August 2014.  
66 Interview resident Midsayap/civil society member, Cotabato city, January 2014. 
67 Interview political leaders barangay Tugal, Cotabato city, March 2013 
68 Interview relative Abusama, Cotabato city, January 2014. 
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In sum, this concise historical overview of the Abusama versus Tubog feud Illustrates that 
binary distinctions between ‘informal’ rebel groups and ‘formal’ state institutions do not 
stand up to empirical scrutiny. Instead, the conflict described above took place between 
shifting family alliances involving commanders belonging to either one (or none) of the 
rebel movements and/or to the state. In other words, in a volatile political environment like 
that of Midsayap in the 1990s and early 2000s, maintaining access to both state and rebel 
structures is vital for the construction and maintenance of local political-territorial 
authority. So far this point has been illustrated for individuals bridging the state-rebel 
divide through their engagement as commander-politicians. In other instances, however, 
this divide is being bridged through kinship/family connections. The aforementioned 
Mangadta family is a case in point. While Abusama had decided “to join the government 
side”,69 his younger brother Tamarudin put forward the objective of becoming an MNLF-
commander –an ambition thwarted by the acting MNLF-commanders at the time. Another 
brother of Abusama, Junie Mangadta, had the ambition of becoming an MILF-
commander. After the 1996 peace agreements, this strategy whereby families cultivate 
connections simultaneously inside the government and inside armed groups could be 
witnessed throughout the province. Another example is that of Jimmy Matalam, the 
grandson of the aforementioned Udtog Matalam (the founder of the Muslim Independence 
Movement), who decided to become part of the AFP after having served as an MNLF-
commander for several years –while also working as a government official at the same 
time. However, rather than simply switching sides from the MNLF to the government, the 
Matalam family became involved in a delicate balancing act, maintaining allegiances 
inside both the Philippine state, the MNLF and the MILF. Here, as suggested in the 
preceding sections, public authority can only be understood as a hybrid, with traditional 
authority (the Matalam family is considered to be a noble family) being combined with 
militaristic authority (through links with the MILF and the MNLF) and ultimately with the 
legal bureaucratic-authority inherent to statehood. Responding to questions regarding his 
allegiance, Jimmy Matalam replied: “To the family, secondary is the group. But we use the 
organization (AFP) as our shield. And also, some in our family, most belong to politicians. 
So we also use the government as a shield. And the MNLF, and the MILF.”70 This quote 
indicates that in a volatile socio-political environment such as that of Central- and Western 
Mindanao, people try to navigate between different institutional fields, including both 
rebel movements and the state. Throughout this entire balancing act, as indicated by 
Matalam himself, kinship/family structures continue to fulfil a vital role.  
                                                          
69 Interview relative Abusama, Cotabato city, January 2014. 
70 Interview Jimmy Matalam, Cotabato city, September 2014. 
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THE NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY IN COMPOSTELA 
VALLEY 
MARTIAL LAW AND THE RISE OF THE NPA 
Rather than relying on indigenous ‘collaboration’, the initial penetration of state structures 
in eastern Mindanao was spearheaded by a Christian settler elite that worked in tandem 
with American colonial officials and American- and Japanese planter interests (Abinales, 
2000; Tiu, 2005). As in other regions of the Philippines, the Davao region saw the 
emergence of strongmen-politicians that fulfilled a vital role in defusing potential social 
tensions at the frontier. As in Cotabato some years earlier, however, this stability was 
upset in the late 1970s and particularly in the 1980s, when eastern Mindanao became a 
hotspot in the war between the Marcos government and the communist New People’s 
Army (NPA).  
The New People’s Army (NPA) was established on 29 March 1969 on the northern island 
of Luzon, as the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). It has 
waged a protracted people’s war against the Philippine government for over 45 years, 
which makes it the longest-running Maoist insurgency in the world (ICG, 2011). The CPP-
NPA is a political inasmuch as a military force: true to Maoist doctrine, it aims to extend 
its political influence over the countryside, eventually encircling and taking over the cities. 
Since the end of the Marcos regime in 1986, the National Democratic Front (NDF), the 
umbrella organization of the left in the Philippines, has been engaged in “intermittent and 
inconclusive” peace negotiations with the national government. However, the only major 
achievements to date have been the signing of a Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) in 1998, and 
intermittent cease-fire agreements (ICG, 2011). 
Initially concentrating their efforts on Luzon and the Visayas, CPP-NPA-organizers 
gradually found their way into Mindanao, and by the early 1980s Eastern and Central 
Mindanao had become one of the movement’s strongholds. The CPP-NPA even made 
inroads into Davao City, the regional urban hub and the third largest city of the country 
(ICG, 2011). The CPP-NPA’s rapid expansion in Mindanao can be related to a number of 
factors (Kerkvliet, 1986; Magno & Gregor, 1993). For one, demographic growth due to 
natural reproduction and in-migration, combined with the expansion of logging, mining 
and plantation agriculture, led to a gradual exhaustion of the land frontier. Combined with 
a worldwide commodities crisis, this increased pressures on smallholder farmers, many of 
whom were faced with the prospect of dispossession. The Marcos regime was failing to 
deliver vital public services, particularly in remote upland areas, and state institutions were 
instead perceived to be serving the interests of regional elites supportive of the martial law 
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regime, many of whom were associated with the extractive industries that displaced the 
local population. Military and paramilitary forces were reverting to increasingly brutal 
strategies, and while partly successful in isolating part of the NPA’s (potential) mass base 
(Masa), this ultimately increased anti-government sentiment among the population. In this 
polarized environment, the NPA provided a recourse for the poor, a protection mechanism 
against land grabbing, cattle rustling, military abuse, and exploitation.  
Despite this anti-elitist agenda, Rutten has also noted that “Alliances with elite politicians 
and landlords in villages and municipalities have always formed a necessary but 
problematic survival strategy for cadres” (Rutten, 2008: 23). Similarly, Marks observed 
that while “initial recruits were reacting to the increased authoritarianism of the Marcos 
administration (…) the movement’s ranks grew to include local politicians and priests 
dissatisfied with the government.” (Marks, 1993: 109). In all, however, existing research 
suggests that the presence of a massive pool of aggrieved (rural) poor was the main factor 
fuelling the erstwhile expansion of the NPA. Gradually but surely, the CPP-NPA managed 
to extend its influence over Eastern Mindanao, particularly in the uplands. In so-called red 
areas the movement was in near-complete control, setting up revolutionary forms of rebel 
governance (Weinstein, 2006), meting out revolutionary justice, and implementing a 
revolutionary land reform agenda (Marks, 1993). In-between these rebel-controlled 
territories and those controlled by the regime and its local allies lay a “twilight zone”, 
where territorial authority was contested, and where most of the actual fighting took place 
(Grossman, 1999).   
THE DEMISE OF THE “OLD” AND THE RISE OF THE “NEW” NPA IN THE 
POST-MARTIAL LAW ERA 
The end of martial law in 1986 heralded a profound crisis in the left , because “the legal, 
democratic channels of claim-making were now restored, the dictatorship dismantled, and 
the need for an armed uprising against a dictatorial state removed” (Rutten, 2008: 301). 
This new context sparked intense divisions within the CPP-NPA, eventually culminating, 
in the early 1990s, in a schism between more moderate ‘rejectionists’ that adopted a rather 
pragmatic approach towards the new political order, and radical ‘reaffirmists’ who 
renewed their commitment to Maoist doctrine and armed resistance (Rutten, 2001, 2008). 
In Mindanao this crisis was exacerbated by Kampanyang Ahos, a bloody internal purge 
aimed at rooting out alleged military spies, which left hundreds of cadres death and 
convinced many others to leave the movement (Abinales, 1996, 2008). On the 
counterinsurgency front, the democratic governments of Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) and 
Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) adopted a multi-pronged strategy, combining local development 
projects with military prowess (Magno & Gregor, 1993). In Eastern Mindanao, as in other 
regions, the restoration of democracy on the local level went hand in hand with the 
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organization of vigilante units which assisted official law enforcement agencies and local 
elites in their fight against the NPA (van der Kroef, 1988; Hedman & Sidel, 2000). These 
militias were later absorbed into auxiliary or paramilitary forces like the CVO and 
CAFGU, which continued to operate under the close supervision of local elected 
politicians (Kreuzer, 2009). These paramilitary structures also offered refuge to former 
NPAs who wanted to lead normal lives under the protective gaze of the state. Vice versa, 
“For political entrepreneurs, former NPAs are attractive candidates for such positions, 
because of their skills and reputation for bravery” (Rutten, 2001: 331). Together, these 
trends led to a notable reduction in the number of NPA-regulars nationwide, from an 
estimated 25000 in the mid-1980s to approximately one fourth of that a decade later 
(Santos, 2010). In Mindanao as well, the combination of internal purges and 
counterinsurgency efforts had dramatically reduced the CPP-NPA’s military strength.  
Rather than leading to its complete demise, however, a decade of decline eventually gave 
rise to a leaner and according to some observers a more determined NPA, which was able 
to reverse the trend of decline (Santos, 2010). The NPA’s resurgence was particularly 
spectacular in Eastern Mindanao which, depending on the estimates, was again home to 
1500-6000 communist rebels by the end of the 1990s (Espejo, 2008). Some observers now 
suggest that the NPA’s military strength in Mindanao now rivals if not exceeds that of the 
1980s (Espejo, 2011). In recent years this renewed military strength became apparent in a 
long series of NPA-attacks, which often involve dozens of well-armed regulars, targeting 
(amongst others) large-scale mining companies (“NPA rebels attack”, 2014), plantations 
(“NPA attacks Del Monte”, 2013), and selected local politicians (“NPA admits killing”, 
2014) and/or traditional leaders (Manlupig, 2014). 
Competing causal explanations exist for the persistence of the NPA in places like Samar, 
Negros, and eastern Mindanao, although most observers agree that revolutionary fervor is 
no longer the most important one. For some, the grievances fuelling the erstwhile 
expansion of the NPA in the 1970s-1980s still matter a great deal today, with poverty and 
landlessness, poor governance, injustice, and military abuse guaranteeing a steady supply 
of recruits (Holden, 2013). At the same time a shift in terms of membership has been 
noted. Whereas earlier NPA-recruits often had educated, urban, middle-class backgrounds, 
and hailed from outside Mindanao, today’s recruits are often young local guys from poor 
rural backgrounds for whom rebellion represents one of the few available livelihood 
opportunities (Santos, 2010). This observation in turn feeds into explanations that treat the 
communist rebellion as opportunity- or even greed-driven, depicting the rebellion as a 
“mafia” (Rosales, 2004) or a “business-like enterprise” (Magno, 2007) that is primarily 
interested in extorting revolutionary taxes. Significant for the purposes of this chapter, the 
NPA is also collecting “permit-to-campaign fees” or “election fees” from local 
politicians, the costs of which depend on the eyed position and the candidate’s financial 
capacity, ranging anywhere from P 10,000 into millions (Hookway, 2004; Magno, 2007). 
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Anecdotal evidence also suggests that in some areas, the NPA is demanding a regular 
share of local government revenues. Finally, Magno (2007) suggested that local insurgent 
units have reverted to bartering votes from within ‘their’ territory in exchange for money, 
guns and/or political support for leftist party list candidates. Reminiscent of the situation 
in North Cotabato, these attempts on the part of the NPA to tap into decentralized state 
resources are a first way in which distinctions between the local state and rebel structures 
have become blurred in the post-transition, decentralization era.  
Together, these different observations provide us with initial insights into the reasons for 
the CPP-NPA’s persistence in eastern Mindanao. However, these explanations fail to 
account for the complexity THAT now characterizes the interaction between rebel- and 
state structures on the local level, which may in fact be a factor in its own right facilitating 
the CPP-NPA’s survival. In what follows, we will demonstrate that in Compostela Valley 
province, communist rebels have become an intricate part of the indistinct politico-
military-commercial networks that now reign over the informal ASM-sector. As has been 
demonstrated in chapter 5, local miner-politicians have come to occupy central positions 
within these networks, relying on the state’s capacity as a coercive and legitimizing 
structure to protect the otherwise informal ASM-sector. 
STATE-REBEL SYNERGIES IN SMALL-SCALE MINING NETWORKS 
The initial expansion of ASM in Eastern Mindanao took place in the volatile 1980s, when 
the uplands were home to different armed groups exercising varying degrees of territorial 
control, prime amongst which the Philippine army and the NPA. Initially, the NPA was in 
firm control over some of the mining areas. In Pantukan, for example, the rebels were in 
charge of allocating mining claims71. Furthermore, according to one respondent, as an 
NPA-supporter you were given a bonus every Friday, sometimes amounting to as much as 
15-20 grams of pure gold72. As the 1980s progressed, however, the army gradually 
extended its influence over the uplands. While this often involved significant fighting, at 
least in the gold rush areas of Compostela Valley the logic of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency never really took root.  
The Diwalwal gold rush area in Monkayo municipality, by far the biggest and most 
notorious gold rush area in the Philippines, provides a good illustration. As early as 1987 a 
reporter from the Washington Post noted that “soldiers are digging alongside their 
adversaries from the Communist New People’s Army (NPA), who have taken a break from 
their fight to overthrow the capitalist system in order to pan for a little gold” (Richburg, 
1987). The lack of clear-cut regulatory order in Diwalwal, and the proliferation of 
conflicts between tunnel operators induced a “market of protection” (Shah, 2006), which 
                                                          
71 Interview with former Pantukan miner, Pantukan, November 2012. 
72 Interview with former Pantukan miner, New Bataan, January 2014. 
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offered opportunities for policemen, soldiers and rebels alike. Aside from providing 
protection-cum-extortion services to tunnel operators, some higher-ranking cadres within 
these groups started investing in their own tunneling- and processing activities. As easily 
accessible alluvial deposits became exhausted, Diwalwal saw a violent phase of cartel 
formation, with mining financiers and armed actors pooling their resources in an effort to 
strengthen their position vis-à-vis their competitors.73 These different mining groups 
formed what is best described as private armies, whose task consisted not only in 
monitoring the labour force, but also in protecting the tunnels from outside intrusion, and 
fighting rival mining groups in “underground encounters”.74 These private armies were 
often composed of rag-tag bands of (former) communist and Muslim rebels, soldiers and 
policemen, giving rise to the enigmatic “fusion groups” and “lost commands” that soon 
became ubiquitous throughout the region. 
Thus, already during martial law and the uncertain transition period which followed it, 
there was a blurring of the divide between insurgent- and counterinsurgent forces in 
Compostela Valley’s ASM-areas. The availability of gold rents seems to have induced a 
process of fragmentation in the different armed groups operating throughout the region, 
with local actors renouncing top-down hierarchies and becoming absorbed in regional 
political-commercial networks built around ASM (Le Billon, 2001). This process of 
fragmentation was facilitated by trends within these different armed groups. Nearing the 
end of the Marcos era, local army detachments were increasingly expected to fend for 
themselves. In addition, Marks noted, “In the absence of any other viable government 
presence, it was the battalions which became, like so many warlords, the rulers of their 
domains.” (Marks, 1993: 125). In the case of the NPA, a strategy of decentralization 
initiated by the movement leadership in the early 1980s resulted in a significant degree of 
autonomy for local commanders and their following (Tiglao, 1993). At the same time, 
after the end of the cold war and the loss of external funding, the CPP-NPA came to rely 
heavily on domestic revenue sources, and ASM soon became a vital source of 
revolutionary taxes (ICG, 2011).  
This blurring of divides became more pronounced in the post-decentralization era, when 
several of the key players involved in these ASM-networks entered the political-electoral 
arena. As argued in chapter 5, a nascent class of miner-politicians started using the 
coercive and regulatory powers of the local state to legitimize and protect the otherwise 
informal ASM-sector, imbuing it with a sense of regulatory predictability that bodes well 
for its survival, and arguably its further expansion. At the same time, as argued in chapter 
6, the barangay’s authority to maintain regulatory order cannot be divorced from its 
entanglement with local kinship structures, as it is typically dominated by a coalition of 
local landowning families who have diversified into small-scale gold mining. 
                                                          
73 Interview with former legal assistant of Compostela Valley governor, Tagum City, October 2012. 
74 This account derives from several interviews with miners formerly or currently active in Diwalwal. 
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Significantly, particularly on the barangay level, relations between local politicians and 
communist rebels are not simply characterized by antagonism, but often involve a degree 
of negotiation, coordination, and in some cases even mutual accommodation. Barangay 
officials repeatedly indicated that they had no choice but to “negotiate” with everyone: the 
army, the police, higher-ranking politicians, but also the NPA. One barangay council 
member hinted at a tacit co-existence between the NPA and the CVO, the barangay-
sanctioned militia: “The NPA respects that the center of the barangay is controlled by the 
CVO, and the NPA respects the influence of the CVO”.75 Many respondents saw 
essentially no difference between the actions of both groups, with both the CVO and the 
NPA now solicit –or extort– contributions and revolutionary taxes from ASM, while 
individual members of the CVO, the NPA, but also police officers and even army 
personnel often figure as portal guards. In this capacity, several respondents suggested, 
they often play a role in disciplining the workforce. At the same time it puts them in a 
position to monitor the mining operations as part of their taxation-cum-extortion activities: 
“You cannot avoid paying to the NPA, because they will often intrude the private 
armies”76. Different respondents also confirmed that there exists a high degree of mobility 
between the rebel movement and local paramilitary groups, the CVO in particular. Even 
some barangay officials that were interviewed had a history in the armed left.  
What we have attempted to illustrate so far is the existence of a multitude of relations 
between on the one hand local miner-politicians and their backers, in their capacity as 
financiers and/or as owners of processing facilities; and on the other hand rebel forces who 
have a clear interest in ASM as a source of revolutionary taxes, but in some cases also as a 
personal source of income. Seen from this perspective, the NPA and local miner-
politicians share a mutual interest in fending off the expansion of large-scale mining, 
which now poses an important threat for the survival of ASM in the region. As will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 8, in places like Monkayo, New Bataan, and Maco, 
large-scale mining companies have already had to contend with acts of resistance and even 
outright violence on the part of what they perceive as ASM-interests colliding with 
communist rebels.  
Finally, to fully understand the relationships cross-cutting the state-rebel divide, analytical 
attention needs to be paid to the wider set of social relations in which both state and rebel 
structures are embedded. It was already suggested earlier that local state (particularly 
barangay) institutions are typically dominated by a coalition of local families, many of 
whom are now involved in ASM. Meanwhile, whereas many of the erstwhile NPA-
regulars hailed from outside of the region, many of today’s members and supporters (the 
Masa) are recruited in local communities, which still harbor a massive pool of aggrieved 
young men and women who potentially see the NPA as a vehicle to struggle for greater 
                                                          
75 Interview with barangay official and mining financier, Nabunturan, January 2014. 
76 Interview with two former miners, Nabunturan, February 2012. 
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social justice, or simply for personal emancipation.  As a result, local respondents in many 
mining areas, including state officials and local militia members, now have cousins, 
siblings, neighbors, former schoolmates, or at least acquaintances within the movement. 
Consider the example of a datu (a traditional leader) with a long and distinguished record 
as an NPA-commander in the 1980s-1990s, who still maintains contacts within the 
movement. While several of his cousins are active inside the NPA, the datu himself has 
acted as an official tribal representative at the municipal level for several years, whereas 
his daughter was running for a barangay position in the 2013 elections. In short, after a 
decade-long presence in the province, the NPA has become firmly rooted in the local 
social fabric, and people have grown accustomed to its presence, which remains however 
somewhat enigmatic not just for an outside researcher, but also for a migrant gold rush 
miner: “I know there are lots of NPAs inside the mining areas, but it is very hard to 
distinguish them. They are all civilians there.”77   
In contrast with this locally rooted character of the NPA, the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP), despite considerable efforts to improve community relations, continues 
to be treated an outsider by many Comvaleños. The overall sentiment was captured by a 
barangay official in a mining area that is known for its strong NPA-presence: “The army 
treats this as a red area. And they are right: there is NPA, there is Masa. (…) Small-scale 
miners pay revolutionary taxes (…) But this is not a warzone, we have a peacekeeping 
alliance”.78 Obviously this has implications for the long-term dynamics of armed conflict. 
As suggested by a 2011 International Crisis Group report: “Local communities and 
politicians work around the conflict, often making pragmatic decisions to collaborate with 
one side or the other or both. This inhibits efforts to quash the insurgency by military and 
police, whose relations with local government units are fraught” (ICG, 2011: 10). Indeed, 
different respondents pointed to the existence of direct lines of communication between 
local paramilitaries who often serve as scouts for the army, and the NPA, which were 
aimed primarily at avoiding casualties on either side due to “misunderstandings”. 
CONCLUSIONS AND COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS  
In this chapter we have critically interrogated a pervasive tendency to portray the Muslim 
and communist insurgencies in Mindanao as being directed squarely against the Philippine 
state. Instead, our empirical analysis of local politics in two conflict-affected provinces 
revealed a high degree of overlap and mutual entanglement between state- and rebel 
structures. In an attempt to explain this observation, we have drawn attention to particular 
trajectories of (post-)colonial state formation, which established the local state as a vital 
instrument for accumulation and for the legitimation of public authority. In many ways, 
                                                          
77 Interview with two former miners, Nabunturan, February 2012. 
78 Interview with barangay official, Nabunturan, January 2014. 
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the situation described in this chapter is reminiscent of that in Colombia, where 
decentralization has given birth to indistinct coalitions between local politicians, 
paramilitaries, and in some cases even (communist) rebels. On the one hand, the survival 
and strength of armed actors has come to depend on their ability to tap into state resources 
(Eaton, 2006) and “state-mediated networks of power” (Ballvé, 2012). Vice versa, local 
politicians now depend on the coercive strength of these armed actors to reinforce their 
claims to political-territorial control. Rather than being anemic to processes of state 
formation, armed actors have become embroiled in the further diffusion of the symbolic 
and normative registers of state rule (Ballvé, 2012). However, we have added a second 
layer of argumentation, drawing attention to the intricate ways in which state- and rebel 
structures are embedded in the local social fabric, with kinship relations in particular 
fulfilling a vital bridging role between state and rebel structures. Admittedly, much work 
remains to be done here, particularly in understanding the relationship between state/rebel 
forces and other “normative and cognitive orders” (Pertierra, 1999), including those of 
religion, ethnicity, and class. 
While the two cases exhibit important similarities, there are also significant differences 
with regards to the form and extent of the interaction between state and rebel forces, which 
was much more direct and intense in North Cotabato as compared to Compostela Valley. 
While this may partly be explained by the more radical anti-statist ideology professed by 
the Maoist NPA, important clues may also be derived from the underlying economic 
structure. As suggested by numerous respondents, in the case of North Cotabato, 
particularly on the level of the barangay, state resources now represent a prime target for 
private accumulation and patronage, requiring a more direct form of control over the state 
apparatus. Meanwhile in Compostela Valley local state institutions, while important as a 
source of rents in their own right, simultaneously serve as an instrument to stabilize the 
ASM-sector as a vital source of income and rents for miner-politicians and the NPA alike. 
In this case, rebels may be more than satisfied with a “live and let live” arrangement with 
local politicians. The influence of underlying economic structures on the type of state-
rebel relationship (and vice versa) is a second promising area of inquiry.  
Finally, rebel-influenced or even rebel-controlled territories are often seen as places of 
exception within the Philippines. However, as hopefully demonstrated by the case studies 
presented in this chapter, these places actually share many of the characteristics of local 
“politics as usual” as practiced elsewhere in the Philippines i.e. factional competition 
between constantly shifting family alliances, embedded in vertical patronage networks tied 
up with political parties (Landé, 1968; McCoy, 1993). Nonetheless, based on the 
particularly violent type of barangay politics witnessed in North Cotabato in particular, it 
can be hypothesized that the presence of armed groups risks exacerbating some of the 
authoritarian tendencies evident in Philippine politics.  
 































AMBIGUITY, AND MINERAL 
CONFLICT 
ORIGINAL ARTICLE: 
Verbrugge, B. (2015). Decentralization, Institutional Ambiguity, and Mineral Resource 
Conflict in Mindanao, Philippines. World Development, 67, 449-460. 
BACKGROUND: 
Mining in general is now seen as one of the key sources of (armed) conflict in the 
Philippines. However, the precise reasons as to why this is the case remain fundamentally 
misunderstood. In this article I attempt to make an initial inventory of the most prominent 
types of mineral resource conflict; and to search for an underlying logic connecting these 
different types of conflict. 
ARTICLE ABSTRACT: 
Based on an analytical framework that builds on theories of incremental institutional 
change, this article interrogates the relationship between decentralization and mineral 
resource conflict in the Philippines. Here, efforts to decentralize control over mineral 
resource wealth have resulted in a highly ambiguous institutional arena, wherein 
heterogeneous actor coalitions are attempting to influence trajectories of institutional 
change, and the associated distribution of mineral wealth. On the ground, this institutional 
renegotiation produces a diverse range of conflicts. Emerging on top of these institutional 
struggles are local elected politicians, which raises important concerns over elite capture 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I will transcend the level of the local regulatory order, which formed the 
analytical focus of chapters 5 to 7, by considering how it fits in with broader mineral 
resource governance regimes in the Philippines. The defining dynamic of mineral resource 
governance in the Philippines, as in other countries, is decentralization (e.g. Arellano-
Yanguas, 2011 on Peru; Hirons, 2014 on Ghana). In recent years and decades, 
decentralization has emerged as a major policy emphasis worldwide, stimulating debates 
about the relationship between decentralization and various aspects of governance and 
economic development, including public accountability and corruption, poverty 
alleviation, intergovernmental fiscal relations, and the nature of political competition (see 
Faguet, 2014 for an overview). In development studies, specific attention has been paid to 
effectivity- and equity concerns in the decentralization of natural resource management 
(Larson & Ribot, 2004), particularly in the domain of forestry (e.g. Larson & Ribot, 2004; 
Andersson, Gibson & Lehoucq, 2005; Batterburry & Fernando, 2006). A recurring 
argument in this body of literature is that otherwise well-intentioned decentralization 
initiatives are thwarted by political-economic considerations, with national governments 
“recentralizing while decentralizing” (Ribot, Agrawal & Larson, 2006), and local elites 
capturing newly devolved powers and resources (Béné et al., 2009; Maconachie, 2010; 
Pattenden, 2011; Poteete & Ribot, 2011). 
A somewhat underdeveloped theme in this growing body of literature on decentralization 
is its alleged potential to mitigate or even to prevent conflict (Lijphart, 1977). A growing 
number of scholars has warned against an overly optimistic reading of the relationship 
between decentralization and sociopolitical stability. These scholars can roughly be 
divided into two groups. A first group is associated with the political science literature on 
civil conflict, and aims to identify the variables that mediate the relationship between 
decentralization (whether or not as part of a broader system of federalism) and intrastate 
stability at the macro level (Kymlicka, 1998; Brancati, 2008). A second group of scholars 
is more closely associated with critical development studies, and argues that 
decentralization increases institutional uncertainty, thereby producing conflicts between a 
range of actors staking competing claims to resources (Mccarthy, 2004; Peluso, 2007; 
Benjamin, 2008; Hagmann & Mulugeta, 2008).  
Identifying with this second group of authors, this chapter adopts an empirical, bottom-up 
approach to analyzing the impact of decentralization on mineral resource governance –a 
theme that has hitherto received only scant attention in the decentralization literature (but 
see Maconachie, 2009; Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; Hirons, 2014)– in the Philippines. First, I 
provide a more elaborate review of the existing literature that deals with the relationship 
between decentralization and intrastate conflict. I will also propose an analytical 
framework to analyze the impact of decentralization on local resource conflicts, which 
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draws heavily on insights from the literature on incremental institutional change (Mahoney 
& Thelen, 2009). I then provide a brief albeit critical historical overview of central-local 
ties and decentralization in the Philippines. Building on chapter 7, it is argued that the 
Local Government Code of 1991, the centerpiece of decentralization, was in fact a 
radicalization of a longstanding tradition of decentralized statebuilding through local 
politicians. Finally, I turn to my actual empirical analysis, arguing that various and 
seemingly uncoordinated efforts to decentralize mineral resource governance have given 
rise to a highly ambiguous institutional arena, marked by pervasive uncertainty regarding 
rule interpretation and -enforcement. This institutional ambiguity creates opportunities for 
the renegotiation and contestation of institutional arrangements, and the associated 
distribution of mineral resource wealth across society. At the same time this institutional 
renegotiation is a political process par excellence, involving a range of conflicts between 
indistinct, asymmetric, and constantly shifting coalitions of actors that may involve, 
amongst others, government officials, large-scale mining companies, ASM-operators, 
tribal groups, and armed groups. In an attempt to make sense of this complex conflict 
ecology, three major cleavages are identified around which institutional struggles are now 
crystallizing, namely (1) Intra-government conflicts over fiscal-regulatory authority in the 
mining sector, (2) Conflicts between large-scale mining companies and ASM-operators 
over access to mineral-yielding land, and (3) Conflicts between tribal groups that seek to 
secure ancestral domain rights and associated mining royalties under the Indigenous 
People’s Rights Act. The common denominator underlying these different conflicts is the 
central role played by local politicians as gatekeepers in the mining sector. While it is 
impossible to predict future trajectories of institutional change, it is highly likely that they 
will continue to do so in the future. This raises important concerns over elite capture of the 
decentralization process. 
TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
Decentralization is defined here broadly as “the transfer of power from the central 
government to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political–administrative and 
territorial hierarchy” (Larson & Ribot, 2004, 3). National policy-makers can have various 
incentives to support the devolution of power and resources to subnational actors. Some 
authors treat decentralization as part of a long-term strategy aimed at shoring up the 
legitimacy and power of the regime (Boone, 2003), while others also draw attention to 
short-term political considerations (Eaton, 2001). Rather than providing an in-depth 
discussion of the various arguments for and against decentralization, this theoretical 
section zooms in on one specific argument that has been coined in favor of 
decentralization, namely its alleged potential to prevent and/or to mitigate conflict. As 
noted in the introduction, existing theoretical-analytical approaches towards the 
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relationship between decentralization and sociopolitical stability can roughly be 
categorized in two groups: one that focuses on macro-level conflict, and one that draws 
analytical attention to micro-level political dynamics.  
DECENTRALIZATION AND INTRASTATE STABILITY ON THE MACRO-
LEVEL 
The relationship between decentralization and sociopolitical stability has been extensively 
debated in the literature on civil conflict (for overviews see Bakke & Wibbels, 2006; 
Brancati, 2008). For some authors, decentralization reduces the likelihood of intrastate 
conflict, by enabling the inclusion of previously marginalized groups, thereby eliminating 
the grievances that fuel conflict in the first place (Lijphart, 1977). Others are more 
pessimistic, arguing that decentralization risks fostering centrifugal forces (Kymlicka, 
1998), amongst others by providing subnational actors with the institutional structure and 
resources necessary to sustain (violent) mobilization (Snyder, 2000; Eaton, 2006). Still 
others argue that the relationship between decentralization and conflict is context-specific, 
and hinges on key variables like interregional inequality and ethnic heterogeneity (Bakke 
& Wibbels, 2006), or the presence of regional parties (Brancati, 2008).  
Despite their disagreements, these authors share an analytical focus on the relationship 
between decentralization and conflict (mostly ethnic and secessionist conflict, but see 
Eaton, 2006) at the macro level. Furthermore, as noted by Brancati (2008), most of these 
authors draw on (comparative) qualitative case study material. A few others, including 
Brancati herself as well as Bakke and Wibbels (2006), use large-N statistical analysis to 
advance their theoretical claims. However, Bakke and Wibbels recognize the limits to the 
generalizability of their findings, stressing the need for “substantial case-study work to 
more carefully examine the mechanisms underpinning those findings” (37-38). 
VIEWS FROM BELOW: DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL RESOURCE 
STRUGGLES 
In recent years decentralization has attracted increased attention of a heterogeneous group 
of political anthropologists, human geographers, and development sociologists, who are 
primarily interested in understanding the impact of decentralization and democratization 
on local (resource) governance arrangements. Emerging from this body of literature is a 
series of related arguments about the intensely political character of decentralization, 
which is all too often presented as a technocratic exercise (Hadiz, 2004). While some of 
these authors make notable efforts to develop an analytical framework, most are primarily 
interested in providing an in-depth analysis of decentralization within a particular 
sociopolitical context, usually based on extensive field research. 
  139 
 
Several authors adopting such a bottom-up approach have convincingly demonstrated that 
in many countries, democratic decentralization is “barely happening” (Larson & Ribot, 
2004), or is subject to intense struggles between different government levels and -agencies 
over the eventual terms and extent of decentralization (Eaton, 2001). Particularly 
significant for the purposes of this chapter are those authors that draw attention to the 
tendency for decentralization to upset existing institutional arrangements that regulate 
access to natural resources, thereby creating opportunities for established or emergent 
elites to capture devolved power and resources (Béné et al., 2009; Pulhin & Dressler, 
2009; Maconachie, 2010; Pattenden, 2011; Poteete & Ribot, 2011). In countries like 
Ethiopia (Hagmann & Mulugeta, 2008) and Indonesia (Mccarthy, 2004; Peluso, 2007; 
Schulte Nordholt & Van Klinken, 2007; Eilenberg, 2009), decentralization has gone hand 
in hand with an increase in conflicts over access to devolved power and resources between 
local elite networks. Significant for the purposes of this chapter, Arellano-Yanguas (2011) 
interrogates the impact of the new “localist paradigm” in the Peruvian mining sector, 
demonstrating how it has contributed to a range of conflicts over the distribution of mining 
rents. The following section aims to integrate these initial observations into a broader 
analytical framework for understanding the relationship between decentralization and local 
resource struggles.  
TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE 
IMPACT OF DECENTRALIZATION ON RESOURCE STRUGGLES 
The analytical framework proposed here draws heavily on insights from historical 
institutionalism, particularly on those authors working on incremental institutional change 
(Pierson, 2004; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). In line with other institutionalists, these 
authors conceive of institutions as formal and informal rules that structure human 
behavior. However, instead of seeing them as “neutral coordinating mechanisms”, they 
are approached as “distributional arrangements that allocate resources unevenly” 
(Mahoney, 2010: 15) and that “reflect, and also reproduce and magnify, particular 
patterns of power distribution” (Thelen, 1999: 394). Moreover, while most 
institutionalists focus on exogenous shocks as sources of radical institutional change, these 
authors combine their power-laden approach to institutions with an analytical focus on 
incremental institutional change (Pierson, 2004; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). Finally, 
historical institutionalism would not be historical if it did not pay attention to the 
determining influence of institutional legacies on existing institutional arrangements, on 
the power relations underpinning them, and on the strategic choices available to (groups 
of) actors (Pierson, 2004). While important questions remain with regards to the 
contextual factors that promote or discourage particular trajectories of incremental 
institutional change, Mahoney and Thelen (2009) suggest that institutional change is 
particularly likely to occur in those environments characterized by high degrees of 
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institutional ambiguity, where uncertainty over the interpretation and enforcement of 
existing rules creates opportunities for “agents of change” to assemble coalitions that seek 
to influence trajectories of change. Ultimately, a power-laden approach towards 
incremental institutional change draws central attention to “distributional conflict among 
aggregate actors as a basic driving force in history” (Mahoney, 2010: 15). 
Approached from this perspective, the most important effects of decentralization may not 
necessarily lie in its sudden impact on institutional arrangements, but in the creation of 
long-term institutional ambiguity, which carries the seeds of incremental institutional 
change. In Mali, to name an example, decentralization has led to an “accumulation of 
several layers of powers with no single legitimacy and no longer any central institution 
capable of imposing its law and norms, thus greatly reducing the clarity of political 
processes” (Béné et al., 2009: 1945). Meanwhile in Indonesia, decentralization has also 
created a highly ambiguous institutional environment, characterized by “confusion about 
the distribution of power and authority between different levels of government” (Hadiz, 
2004: 705). On the local level, this institutional ambiguity feeds into “highly volatile 
socio-legal configurations that create insecurity and heighten resource conflict” 
(Mccarthy, 2004, 1199) between different actors that are “competing, conflicting or 
colluding” (Béné et al., 2009: 1945), and capitalizing on divergent interpretations of the 
law to stake competing claims to power and resources. While these institutional conflicts 
and resource struggles unleashed by decentralization need not necessarily be destructive or 
disempowering, and can have important emancipatory effects (Ravikumar et al., 2013), 
evidence so far suggests that they are mostly an elitist affair, which ultimately serves to 
exclude the end-users. 
HISTORICAL-INSTITUTIONAL LEGACIES AND 
CENTRAL-LOCAL TIES IN THE PHILIPPINES 
A TRADITION OF DECENTRALIZED CENTRALISM 
Throughout this PhD-thesis it has repeatedly been mentioned that despite a longstanding 
tradition of de jure centralized governance, local politicians have always enjoyed a high 
degree of autonomy, and use local state institutions as a structure for accumulation and the 
legitimation of their claims to public authority. According to Sidel (1999) this has given 
rise to “bossism”: a highly coercive form of local political-economic control whereby 
local politicians, often members of entrenched political dynasties, wield control in 
‘authoritarian enclaves’ (Franco, 2001). For Abinales (2000), this prominent position of 
local politicians should be understood as part of a broader statebuilding agenda whereby 
local strongmen-politicians, in return for their local prerogatives, commit themselves to 
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upholding the democratic electoral process, and to preventing the rise of organized 
opposition against the state (see also Wong, 2006).  
At the same time there were clear limits to local autonomy, with Manila-based elites 
retaining control over their local counterparts through vertical patronage networks 
organized around the main political parties (Landé, 1968). Furthermore, when Marcos 
assumed the presidency in 1965, he gradually centralized power in the hands of the 
presidency. However, while Marcos was fairly successful in reigning in selectively on 
local elites, the regime continued to rely on local powerbrokers for the implementation of 
its increasingly authoritarian development strategy. Ultimately, Marcos failed to do away 
with the localist tendencies in Philippine politics altogether (Hutchcroft, 2000). By the 
1980s, the limits of the Marcos regime’s debt-driven developmentalist strategy became 
apparent, and it was faced with mounting opposition from a broad range of societal forces, 
ranging from disenfranchised local elites to Muslim and communist insurgents that were 
particularly active in Mindanao (Abinales, 2000). 
DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE 
The military mutiny and people power revolt that eventually overthrew Marcos and swept 
Corazon Aquino to power in 1986 ushered in an uncertain transition period, marked by a 
profound spirit of popular empowerment. The new 1987 constitution reflected this spirit, 
calling on congress to produce several pieces of legislation that would facilitate 
progressive social change. This included “a Local Government Code which shall provide 
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a 
system of decentralization” (The 1987 constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A. 
X, s. 3). While the Local Government Code was given high priority in congress, it would 
take until 1991 before it was eventually passed in the form of Republic Act (RA) 7160, 
which devolved important fiscal and regulatory responsibilities to local government units 
(LGUs; in descending order: the region, province, city, municipality and barangay (for a 
more detailed discussion see Legaspi, 2001; Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2013).  Furthermore, 
LGUs became entitled to unconditional Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) and a share of 
natural resource rents, which significantly decreased local politicians’ financial 
dependence on national-level patrons (Clark, 1999). Finally, the code reestablished local 
executive control over the police.  
So what motivated national-level politicians to cede substantial power and resources to 
local politicians? According to Eaton (2001), the answer lies in a combination of 
realpolitik on the part of congress members, and the extraordinary political circumstances 
of the transition period. Decentralization was first and foremost a product of the 
emancipatory spirit of people power, and President Aquino saw it as one of the defining 
legacies of her presidency (1986-1992). Meanwhile at least some members of congress, 
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who were now bound by term limits, had ambitions to run for local office themselves one 
day, or at least had strategic allies (often family members) on the local level that would 
profit from a downward transfer of power and resources. Furthermore, national politicians 
managed to sneak in several safeguards in the Local Government Code that allowed them 
to retain at least some degree of control over their local-level counterparts (Eaton, 2001). 
For Siegle and O’Mahony (2006), decentralization was also a strategy to increase 
sociopolitical stability in the face of recurrent social conflict and rebellion. Two regions of 
the country that had experienced what was widely perceived as an ethnically motivated 
rebellion (the northern Cordilleras and the Muslim regions of Mindanao) during the 
Marcos years were placed under a special autonomy arrangement. However, even in those 
regions without such a special status, decentralization in the form of the Local 
Government Code can be seen as “a principal means to improve security by bringing 
government closer to the people” (Siegle and O’Mahony, 2006, 39). Significantly, in 
those areas of the peninsula with a strong rebel presence, the restoration of democratic 
state rule on the local level went hand in hand with brutal counterinsurgency efforts that 
involved vigilantes and paramilitary units supported by local (would-be) politicians (Van 
der Kroef, 1988; Hedman & Sidel, 2000). As confirmed by field research findings, many 
of these vigilantes were later transformed into state-sanctioned security forces (Kreuzer, 
2009) such as the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO), a supposedly unarmed 
barangay (village) level police force. 
In sum, as suggested in the previous chapter, while decentralization was in large part a 
response to the authoritarian excesses of the Marcos regime, the Local Government Code 
was not a radical move away from a historically rooted centralism (Legaspi, 2001). 
Rather, it is a (more radical) expression of a longstanding tradition of decentralized 
statebuilding and counterinsurgency through local politicians (Hutchcroft, 2000; Wong, 
2006). Indeed, critical observers were quick to point out that the ‘democratic’ transition 
soon turned out to be nothing more than a restoration of the elitist pre-Marcos institutional 
structure, including a return to traditional-style patronage- and coercion-based local 
politics (Hedman & Sidel, 2000; Hutchroft & Rocamora, 2003). This chapter builds on –
and will hopefully qualify– these observations, through an empirical investigation of the 
impact of decentralization in the domain of mineral resource governance where, as we will 
see, decentralization has unleashed a range of open-ended struggles over future 
institutional trajectories and the associated distribution of mineral resource wealth. 
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MINERAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AN ERA 
OF DECENTRALIZATION  
THE 1995 MINING ACT AS THE CENTRALIST BASIS OF MINERAL 
RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 
While Spanish colonialism (which lasted from the early 16th century until 1898) failed to 
subjugate the entire peninsula, it did lay the basis for a highly centralized system of 
mineral resource governance centered around the Regalian doctrine, which vests 
ownership of public lands and all mineral resources in the (colonial) state. 
Notwithstanding a brief experiment with a freehold system under US rule, subsequent 
post-independence governments upheld this centralist spirit, which reached its climax 
during the Marcos years (Cabalda et al., 2002). While under Marcos, the mining sector 
was formally regulated through Presidential Decree 463, in reality it was governed by 
‘special deals’ that benefited Marcos’ intimate circle of cronies (Clad, 1988). Amidst 
mounting economic and political instability, the Marcos regime gradually lost control over 
the mining sector, which increasingly fell prey to mismanagement and corruption (Lopez, 
1992). This corporate mining crisis was aggravated by a global commodity crisis in the 
1980s, when a combination of increased mineral supply and decreasing demand (mainly 
due to the global economic downturn) led to a collapse of mineral prices (Maizels, 1992). 
Ultimately, many large-scale mining companies were forced to shut down their operations. 
As demonstrated in chapter 4, this large-scale mining crisis provided the space necessary 
for a dramatic expansion of ASM. 
Subsequent governments in the post-Marcos era undertook a series of regulatory 
interventions aimed at reviving the fledgling mining sector. This eventually culminated, in 
1995, in Republic Act No. 7942, “an act instituting a new system of mineral resources 
exploration, development, utilization and conservation”. Better known as the ‘Mining 
Act’, RA 7942 upheld the centralist spirit of the Regalian Doctrine, by stating that 
“Mineral resources are owned by the State and the exploration, development, utilization, 
and processing thereof shall be under its full control and supervision. The State may 
directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral agreements with 
contractors.” (Republic Act No. 7942, 1995: ch.I, s.2). The authority to administer and 
dispose of the state’s mineral resource reserves was vested in the secretary of the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and is effectively administered by the 
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), one of the line agencies of the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resourcess (DENR) (Ibid.: ch.II, s.8-9). The MGB now has 
several mineral-tenurial instruments at its disposal to issue mining rights, including 
Exploration Permits (EP), Financial Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAA), and 
Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA). With notable exceptions, including 
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those areas covered by existing (small-scale) mining rights, mining rights can cover “all 
mineral resources in public or private lands” (Ibid.: ch.III, s.18).  
In all, the Mining Act provides for a fairly clear-cut system of mineral resource 
governance, which centralized control over mineral resources in the hands of the national 
government. It aroused enthusiasm among (foreign) mining companies, and the number of 
mining applications increased dramatically over the following years and decades. As of 
January 31, 2014, there existed a total of 40 exploration permits covering 199,122 
hectares, 339 MPSAs covering 602,012 hectares, and 6 FTAAs covering 108,872 
hectares79.  
DECENTRALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITIES IN MINERAL 
RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 
However, as noted by a long-time observer of the Philippine mining sector, the 
congressional deliberations that eventually produced the Mining Act were completely 
detached not only from realities on the ground, where ASM had undergone a dramatic 
expansion; but also from a broader trend towards decentralization, spawned by a 
combination of short-term political considerations and long-term concerns over 
democratization and security80. Significant for our purposes, this move towards 
decentralization also involved efforts to devolve control over mineral resources to a range 
of subnational actors.  
First, the Local Government Code gave LGUs significant discretion over the issuance of 
permits and franchises, and over the enforcement of national environmental laws, 
stipulating that any project or program that “may cause pollution, climatic change, 
depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover, and 
extinction of animal or plant species” requires the approval of affected LGUs (Republic 
Act No. 7160, s. 27-28). Furthermore, in addition to automatic Internal Revenue 
Allotments (IRA) from the national government, LGUs also became entitled to a share of 
‘resource rents’ collected from activities involving the development of mineral resources 
within their territorial jurisdiction (Clark, 1999). Finally, LGUs were given control over 
ASM (Republic Act No. 7160, s. 484). 
Prior to 1991, artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) was regulated by Presidential 
Decree 1899, a highly permissive permit system that was put in place by the Marcos 
government in 1984, allegedly to divert some of the ASM-gold into central bank coffers 
(Clad, 1988). In line with the broader trend towards decentralization and democratization, 
                                                          
79 A regularly updated list of all approved mining permits and contracts is available online on 
http://mgb.gov.ph/lptt.aspx. 
80 Interview with Edwin Domingo, former assistant director of the MGB, Quezon City, March 2014. 
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in 1991 congress enacted Republic Act 7076, or the ‘People’s Small Scale Mining Act’. 
RA 7076 created provincial/city mining regulatory boards (P/CMRB) that were mandated 
to segregate ASM-areas (Minahang Bayan) in public lands and to issue contracts inside 
these areas pending the consent of (potential) existing rights holders. Chaired by the MGB 
regional director, these mining regulatory boards are composed of representatives of 
respectively the local executive (the provincial governor or city mayor), small-scale 
mining, large-scale mining, and civil society. However, key informants from different 
provinces suggested that in practice these boards, if functional at all, are dominated by the 
local executive, who retains a high degree of discretion over the issuance of permits. 
Finally, the same spirit of bottom-up empowerment eventually enabled the legislation of 
Republic Act 8371 (“an act to recognize, protect and promote the rights of indigenous 
cultural communities/indigenous peoples”) in 1997 (Eder & McKenna, 2008). While the 
Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) is not typically treated as an expression of 
decentralization, it nonetheless entails a radical devolution of rights over natural resources 
to indigenous communities. More specifically, the IPRA’s main focus lies on the 
recognition of political-territorial ancestral domain rights that amount to (near-)complete 
property rights, formalized through Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADT) 
awarded by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). Both the 
implementation and evaluation of the IPRA focus on the (hampered) process of Free and 
Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), whereby outsiders need to secure the explicit consent of 
the majority of the indigenous community in order to secure “any license, lease or permit 
for the exploitation of natural resources” (Republic Act No. 8371, s. 46(a)), usually in 
exchange for some kind of royalty.  
Significantly, these different laws co-exist uneasily not only with one another, but also 
with the centralist provisions of the 1995 Mining Act. According to the same observer 
cited earlier, “there were no real efforts to synchronize the Mining Act with the ‘special 
laws’. We did not want to tackle the special laws, we trusted that local bodies would work 
out which law was appropriate (…) if necessary they can go back to old laws”81. 
Together, this plethora of overlapping laws gives rise to a highly heterogeneous system of 
mineral resource governance, whereby different government levels and -agencies create 
contradictory and overlapping laws and administrative rules. In line with the analytical 
framework proposed in section two, this institutional ambiguity provides room for 
incremental institutional change, understood as the renegotiation of the institutional 
arrangements that distribute mineral resource wealth across society. This renegotiation of 
institutional arrangements is an intensely political process, that often produces conflicts on 
the ground. In order to substantiate this argument, and in order to make sense of current 
and future trajectories of institutional change, the remainder of this section provides an 
                                                          
81 Interview with Edwin Domingo, former assistant director of the MGB, Quezon City, March 2014. 
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empirical analysis of the three major axes around which conflicts over the redistribution of 
mineral resource wealth are currently unfolding.   
INTRA-GOVERNMENT CONFLICT OVER LARGE-
SCALE MINING 
The first type of conflict that has surfaced at least in part due to decentralization are intra-
government conflicts over the expansion of large-scale mining. Increasingly, local 
politicians are using the provisions of the Local Government Code to oppose the entry of 
large-scale mining (Holden & Jacobsen, 2006). While some LGUs have merely withheld 
consent for selected mining projects, others have gone further, implementing moratoria or 
even an outright ban on mining activities within their territory. The national government 
has in turn undertaken various efforts to counter LGU-opposition to mining projects. The 
latest of these efforts is executive order (EO) 79. Issued by president Aquino in 2012, EO 
79 can partly be read as a response to increased anti-mining activism, as it calls for the 
strict enforcement of environmental standards, closes a number of areas for mining, and 
issues a ban on the issuance of new mineral agreements pending the passage of new 
legislation on revenue sharing (Salamat, 2012). At the same time EO 79 calls on LGUs to 
“confine themselves only to the imposition of reasonable limitations on mining activities” 
and “to conform to regulations, decisions and policies … promulgated and taken by the 
National Government” (Executive Order No. 79, 2012, s. 12). In this way EO 79, and 
subsequent opinions and memorandums issued by national government officials that 
confirm the primacy of national government laws over local ordinances, can be seen as 
part of a broader attempt on the part of the current administration to recentralize control 
over mineral wealth. 
Undoubtedly the most widely cited case involving LGU-opposition to large-scale mining 
is that of the Tampakan open-pit copper-gold mining project in South Cotabato province, 
which is co-owned by Filipino Sagittarius Mining (SMI) and Swiss mining giant 
Glencore-Xstrata. On June 29, 2010, South Cotabato provincial Governor Fuentes signed 
into law a provincial environmental code that banned the use of open-pit mining methods 
(Aquiles, 2010). However, in February 2013, following an order by the MICC (the 
national coordinating council for the mining sector created by virtue of Executive Order 
79), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources decided to grant the company 
its environmental compliance certificate, thus neglecting the provincial environmental 
code (“Finally, Tampakan”, 2013). Rather than fast-tracking the Tampakan project, 
however, the DENR’s move is indicative of a near-complete gridlock between the national 
government and LGUs. Meanwhile a combination of a deteriorating security situation (in 
recent years Tampakan has witnessed a parallel increase in illegal hydraulic mining and 
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communist rebel activity), increased anti-mining activism (particularly on the part of the 
church), and last but not least LGU-opposition, has led to repeated delays in the progress 
of the Tampakan project. There are now important indications that Swiss Glencore-Xstrata 
is planning to divest its majority share in the Tampakan project, with the company citing 
the legal uncertainty created by the provincial ordinance as one of its key motivations 
(Espejo, 2014).  
The Tampakan case illustrates how local politicians emboldened by decentralization have 
become key gatekeepers in the large-scale mining sector. However, important questions 
remain with regards to their motivation to resist the expansion of large-scale mining. For 
Holden and Jacobsen (2006), this opposition stems from an interplay between civil society 
activism, a growing awareness about the environmental impacts of mining, and political-
electoral considerations. However, countless LGU-officials indicated that they are not 
necessarily opposed to large-scale mining as such. Rather, they are fed up with what they 
perceive as a top-down decision process: “Whatever the MGB says, we are expected to 
comply. And whenever something goes wrong, guess who takes the blame?”82. More 
importantly, numerous local government treasurers expressed frustration over the lack of 
fiscal benefits associated with large-scale mining. Under the Local Government Code, 
LGUs are entitled to a 40 percent share of previous year’s collection of excise tax from 
mining activities within their territorial jurisdiction (Clark, 1999). However, both the 
collection and redistribution of tax revenues are mired in problems (Gomez, 2010). The 
overall tax effort in mining is low compared to that in other sectors, not least because of a 
range of fiscal stimuli introduced to encourage investment in the mining industry. 
Furthermore, it has proven an arduous task for the relevant government agencies to 
correctly estimate output levels in large-scale mining, and consequently to collect accurate 
amounts of excise tax. Ultimately, LGU-officials complain about what they perceived as 
mere “hand-outs”, about long delays in the “downloading” of LGU-shares, and about the 
notoriously intransparant nature of revenue sharing83.  
STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN ASM AND 
LARGE-SCALE MINING 
A second major type of mineral resource conflict is that between ASM and large-scale 
mining. At least in some areas, conflicts between ASM and large-scale mining have 
become entangled in complex ways with those between LGUs and the national 
government, as the presence of ASM can become a factor in its own right fuelling 
localized resistance to large-scale mining. Such is the case in Compostela Valley. As has 
                                                          
82 Interview with municipal government official in Compostela Valley, October 2012. 
83 Interview with provincial treasurer of Compostela Valley province, October 2012. 
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been discussed at length in chapters 3 and 4 in particular, since the 1980s Compostela 
Valley has witnessed a massive expansion of ASM, most of it beyond the formal-
regulatory control of the national government, which consequently brands these ASM-
activities as illegal. One of the main reasons for the persistence of informality is the fact 
that most ASM is now taking place inside large-scale mining concessions, without the 
official consent of the rights-wielding company. These observations feed into allegations 
on the part of ASM-operators that existing regulatory frameworks favor large-scale, 
corporate mining over ASM. As one ASM-financier described the current situation: “For 
us it is like climbing Mount Everest, while for them, they can come in and slide down the 
mountain. The paramilitaries are part of the package deal.”84. Executive Order 79 was 
interpreted as the latest illustration of this government bias against ASM, as it seeks to 
“contain” ASM in officially recognized Minahang Bayan, calling for the creation of a 
“Task Force Against Illegal Mining” (Executive Order No. 79, s. 10, s. 11). In addition, 
mining companies are calling on the MGB to issue stoppage orders to ASM operating 
inside their concession, and are now calling in the assistance from local governments, the 
police, or in some cases even the military to implement these orders. At least in the case of 
Compostela Valley province, however, attempts to root out ASM have hitherto proven 
largely unsuccesful. Here, images of an all-powerful alliance between ‘the government’ 
and corporate mining capital, united in their struggle to root out illegal ASM, fail to do 
justice to how the sector has become firmly embedded in the local institutional fabric, and 
has become intimately entangled with local political interests.  
LOCAL POLITICS AND THE ‘ILLEGAL’ MINING ECONOMY 
In the preceding chapters I have demonstrated how during the volatile 1980s, ASM was 
controlled by indistinct military-commercial networks comprised of police officers, army 
commanders and -intelligence officers, communist rebels and mining financiers. Since 
democratization and decentralization in the early 1990s, some of these actors became 
involved in the local electoral arena, leading to the emergence of a group of ‘miner-
politicians’ that cultivate intimate albeit indistinct connections with ASM-financiers and 
the various armed actors operating in the region, leading to a pervasive blurring of the 
state/non-state divide in what has been described elsewhere as “peculiar coercive 
arrangements” (Hedman & Sidel, 2000). These coercive arrangements, as well as the 
legitimizing powers of the state, have provided local politicians with the leverage 
necessary to expand their personal, fiscal and regulatory control over the purportedly 
‘illegal’ ASM-sector.  
As demonstrated in chapter 5, this mutual entanglement between ASM and local politics is 
particularly evident on the level of the barangay. In addition to high degrees of personal 
                                                          
84 Interview with barangay council member and ASM-financier, Nabunturan, January 2014. 
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involvement in ASM on the part of barangay officials, they have also developed inventive 
ways to extract rents from ASM. More importantly, in several mining areas they are now 
undertaking a range of sophisticated fiscal and administrative interventions in ASM, 
including the registration of tunneling agreements between mining financiers and 
(informal) landowners, mediation in disputes between tunnel- and/or landowners, and the 
issuance of business permits to owners of processing facilities. By the late 2000s, in 
response to a renewed gold rush, provincial authorities have even put up a system of 
checkpoints for the collection of “environmental user’s fees” and “donations”. 
Significantly, while the national government continues to brand the mining activities in 
question as illegal, most of these fiscal-administrative interventions have a legal basis in 
the Local Government Code, and are described in the amended local revenue code of the 
province.  
In recent years provincial authorities have taken this regulatory drive one step further, 
using existing regulatory frameworks for ASM to initiate a bottom-up process of 
formalization. After the provincial mining regulatory board (PMRB) –which effectively 
operates at the behest of the provincial governor– has identified an ASM-area, it will file a 
formal request in the regional MGB-office for the technical and commercial evaluation of 
the area as Minahang Bayan85. According to MGB-officials, ASM-operators will often 
present them documents and tax receipts issued by LGUs to underpin their claims to the 
area in question. However, since most ASM takes place inside large-scale mining 
concessions, even if the area receives a positive evaluation, the company will not be 
willing to consent to the regularization of ASM inside its claim. Hence, the areas in 
question are now categorized as “proposed Minahang Bayan”. A provincial government 
official told the author that the province is now considering an ordinance that would 
enable the official recognition, at least on the level of the province, of Minahang Bayan 
inside large-scale mining concessions without the consent of the company, provided that 
the company “maintains no visible presence on the ground”. Large-scale mining 
companies, on their part, continue to approach the MGB to issue stoppage orders against 
illegal ASM, which are then delivered by local government officials, a representative of 
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and/or by a delegation of state 
security personnel. So far however, these stoppage orders have proven futile, in large part, 
a mining company representative claimed, because “Those delivering the stoppage orders 
are actually those controlling the small-scale mining. They will take a picture standing 
next to the closed tunnel, and one week later it is operating again”86.  
Thus, local politicians have taken center stage in the indistinct politico-military-
commercial networks that reign over ASM, making inventive use of their mandate under 
decentralization to undertake a series of fiscal-administrative interventions in the 
                                                          
85 Interviews in Provincial Agriculturalist Office of Compostela Valley Province, January 2014. 
86 Interview with community relations officer of large-scale mining company, Compostela Valley, January 2014. 
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purportedly “illegal” mining economy, thereby contesting the terms of legality itself. 
Indeed, what is classified as “illegal” by national government actors, may in fact be the 
outcome of an exclusionary legal framework, and may be considered perfectly legitimate 
on the local level (Lahiri-Dutt, 2007). In fact, several ASM-operators did not have the 
slightest idea about national regulatory frameworks, and considered their operations as 
legal because they were sanctioned by local government officials. Based on the analytical 
framework proposed earlier, it could be argued that local miner-politicians have emerged 
as agents of incremental institutional change, capitalizing on the institutional ambiguities 
produced by decentralization to tilt the institutional balance in favor of ASM. On the 
ground, however, these institutional struggles go hand in hand with real-life conflicts over 
access to mineral-yielding land, involving indistinct coalitions of actors connected with 
ASM and/or large-scale mining.  
CONFLICTS OVER ACCESS TO MINERAL WEALTH87 
Diwalwal in Monkayo municipality is the most (in)famous example of conflict following 
the entry of large-scale mining. In the early 1980s ASM-activities similar to those found 
elsewhere in the region began to proliferate in the Diwalwal area. These activities 
underwent a gradual process of capitalization, with Sino-Filipino merchant capital 
investing in the further development of tunneling and processing activities. This gradual 
capitalization went hand in hand with the development of indistinct alliances between 
these mining financiers as well as army commanders, police officers, and communist- and 
Muslim rebels. In time, these groups became embroiled in violent conflicts over 
underground ore bodies. The situation stabilized somewhat in the 1990s, mainly 
(according to local miners) because of the interventions of barangay authorities, under the 
leadership of charismatic barangay captain Franco Tito and his “peace guards”. Whenever 
a conflict emerged between different tunnel owners, barangay authorities would intervene 
to restore order. However, this relative stability provided by the barangay-centered 
regulatory order was upset in the late 1990s, when Semco, a domestic subsidiary of 
Canadian Marcopper Mining, entered the scene. Rather than attempting to wrest control 
away from existing miners, Semco entered into a murky legal arrangement with JB 
Mining, one of the major ASM-groups operating in Diwalwal. Beefed up by its association 
with Semco, JB Mining began to (literally) undermine its competitors, leading to a 
renewed escalation of the dirty underground war, this time pitting informal ASM-
operators—many of whom no longer qualified as ASM given their level of capitalization–
against JB Mining (Gonzales & Conde, 2002). The conflict soon spilled over into the 
political arena: while barangay authorities were widely seen to cater to the interests of 
ASM, municipal politics were dominated by the Brilliantes family, which was in charge of 
                                                          
87 The following accounts are based on scant existing media coverage and a range of interviews inside and outside of 
the mining areas. 
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JB Mining. In response to the rising unrest in Diwalwal and surrounding areas, in 2002 
president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo proclaimed a 8100 hectare ‘Diwalwal mineral 
reservation’ that would be controlled by the Natural Resources Mining Development 
Corporation (NRMDC), the “corporate arm of the DENR” (Bagayaua, 2008). However, 
the government takeover and subsequent militarization of the area failed to defuse 
tensions. Instead, municipal mayor Brillantes was widely seen to be using his mayoral 
prerogatives and allegedly also his contacts in the army (he was a former military 
intelligence officer) to protect his own mining interests and to harass his ASM-foes. In 
2003, mounting tensions culminated in the assassination of the mayor, allegedly by 
elements connected with ASM and the communist rebels of the New People’s Army 
(“Compostela Mayor”, 2003). As will be discussed in more detail below, the enactment of 
the Indigenous People’s Rights Act in 1997 further intensified the conflict, with different 
tribal groups siding with competing mining investors and local politicians. In 2008 the 
Arroyo government unveiled a new plan for the mineral reservation, which would be 
subdivided in 3 zones (Bagayaua, 2008): a “Tribal Mining Area” (TMA), “Mining 
Investment Areas”88, and the Diwalwal gold rush area itself, which was placed under a 
very complex arrangement that ultimately failed to alleviate ASM’s concerns over large-
scale mining expansion. Instead, at several instances state security forces have purportedly 
joined hands with JB Mining’s security guards (the “black ninjas”) to protect JB’s tunnels 
or to disperse protesting small-scale miners. Meanwhile it is a public secret that the 
communist NPA continues to profit handsomely from ASM in the form of revolutionary 
taxes (see ICG, 2011). In this way, the Diwalwal conflict intertwines in complex ways 
with the broader conflict between the Philippine government and the NPA. In recent years, 
tensions in and around the mineral reservation are again on the rise. While the national 
government is beefing up the presence of the army, purportedly to protect local 
communities from ‘extortionist’ communist rebels, ASM and leftist activists decry the 
militarization of Diwalwal, claiming that the army is only there to facilitate a take-over by 
multinational mining interests (these claims surfaced during various interviews, but see 
also “Army deploys”, 2010).  
A second example is that of New Bataan, where, in the mid-2000s, PHILCO mining was 
confronted with a sudden expansion of ASM inside its exploration claim. PHILCO 
responded by beefing up its security forces, and by securing stoppage orders from the 
MGB regional office in Davao City. These orders were delivered to ASM-operators by 
delegations of DENR-staff, municipal and barangay officials, police, and in one instance 
even army personnel. Rather than leading to a stoppage of ASM, however, indistinct 
elements affiliated with ASM and according to some also with the communist NPA started 
harassing (and in one instance killing) PHILCO-guards, and repeatedly torched the 
company’s equipment. The situation was further complicated when in the late 2000s, 
                                                          
88 Those parts of the reservation with low population density that are believed to be highly mineralized, and where 
mining rights would be awarded through competitive tender (Bagayaua, 2008). 
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ASM-operators supported by politicians at the municipal and provincial level, organized 
themselves into an association, and applied for the segregation of a “Minahang 
Camanlangan” (named after the barangay hosting the mining area). By the time of the last 
visit to the area, ASM was still in firm control. And while PHILCO had effectively 
transferred its rights to two other mining companies, Batoto resources and Agusan Metals 
Corporation, these companies did not maintain a significant presence on the ground, and 
the few remaining employees –ironically mostly local landowners who were collecting 
royalties from ASM themselves– admitted that it was very difficult if not impossible for 
the company to operate in the area. 
TOWARDS A WIN-WIN SOLUTION? 
Ultimately, the situation in Compostela Valley is best described as a “strategic stalemate”. 
On the one hand, large-scale mining concessionaires wielding formal mining rights are 
having a hard time to effectively exercise these rights due to the presence of ASM. On the 
other hand, ASM-operators now see their mining rights recognized in local institutional 
arrangements, but face a range of obstacles –not least the overlap with large-scale mining– 
that prevent the official recognition of these rights on the national government level. 
Nearly all actors involved –except (most) large-scale mining companies– now recognize 
the need to move towards a win-win solution. Even MGB-officials in the Davao City 
regional office were not entirely unsympathetic to the idea of working out a solution that is 
acceptable both for ASM and for large-scale mining, mainly because: “It is our job to 
promote mining (…) but now there are too many companies that are just speculating, just 
holding on to their claim as a future asset (…) this is our problem now”89. However, 
important questions remain with regards to the willingness of large-scale mining to move 
towards such a win-win solution, and with regards to who would eventually benefit from 
such a solution. Initial observations suggest that corporate actors are now realigning, 
identifying local agents who can help tilt the institutional balance in their favor. Based on 
the preceding analysis, it should not come as a complete surprise that local politicians 
form one of their key targets, and several politicians previously sympathetic towards ASM 
have now openly aired their support for large-scale mining. Particularly in recent years, 
another important institutional player has entered the scene, namely tribal groups claiming 
priority rights over mineral resources and associated royalties under the Indigenous 
Peoples Rights Act.  
                                                          
89 Interviews in MGB regional office in Davao City, January 2014. 
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THE IPRA AND TRIBAL CONFLICTS OVER 
MINING ROYALTIES  
The legislation of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) in 1997 aroused significant 
opposition, not least on the part of the Philippine Chamber of Mines and the MGB, who 
argued that granting indigenous communities priority rights over their ancestral domain 
and over the (mineral) resources underlying it violated the constitutionally enshrined 
principle of state ownership of public lands and minerals (Eder & Mckenna, 2008). Others 
have drawn attention to the hampered implementation of the IPRA, and how it fits in with 
a broader trend towards the dispossession of indigenous communities by mining 
companies (Holden, Nadeau & Jacobsen, 2011). This section, like the previous one, seeks 
to qualify this dominant analytical focus on dispossession from above, by means of an 
admittedly initial discussion of tribal conflicts over mineral wealth unleashed by the IPRA, 
which can be seen as yet another illustration of the spirit of decentralization. 
THE AHISTORICAL IPRA AND INDIGENOUS ‘COMMUNITIES’ 
To understand the impact of the IPRA on local institutional arrangements, we first need to 
critically evaluate its definition of Indigenous Peoples as “historically differentiated from 
the majority of Filipinos” (Republic Act No. 8371, 1997: s. 3(h)). By invoking an image 
of isolation and uniqueness, this definition obscures a long history of interaction between 
upland pagans and Christian lowlanders, which resulted in a serious distortion of 
traditional indigenous structures –a notoriously indistinct concept to begin with. Even 
prior to the IPRA, the Philippine state undertook various efforts to deal with the upland 
population, including the creation of different special bodies, agencies and programs (Eder 
& McKenna, 2008). Meanwhile increased upland migration on the part of non-indigenous 
settlers, combined with economic modernization, resulted in processes of social 
differentiation across the indigenous / non-indigenous divide (Dressler & Turner, 2008). 
Particularly (but not exclusively) in Mindanao, parts of the upland population were also 
recruited for insurgency or counterinsurgency purposes, spurring further divisions in 
upland communities (Asia Watch Committee, 1992).  
Last but not least, the proliferation of political-administrative (barangay-, municipal, 
provincial and regional) boundaries that cross-cut the ancestral domain had a profound 
impact on indigenous authority structures. Particularly following democratization and 
decentralization in the early 1990s, many datus (the local term for a traditional leader) 
became directly (as candidates) or indirectly (as vote brokers) involved in political-
electoral competition; a trend that was, somewhat paradoxically, encouraged by the 
National Commission of Indigenous Peoples when it called for the mandatory 
representation of indigenous peoples in local legislative councils in 2009 (NCIP 
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administrative order No. 001, s. 2009). As confirmed by various key respondents, this 
created opportunities for local politicians to expand their patronage networks into the 
indigenous community; and for educated, rich, or “brave” tribals to assert themselves as 
datus.  
Ultimately, when NCIP-staff are now talking about “organizing a community” (i.e. 
identifying its leaders and delineating its ancestral domain), they are dealing with an 
upland population divided along the lines of class, clan affiliation, the insurgency-
counterinsurgency divide, and last but not least dynamic political-electoral alliances. 
Given these cross-cutting cleavages, it should not come as a complete surprise that the 
entry of mining and associated royalties entails risks for conflict. 
MINING ROYALTIES AND TRIBAL CONFLICTS IN COMPOSTELA VALLEY 
PROVINCE90 
Gold-rich Diwalwal can again serve as a good empirical illustration. After the enactment 
of the IPRA in 1997, different datus claiming to represent the Mandaya, Mansaka, 
Dibabawon and Manguanggan tribes, started filing overlapping ancestral domain claims 
over the area that contained the Diwalwal gold rush area. These competing tribal groups 
were connected with the different mining groups that were fighting over Diwalwal’s rich 
gold deposits, and that included not only armed actors but also miner-politicians 
(Canuday, 2008). The subsequent nationalization of Diwalwal in 2002 by the Arroyo 
administration went hand in hand with an effort to pacify the indigenous community. In 
close coordination with the different tribal groups, the NCIP started working towards a 
reunification effort, eventually resulting in the issuance of Certificate of Ancestral Domain 
Title 0702-0007 to the ‘four tribes of Monkayo’ (Canuday, 2008). However, while the 
indigenous problem was now legally settled, by no means did this solution end in-fighting 
within the tribal community. Things even got worse after the creation, in 2008, of the 
tribal mining areas (TMA) i.e. those parts of the Diwalwal mineral reservation wherein the 
four tribes of Monkayo could exercise their priority rights. After the four tribes had 
entered into a joint venture with the Philippine Mining Development Corporation and 
started looking for investors, different tribal leaders signed agreements –allegedly “in 
exchange for a signing bonus of millions”91– that covered overlapping areas. The resulting 
competition led to a spate of killings in the tribal community that continues until this day 
(“Mining Firm”, 2011). 
A second example is that of Maco, where royalties from APEX mining –currently the only 
large-scale mining company in Compostela Valley province that is in the production 
                                                          
90 The following accounts are based on a combination of key respondent interviews and scarce (online) media 
coverage. 
91 Interview with tribal leader from Monkayo, Davao City, February 2012. 
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stage– are sowing discord within the Mansaka tribe. In 2003, the NCIP provincial office 
supported the formation of an association that convened indigenous land claimants from 
the different “impact barangays”, or those barangays directly affected by the APEX-
operations. This association, SIMI, was dominated by the Onlos clan, headed by a certain 
datu Onlos. In 2008, after the Mansaka tribe was issued its CADT, APEX started paying 
royalties to both SIMI and MDCI, another organization controlled by Datu Onlos which 
was set up as a vehicle for the redistribution of APEX-royalties over 29 barangays that 
have a Mansaka mandatory representative. In 2010, however, datu Onlos was killed, and 
soon after this a new organization was created with the assistance of NCIP, APEX, and 
last but not least local politicians. While this new organization, MIPADMA, also absorbed 
several MDCI-members, others were sidelined, and there are now several barangays with 
both MDCI- and MIPADMA-aligned datus, with the latter on the receiving end of the 
royalty sharing. As in the Diwalwal case, electoral politics played a key role in sowing 
discord in the tribal community. 2010, the year of datu Onlos’ killing and of MIPADMA’s 
creation, was an important election year, and many MIPADMA-members became acting 
mandatory tribal representatives on the barangay- or municipal level; or at least have a 
clear affiliation with local politicians. Also telling in this regard is the ongoing 
construction (in February 2014) of an 11 million peso (around US$ 250000) tribal hall 
next to the municipal hall.  
To be sure, these tribal conflicts over ancestral domain rights and associated royalties are 
embedded in a broader and much more complex conflict ecology. However, both in Maco 
and in Monkayo the situation at the time of the research was too volatile and sensitive to 
get to the heart of the matter without jeopardizing the security of the researcher or, more 
importantly, that of the respondents; and there was a general reluctance to discuss many of 
the issues at hand. Some tentative and more general observations can nonetheless be made. 
First, these tribal conflicts stand in close connection with political-electoral competition, 
and initial evidence suggests that –in line with the situation in countries such as Ethiopia 
(Hagman & Mulugeta, 2008) and neighboring Indonesia (Schulte Nordholt & van 
Klinken, 2007)– the decentralization of resources on the basis of ethnicity is fostering the 
growth of patronage networks that convene local politicians and ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’. 
Secondly, because several (self-proclaimed) tribal leaders have a longstanding 
involvement in ASM, these tribal conflicts also intertwine with the conflict between ASM 
and large-scale mining described earlier. For example, the late datu Onlos was known to 
be involved in ASM, and was a staunch opponent of the further expansion of large-scale 
mining in Maco (“Auction of Davao”, 2009). Thirdly, these tribal conflicts interact in 
complex ways with the broader conflict between the Philippine government and the 
communist NPA. As one datu from Monkayo stated: “Every tribe has its own security 
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strategy (…) some join the counterinsurgency of the AFP (…) if you don’t join you get 
killed because they say you are a communist”92. 
CONCLUSION 
Building on academic debates on the relationship between decentralization and conflict, I 
developed a conceptual-analytical framework that draws central attention to the ways in 
which decentralization offers opportunities for incremental institutional change, 
understood as a renegotiation of the ways in which power and resources are distributed 
across society. Such a renegotiation of institutional arrangements is a political process par 
excellence, and often goes hand in hand with (armed) conflicts on the ground. This 
analytical approach was then applied to mineral resource governance regimes in the 
Philippines, where various legislative efforts to decentralize control over mineral resource 
wealth to subnational actors co-exist uneasily with the centralist provisions of the 
Philippine Mining Act –purportedly still the basis of mineral resource governance in the 
country. This has given rise to a highly ambiguous institutional arena, wherein a broad 
array of actors are now contesting the redistribution of mineral resource wealth. In an 
attempt to make sense of these complex institutional struggles, three major cleavages were 
identified around which mineral resource conflicts are now crystallizing, namely intra-
government conflicts over fiscal-regulatory authority in the mining sector, conflicts 
between ASM and large-scale mining over access to mineral-yielding land, and conflicts 
between tribal groups seeking to secure ancestral domain rights and associated royalties. 
Hence, rather than increasing sociopolitical stability, seemingly uncoordinated efforts to 
decentralize mineral resource governance have increased local mineral resource conflicts, 
by enabling a broad range of actors to stake competing claims to mineral wealth.  
To be sure, the outcomes of these conflicts over institutional arrangements, while 
increasingly producing violent confrontations on the ground, are not necessarily negative. 
Instead they may produce substantial emancipatory effects, in the form of a redistribution 
of mineral resource rents to a greater number of people. In line with the new “localist 
paradigm” in natural resource management (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011), many would indeed 
consider increased local control over resources –whether in the hands of ASM or 
indigenous communities– to be a good thing. However, while decentralization may have 
offered opportunities for the redistribution of resource wealth in favor of selected local 
actors, two worrying trends are now becoming apparent. 
First, partly as a product of ongoing decentralization efforts, but also as a legacy of a much 
longer history of decentralized statebuilding, local politicians play a key role in existing 
institutional arrangements, and will likely continue to do so in the future. In line with 
                                                          
92 Ibid. 
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concerns raised by critical observers of the decentralization process in other countries, this 
raises important questions with regards to elite capture. These questions are particularly 
relevant when considering a second trend, namely the gradual (re)concentration of control 
over mineral resource wealth. On the one hand, mining companies are slowly adjusting 
their strategies to local institutional realities, by identifying key brokers –particularly local 
politicians and tribal leaders– that can help tilt the institutional balance in their favor. On 
the other hand, as discussed at length in chapters 4, processes of professionalization and 
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CHAPTER 9:  
CONCLUSION 
In this concluding chapter, I aim to bring together the arguments presented in the different 
chapters included in this PhD-thesis into a ‘master narrative’: a series of arguments about 
the state of the ASM-sector in Compostela Valley province. At the same time I will make 
efforts to transcend this more narrow geographical and thematic focus, by considering how 
my research findings speak to a broader research agenda on ASM, on trajectories of state 
formation in the Philippines, and on the interface between broader processes of economic 
and political transformation  
THE ‘MASTER NARRATIVE’: THE STATE OF ASM 
IN COMPOSTELA VALLEY 
Before presenting my key arguments, it is useful to reiterate the overarching research 
questions that were identified in the opening chapter of this PhD-thesis: 
(1) What explains the massive expansion of ASM in Compostela Valley, and its 
transformation from more rudimentary artisanal mining into a heterogeneous sector 
that also includes fairly advanced mining operations? 
(2) With regards to the regulatory situation in ASM: a) What explains the persistence 
of informality; and b) What is the real regulatory situation inside ASM-areas? 
(3) Who benefits and who loses from current (regulatory) realities in the sector? 
In engaging with ongoing debates in the literature on the causal explanations for the 
massive expansion of ASM as a predominantly informal activity, in chapters 3 and 4 I 
have drawn central attention to ASM not merely as a subsistence activity (cf. the dominant 
poverty-driven narrative), but also as a site for accumulation for a nascent class of ASM-
entrepreneurs, and for a heterogeneous group of (armed) rent-seekers. Adopting a critical, 
long-term perspective on shifting strategies of accumulation in the mining sector, I argued 
that the expansion of ASM in Compostela Valley is indicative of a broader process of 
informalization (Meagher, 1995; Tabak & Crichlow, 2000) in the mining sector as a 
whole. More precisely, in response to a profound crisis of accumulation in the mining 
sector, a transition took place away from capital-intensive large-scale mining, towards a 
regime of accumulation built around flexible ASM and the exploitation of informal labour. 
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In chapters 5 to 7, I presented an empirical analysis of regulatory realities in the ASM-
sector. It was demonstrated how, particularly since the democratic transition and 
subsequent decentralization efforts in the early 1990s, local politicians have come to play 
a pivotal role in the regulation of purportedly informal ASM. More precisely, relying on 
the coercive and legitimizing powers of local state institutions, they have initiated a 
process of “informal formalization” (Benjaminsen & Lund, 2003) in local land- and 
mineral tenure regimes. While local politicians now benefit from the presence of ASM as 
a source of fiscal revenues, personal rents, and political legitimacy; I have also 
demonstrated that ASM-financiers (chapter 3), local landowners (chapter 6) and armed 
rent-seekers (chapter 7) equally profit from a local regulatory order that is amenable to the 
persistence- and possibly even the further expansion of ASM. Rather than constituting 
distinct actor groups, these different actors (i.e. politicians, financiers, landowners and 
armed rent-seekers) have come together in what is perhaps best described as “peculiar 
coercive arrangements”  (Hedman & Sidel, 2000) that are sustained by the rents produced 
by informal ASM. I have suggested that these particular regulatory arrangements can be 
seen as an intricate product of a longstanding tradition of decentralized statebuilding 
through local elected politicians, who play vital roles as frontier stabilizers and protégées 
of the stately order (Abinales, 2000; Wong, 2006). However, as demonstrated in chapter 8, 
these regulatory arrangements do not operate in a vacuum. Instead I have drawn attention 
to a major threat from above, in the form of the looming expansion of large-scale mining 
under the tutelage of (sections of) the national elite, which risks undermining the 
institutional arrangements built around informal ASM, and the sociopolitical stability they 
generate. 
Combining these two lines of inquiry –i.e. a critical analysis of shifting regimes of 
accumulation in the mining sector and a historical-institutional analysis of changing 
governance regimes– it can be argued that the informalization of mining has gone hand in 
hand with the emergence of a local regulatory order centered around the bottom-up 
formalization of land- and mineral rights by local politicians. While these regulatory 
arrangements centered around a minimalistic recognition of (mineral) property- and 
associated royalty rights cater to the interests of a heterogeneous local elite that currently 
derives its wealth and power from ASM, they largely ignore the needs of a massive 
informal workforce. While in Compostela Valley alone tens- if not hundreds of thousands 
of people now depend on ASM as their primary if not their only source of income, initial 
observations suggest that this workforce is falling prey to rising rates of exploitation. 
Ultimately, then, the state –understood as a multi-layered and fragmented institutional 
arena punctured with constant references to legality– has played an enabling role in 
processes of informalization in the mining sector (Meagher, 1995), adapting itself to 
shifting strategies of accumulation in the mining sector.  
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THE PITFALLS OF POVERTY-DRIVEN, DUALIST, 
AND POPULIST VIEWS OF ASM 
So what are the implications of these findings for ongoing debates in the ASM-literature? 
In this section I aim to demonstrate how the empirical evidence presented in this PhD-
thesis can serves as a timely qualification of three influential albeit rather simplistic 
narratives about the ASM-sector.  
ASM AS A QUESTION OF SUBSISTENCE AND ACCUMULATION 
A first narrative that has become extremely influential, both in academic- and in 
policymaking circles, is the poverty-driven view of ASM, which essentially treats it as a 
rudimentary subsistence activity practiced by destitute individuals. To account for the 
persistence of informality in the sector, this poverty-driven view is often combined with a 
legalistic focus on entry barriers that prevent poor and uneducated ASM-operators from 
securing a formal mining license. To avoid the pitfalls of an unfettered poverty-driven 
view, I approached the ASM-sector not merely as a subsistence safety net, but also as a 
site for accumulation. Such a perspective on accumulation strategies has exposed 
processes of capitalization within the ASM-sector, and an associated differentiation 
between a massive workforce and a dominant stratum of ASM-entrepreneurs. While 
several of these ASM-entrepreneurs were erstwhile miners who had struck it rich, hinting 
at a degree of social mobility within the workforce (Jønsson & Bryceson, 2009), the large 
majority were outsiders seeking to capitalize on newly emerging opportunities for 
accumulation. 
These critical insights into processes of capitalization, differentiation and accumulation 
have in turn enabled me to better understand the selective nature of existing (analyses of) 
formalization efforts. More precisely, in line with the situation in Tanzania (Fisher, 2007), 
by emphasizing the issuance of mineral property rights, (severely hampered) formalization 
frameworks favor a dominant stratum of ASM-entrepreneurs to the detriment of a massive 
workforce that remains bereft of formal-legal recognition. This observation applies not 
just to the legal frameworks that exist at the national level (chief amongst which Republic 
Act 7076), but also to the local regulatory arrangements that were described in this PhD-
thesis, which are primarily geared towards a minimalistic recognition of (otherwise 
informal) land- and mining rights. As such, my analysis can also be read as an invitation 
for policy-makers to think of more inclusive formalization policies that also target those 
“doing the dirty work” (Verbrugge, 2014).  
The relevance of these findings transcends the confines of Compostela Valley. While the 
province may indeed be somewhat exceptional in terms of the magnitude of its ASM-
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sector, initial indications suggest the sector has undergone a similar (albeit perhaps less 
outspoken) transformation in other countries, including a differentiation between a multi-
layered workforce and a dominant stratum of elite players. There is an urgent need for a 
more systematic analysis of these processes of transformation and differentiation in the 
sector, the various actors enmeshed in them, and the ways in which these actors are 
included or remain excluded from ongoing efforts to formalize the sector. 
MOVING BEYOND DUALIST ASSUMPTIONS 
The poverty-driven view of ASM fits in with a broader narrative of a “dual mining 
economy” (Banchirigah, 2007; Hilson & Gatzinsi, 2014). In line with earlier dualist 
approaches to informal sector activity (ILO, 1972), dualist perspectives posit a rigid 
dichotomy between on the one hand an informal and subsistence-oriented ASM-sector, 
and on the other hand an industrial large-scale mining sector. To be sure, in many 
countries a distinction can indeed be made between more labour-intensive ASM and 
capital-intensive corporate mining practices. However, as argued above, images of an 
entirely informal subsistence economy fail to do justice to the situation in the Philippines, 
where operations of varying sizes now operate with varying degrees of legal recognition 
(cf. Teschner, 2013 on Ghana).  
Furthermore, my long-term perspective on shifting strategies of accumulation in the 
mining sector as a whole has revealed the existence of intricate relationships and 
continuities connecting ASM to large-scale mining. First emerging from the ashes of a 
moribund large-scale mining sector, ASM initially operated in a subordinate position to 
(former) large-scale mining interests, albeit only for a brief period of time. As ASM 
emancipated itself from large-scale mining, and developed its ‘homegrown’ elite that 
pushed ASM far beyond subsistence level, the logic of accumulation in the sector 
continued to revolve around the availability of a massive, cheap and flexible informal 
workforce.  
In recent years, the Philippines have attracted renewed interest on the part of large-scale 
mining companies, who are increasingly venturing into areas with a significant ASM-
presence. Building on my critical analysis of shifting strategies of accumulation in the 
mining sector, it will be particularly interesting to find out whether the renewed expansion 
of large-scale mining will herald a full-blown return to a regime of accumulation built 
around capital-intensive mining, or whether some alternative logic of accumulation will 
develop. In either case, what will be the position of the massive informal workforce that 
currently forms the backbone of the ASM-sector? The situation in Tanzania provides us 
with interesting albeit discouraging insights. Here, the liberalization of the mining sector 
and the subsequent proliferation of large-scale mining concessions had detrimental effects 
on the position of the ASM-workforce. On the one hand, as ASM-claimants started selling 
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their claims to mining companies, the position of those working inside these claims was 
rendered highly uncertain (Fisher, 2007). On the other hand, instead of simply displacing 
ASM and investing in more mechanized operations, many of these companies simply used 
their mining rights to levy rents from ASM, thereby indirectly putting further downward 
pressures on the revenue share of the workers (Chachage, 1995).  
THE PITFALLS OF A POPULIST “RESISTANCE” NARRATIVE  
A third and final perspective on the ASM-sector that has become more influential in recent 
years is a populist narrative which treats ASM as “a strategy of resistance to state mining 
policy and foreign mining operations” (Bush, 2009). In a similar vein, Lahiri-Dutt 
proposes to see informal ASM as “a popular resistance to the official mining economy” 
(Lahiri-Dutt, 2006: 19), with “people’s mines” reflecting “the efforts of communities to 
re-establish rights over local natural resources” (Lahiri-Dutt, 2004: 131). Even within the 
Philippine NGO-community, which has long been known for its virulent anti-mining 
stance, one now encounters NGOs –most of them associated with the left– that strive to 
protect (traditional) small-scale mining communities against the onslaught of corporate 
mining capital, which is said to work in tandem with the ‘neocolonial’ government in an 
effort to dispossess ASM. While a case can indeed be made to protect ASM as a vital 
source of employment, particularly when considering rising levels of youth unemployment 
(Hilson & Osei, 2014), based on the Compostela Valley experience several important 
qualifications can and should be made regarding the pitfalls of a populist narrative.  
For one, undergirding these narratives is a particular representation of ASM-sites as 
homogeneous and harmonious “community economies” (Lahiri-Dutt, 2004) that are 
somehow devoid of internal power struggles and inequalities (Li, 1996). As hopefully 
demonstrated in this PhD-thesis, such an image is extremely problematic, as it glosses 
over complex processes of differentiation and a skewed distribution of risks and benefits 
accross the sector. Uncritical efforts to empower ASM risk exacerbating rather than 
alleviating existing inequities within the sector. 
Meanwhile suggestions that ASM-operators are at risk from being ‘dispossessed from 
above’, by an unholy alliance between ‘the government’ and corporate mining, while not 
entirely false, are nonetheless problematic in the Compostela Valley case. Despite 
repeated claims about the Philippine government’s “mining-based development 
paradigm” (Holden & Jacobsen, 2006), subsequent governments have been blowing hot 
and cold over the future of the mining sector, which is now subject to intense political 
debate both in congress and in civil society writ large. Furthermore, claims that ‘the 
government’ supports large-scale mining to the detriment of ASM neglect how local 
politicians emboldened by decentralization have actively resisted the entry of large-scale 
mining projects (Holden & Jacobsen, 2006), and are at least in Compostela Valley relying 
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on the state as a coercive force and a legitimizing repertoire to protect informal ASM. 
Here, the state no longer emerges as a monolithic entity –in this case captured by 
multinational mining interests– but as a multi-layered and fragmented arena, underpinned 
by constant references to the “idea of the state” (Lund, 2006). As demonstrated in chapter 
8, it is within this fragmented ‘state arena’ that various actors are now capitalizing on 
inconsistencies and overlaps in legal frameworks to stake (competing) claims to mineral 
resource wealth. It is here, in this fragmented institutional space permeated with references 
to the state, that room for agency exists, and where even the terms of legality itself have 
now come to be contested. At the same time serious concerns can and should also be 
raised over who it is that wins and who loses from instances of negotiability (Peters, 
2004); with local politicians currently at the commanding realms of a political economy 
that ultimately revolves around the exploitation of an informal workforce. 
ASM AS AN ANALYTICAL ENTRY POINT INTO 
PROCESSES OF POLITICAL-ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATION 
Finally, this PhD-thesis can be read as an illustration of how ASM can serve as an 
analytical entry point for understanding trends in the broader political economy. In the 
existing literature, while increased attention is now being paid to the complex and multi-
layered struggles between ASM and large-scale mining (e.g. Fisher, 2008; Luning, 2008; 
Geenen & Claessens, 2013; Geenen, 2014), mining areas still emerge as places of 
exception that are somehow disconnected from trends in wider society. In what follows, I 
will identify three ways in which my findings about the ASM-sector speak to ongoing 
debates on local politics, trajectories of state formation, and broader processes of political-
economic transformation. 
PREDATION AND RECIPROCITY IN LOCAL POLITICS 
By and large, three major perspectives on local politics in the Philippines can be 
distinguished in the academic literature (for a more elaborate discussion see Kawanaka, 
2007; Quimpo, 2008). A first one, the patron-client, factional framework, emphasizes the 
existence of (1) mutually beneficial but highly unequal patronage relations between local 
politicians and voters; and (2) factional competition between vertically organized 
patronage networks centered around these local politicians as representatives of broader 
family dynasties and -alliances (Landé, 1968). A second approach emphasizes the 
predatory and coercive character of local politics, with local ‘bosses’ (Sidel, 1999) seen to 
capitalize on the predatory potential of state institutions to wield control in the local 
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political economy. A third approach, which has become more influential in recent years, 
focuses on the role of local strongmen-politicians as statebuilders. Instead of highlighting 
the centrality of coercion, scholars like Abinales (2000) and Wong (2006) emphasize the 
importance of accommodation, with local strongmen relying on a combination of 
patronage, paternalism, and the legitimizing and coercive powers of the state to maintain 
social stability and to espouse the symbols of the democratic state. In this way, local 
strongmen contribute to the resilience of the state as a cognitive and normative order in 
society.   
To some extent the research findings presented in this PhD-thesis give credence to all 
three approaches. For one, barangay politics in many mining areas visited throughout my 
PhD-research continue to be dominated by factional competition-, or in some cases an 
elite pact, between landowning families who have increasingly diversified into ASM. 
Furthermore, local politics still exhibits coercive and even predatory traits, with barangay 
officials relying on the (purportedly unarmed) CVOs to maintain peace and order and to 
protect their personal political and commercial (mining) interests, while also cultivating 
indistinct relationships to a range of other armed rent-seekers. Thirdly, however, and this 
is arguably the most important contribution of this PhD-thesis to ongoing debates on state-
society relations in the Philippines, I have drawn attention to an important degree of 
reciprocity between local politicians and ASM-interests. Rather than revolving simply 
around patronage, this reciprocity has become institutionalized in a local regulatory order 
that is conducive to the survival and arguably even to the further expansion of ASM as a 
vital source of rents, and that is legitimated through constant implicit and explicit 
references to state-sanctioned legality as a vital legitimizing repertoire. 
DECENTRALIZATION AS A GAME-CHANGER 
In the broader literature on local politics and state-society relations in the Philippines, 
surprisingly little attention has hitherto been paid to the impact of decentralization. Where 
the local government code of 1991 (the centerpiece of decentralization in the Philippines) 
is explicitly discussed, it is usually in the more ‘formalistic’ public administration 
literature, which tends to treat it as a radical break with a longstanding history of political-
administrative centralism, which was taken to the extremes during the Marcos martial law 
regime (e.g. Guevara, 2000; Turner, 2006; Yilmaz & Venegupal, 2013).  
In this PhD-thesis I adopted a different stance, building on critical historical-institutional 
analyses that demonstrate how since the advent of US colonialism, the Philippines has 
been characterized by a high degree of de facto decentralization, with local politicians 
retaining a high degree of autonomy from Manila (Abinales, 2000; Hutchcroft, 2001). 
Seen from this perspective, decentralization is best seen as a continuation, and quite 
possibly even a radicalization, of this longstanding tradition of decentralized statebuilding. 
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Indeed, it has been demonstrated that most of the fiscal-regulatory interventions 
undertaken by local politicians in the purportedly informal ASM-sector refer –correctly or 
not– to the local government code.  
In many ways the situation in the decentralized Philippine polity is reminiscent of that in 
nearby Indonesia, where decentralization –as part of the broader Reformasi reform 
movement– has opened up opportunities for “provincial middle classes” to assert 
themselves in the broader political economy (Van Klinken, 2014), capitalizing on the state 
apparatus as a vital “structure of accumulation” (Harriss-White, 2003). In fact, based on 
chapter 8, it can be argued that ASM-elites in Compostela Valley are using local state 
institutions as an instrument in a broader institutional struggle over mineral resource 
access.  
ASM AS INDICATIVE OF BROADER PROCESSES OF POLITICAL-
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
Finally, in contrast with images of the Philippines –or at least those regions outside of the 
peninsula’s major urban centers– as a predominantly ‘rural’ country, dominated by 
smallholder agriculture and large-scale landholdings, what is commonly referred to as ‘the 
province’ has undergone a dramatic socio-economic transformation. In many ways the 
expansion of ASM is indicative of these broader processes of transformation. The initial 
expansion of ASM as a fairly rudimentary activity was in large part a product of the 
declining viability of (upland) agriculture, which resulted from a combination of 
demographic growth and the expansion of extractive industries like logging, mining, and 
plantation agriculture (Cramb et al., 2009). However, since the 1980s, the ASM-sector has 
attracted the attention of a more heterogeneous array of actors, including not only poor 
rural dwellers in dire need of income opportunities, but also local middle classes and 
Chinese merchant elites that have started to diversify into ASM for accumulation 
purposes. Hence, the expansion of ASM is not simply indicative of broader processes of 
livelihood diversification (Bryceson, 2002) and possibly even de-agrarianization –i.e. a 
broader move away from agriculture towards a range of nonfarm activities– but also of the 
socially differentiated character of these processes, which offer opportunities for some to 
the detriment of others (Rigg, 1998). 
In parallel with these processes of socio-economic transformation, different observers 
have noted rising degrees of human mobility (Kelly, 2011). Indeed, for countless 
respondents, their involvement in the ASM-sector fits in with a much longer trajectory of 
livelihood change, which not only involves moving back and forth between different jobs 
with varying degrees of legal recognition, but also entailed a significant degree of 
geographical mobility. Within the ASM-sector as well, one has seen the emergence of a 
massive group of migrant miners that move between different employers and different 
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mining areas, constantly on the lookout for (good) labour opportunities. Just like economic 
diversification impacts on processes of economic differentiation –and vice versa– spatial 
mobility interacts in complex ways with social mobility (Kaufman et al., 2004). This 
interface between human and social mobility is a particularly promising area for future 
inquiry, both in the ASM-sector (Jønsson & Bryceson, 2009) and beyond (Kaufman et al., 
2004),.  
Increased economic diversity and human mobility induced by shifting economic frontiers 
also have a profound impact on human settlement patterns. In fact, ASM-areas like the 
Diwalwal gold rush area depicted on the front cover could be described as an expression 
of “the thoroughgoing urbanization” of rural Southeast Asia (Jones, 1997). These 
processes of (peri-)urbanization upset traditional and almost intuitive distinctions between 
rural areas with a primarily agricultural and natural resource-based economy, and urban 
areas with service-based economies (Lerner et al., 2011). Instead, what we are witnessing 
is a pervasive blurring of the rural-urban divide, both in economic, physical, and human 
terms (Rigg, 1998).  
Ultimately, therefore, this PhD-thesis should be read as a critical exploration of how the 
expansion of ASM as a labour-intensive and primarily informal activity, and as a 
particular expression of these dramatic processes of socio-economic transformation, 
interacts with broader trajectories of sociopolitical change. More in particular, it has been 
argued that the gradual expansion of ASM into the “unruly” uplands (Scott, 1998) has 
gone hand in hand with the gradual emergence of governance arrangements centered 
around local state institutions, which facilitate accumulation for particular actors (in this 
case indistinct networks that connect local politicians to ASM-financiers, royalty-
receiving landowners and armed rent-seekers) to the detriment of others (a massive 
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